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It is illegal to speak over the airwaves without a broadcast license.
The FCC grants those licenses, and decides whether they will be renewed,
on the basis of a vague 'p7ublic interest" standard. The resulting system of
broadcast regulation conflicts, starkly and gratuitously, with ordinary free
speech philosophy. In this Article, the author argues that that inconsist-
ency is crucially linked to inadequacies in free speech theory itself
Conventional free speech theory ignores the extent to which imbalances of
private power limit freedom of expression. It presupposes that public dis-
course takes place on a rational plane. The author explores the link
between the philosophical failings of broadcast regulation and the empiri-
cal failings offree speech theory by identifying competing legal visions that
underlie discussions of broadcasting and freedom of speech. The first of
these visions, which forms the bases for ordinary free-speech philosophy,
emphasizes hard-edged rules, individualism, a belief in overall private
autonomy, and a sharp public-private distinction. The second, at the heart
of our broadcast regulatory system, emphasizes situationally sensitive stan-
dards, altruism, the pervasive role of the government in structuring private
ordering, and the pervasiveness of dependence and constraint. These com-
peting visions, the author submits, are fundamentally irreconcilable; our
speech regulatory law is driven by the contradiction between them.
INTRODUCTION
The field of broadcast regulation has seemed, of late, to be slipping
into constitutional chaos. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has repealed the "fairness doctrine"-a regulatory mainstay since
before there was an FCC-calling it unconstitutional.1 The Supreme
Court decision upholding the fairness doctrine, the FCC blithely stated,
"cannot be reconciled with well-established constitutional precedent."2
A D.C. Circuit decision a few years ago took the position that the entire
t Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. 1980, Harvard College;
J.D. 1983, Columbia Law School. I owe thanks to Frederick Schauer, Robert Post, Avery Katz,
Jonathan Entin, Jeffrey Rachlinski, William Marshall, Robert Sedler, Leroy Lamborn, and the
Research Group on Diversification of Media and Diversification of Regulation for their helpful
comments on drafts of this Article. Most of all, though, I owe thanks to Jessica Litman, who read
all drafts and-every time-told me things I did not want to hear.
1. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987) (concluding that the fairness doctrine, on
its face, violates the First Amendment and contravenes the public interest), aff'd on narrower
grounds, 867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
2. Id. at 5056 (discussing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
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basis for our broadcast regulatory scheme is incoherent.' Courts have
seemed eager to strike down as unconstitutional federal statutes regulat-
ing broadcasting;4 Presidents Reagan and Bush vetoed bills on the same
ground.' The cable television regulatory scheme has been the subject of
especially punishing judicial attack.6 Academics have joined the
3. Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (arguing that the Court's rationale for greater content regulation of broadcast than of print
media rests on a "distinction without a difference ... lead[ing] to strained reasoning and artificial
results"), cerL denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
4. See, eg., Beach Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking
down, as unconstitutional, statutory direction that certain satellite master antenna TV facilities be
subject to local cable franchise requirement), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993); Edge Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1904 (4th Cir. 1992) (striking down, as unconstitutional,
statutory restrictions on broadcast of lottery information and advertisements), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696
(1993); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (striking down, as
unconstitutional, legislation mandating that the FCC enforce a ban of all radio and television
broadcasts of "indecent" materials), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992); News Am. Publishing v.
FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (striking down, as unconstitutional, legislation forbidding
extension of waivers of newspaper-television cross-ownership rule); Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v.
United States, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12806 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 1993) (striking down, as
unconstitutional, three provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, No. 92-1751-A, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11822 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 1993) (striking down, as unconstitutional, legislation prohibiting
telephone companies from offering video programming within their service areas); see also Preferred
Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1411 & n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that
section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act would be invalid if read, as the legislative
history provides, to authorize exclusive cable franchising), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488
(1986).
5. See 138 CONG. REc. HI1477 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (President Bush vetoing the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, arguing in part that its "must carry"
provisions were unconstitutional); Memorandum of Disapproval for the Children's Television Act of
1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1456 (Nov. 5, 1988) (President Reagan vetoing the Children's
Television Act of 1988, arguing that it would violate the First Amendment); Veto of the Fairness in
Broadcasting Act of 1987, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 715 (June 19, 1987) (President Reagan
vetoing the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, arguing that it is "antagonistic to the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the First Amendment"). President Bush invoked the First Amendment in
withholding his approval from the Children's Television Act of 1990, which became law without his
signature. See Statement on the Children's Television Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1611-12 (Oct. 17, 1990).
6. See, e.g., Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (striking
down FCC "must carry" rules requiring operators to transmit local over-the-air television broadcast
signals as violative of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV,
Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Preferred
Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the city could
not, consistently with the First Amendment, limit access to one region of the city to a single cable
television company if public utility facilities in that region were physically capable of
accommodating more than one system), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978) (striking down FCC regulations imposing
mandatory channel capacity, equipment, and access rules as unauthorized and probably
unconstitutional), aff'd on narrower grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (striking down FCC pay cable rules as unsupported by evidence,
unauthorized by law, and unconstitutional), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Daniels Cablevision,
Inc. v. United States, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12806 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 1993) (striking down, as
unconstitutional, three provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, No. 92-1751-A, 1993 U.S. Dist.
1104
1993] BROADCASTING AND SPEECH 1105
onslaught. Some have attacked specific aspects of the regulatory
scheme,7 while others have suggested that the entire American broadcast
regulatory system is hopelessly in conflict with core First Amendment
values and should be discarded.8
LEXIS 11822 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 1993) (striking down, as unconstitutional, legislation prohibiting
telephone companies from offering video programming within their service areas); Century Fed.,
Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1552 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (concluding that the city's access
channel, universal service, and state-of-the-art requirements violated the First Amendment); Pacific
West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that exclusive
cable franchising scheme violated cable operator's First Amendment rights); Group W Cable, Inc. v.
City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo
Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that exclusive cable franchising scheme violated
the First Amendment). But see Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879
F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a cable franchise agreement), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d
711 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the city's de facto exclusive franchise),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119
(7th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court's rejection, on motion for preliminary injunction, of First
Amendment challenge to cable regulatory scheme); Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981) (reversing preliminary injunction, based on the First
Amendment, blocking city's exclusive cable franchising scheme), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001
(1982); Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to "must carry" provisions of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1993) (No. 93-44); Erie
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to city's franchise fee and "public access" requirements), aff'd on narrower
grounds, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I.
1983) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to "public access" requirement), vacated as moot, 773
F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
7. See, e.g., Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership
Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1989) (attacking FCC ownership rules as constitutionally
suspect); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional
Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (arguing that the fairness doctrine is
incoherent and unworkable).
8. See, e.g., JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1991) (arguing that only a property rights model for broadcast regulation can ensure
adequate protection for freedom of speech and press); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987) (contending that broadcast licensing is
unjustifiable and has provided a vehicle for blatant content censorship); MATTHEW L. SPITZER,
SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND
BROADCAST (1986) (arguing that neither economic nor psychological rationales support differential
treatment of print and broadcast media); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 209 (1982) (urging "that the perception of
broadcasters as community trustees . . . be replaced by a view of broadcasters as marketplace
participants"); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum,
33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 137-38 (1990) (arguing that the interference rationale for broadcast licensing is
nonsensical); William T. Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC, 38
EMORY L.J. 715 (1989) (arguing that the current regulatory scheme, under which the FCC exercises
broad "public interest" power, is based on a misinterpretation of the Communications Act of 1934);
Laurence H. Winer, The New Media Technologies and the Old Public Interest Standard, 29
JURIMETRICS J. 377 (1989) (concluding that the public interest standard for broadcast media should
be discarded). All of these authors agree that our broadcast regulatory system is fundamentally
misguided; they do not all agree on what we should do with it now, sixty-five years after the Radio
Act of 1927 set us on this course.
Other academics, by contrast, argue that we should extend the current broadcast regime. See,
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Our broadcast regulatory scheme is certainly vulnerable to attack.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) distributes a limited
number of broadcast licenses to selected individuals and corporations
based on its determination of the "public interest." The FCC has
declared it illegal for any unlicensed entity to engage in mass communi-
cation over the airwaves. This is all rather odd. Ordinary First
Amendment philosophy strongly disfavors government licensing of
speakers;9 the broadcast regulatory system, by contrast, embraces such
licensing. The Supreme Court first justified this system with reference to
"the problem of interference": because of the danger of competing
broadcasters interfering with one another, "if there is to be any effective
communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be
barred from the airwaves."10 That explanation, though, has been the tar-
get of withering attack: "Economists, political scientists and lawyers
generally agree" that the interference rationale for public-interest licens-
ing is "nonsensical."'" It is "simply silly"; 2 it "has worn so thin that
continuing to refute it would be gratuitous."' 3
As a result, some commentators describe the 1927 decision to create
a government agency to regulate broadcasting through public-interest
eg., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 289 (1992) ("It is worthwhile to
consider ... a compulsory hour of public affairs programming per evening.... content review of
children's television by nonpartisan experts, or guidelines to encourage attention to public issues and
diversity of view."). Substantive proposals for greater regulation, however, are less destabilizing
than are arguments that our entire broadcast regulatory scheme is fundamentally unconstitutional.
They typically can be made within the ruling constitutional paradigm for broadcasting. See, e.g.,
Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297
(1990) (concluding that a blanket prohibition of "indecent" radio and television comports with
constitutional standards), vacated sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504
(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992).
9. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (striking down a statute on the
ground that it effectively imposed a licensing system on newspaper owners and publishers who
charged official misconduct).
10. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969). It is well-accepted that
[b]roadcasting is the transmission of electromagnetic waves over the radio spectrum.
When more than one station in a particular geographical area simultaneously attempts to
use the same piece of spectrum space, the result is chaos. Thus, for the spectrum to have
reliable utility, the right to exclusive use of a portion [of the spectrum] must be protected.
BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 126 (1976). According to
proponents of the interference rationale, in light of the physical scarcity of the broadcast spectrum,
"[g]overnment allocation and regulation of broadcast frequencies are essential"; and given "the need
for such allocation and regulation . . .nothing in the First Amendment .. . prevent[s] the
Commission from allocating licenses so as to promote the 'public interest.'" FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978).
11. Hazlett, supra note 8, at 137-38 (footnotes omitted); see also LEE C. BOLLINOER, IMAGES
OF A FREE PRESS 87-88 (1991) ("It is a decisive fact about broadcast regulation that the primary
rationales used to justify that system ... are illogical.").
12. L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Communications and the First Amendment: An Overview, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 53, 69 (1992).
13. Daniel D. Polsby, Candidate Access to the Air: The Uncertain Future of Broadcaster
Discretion, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 223, 257-58.
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allocation14 as a mistake.1 5 These critics suggest that the right to use the
frequency spectrum should have been treated as a simple property right,
bought and sold on the market, and subject to common-law property
rules.16 That, after all, is the way we distribute the right to communicate
in print. We allow people to own the resources of communication, rather
than allocating them administratively.17 Regulating broadcast via a
property-rights system, critics say, would have been both consistent with
First Amendment values and economically efficient.1 8 Our current sys-
tem, they contend, is neither. 19
The constitutional attacks on our broadcast regulatory system have
force. Ordinary First Amendment jurisprudence insists that if the gov-
ernment must engage in licensing, it may not rely on informal, vague, or
discretionary criteria and procedures.2" Licensing criteria must be sharp-
edged and objective.21 As a general matter, the government may not reg-
14. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (superseded 1934). Before 1927, the
Secretary of Commerce exercised some supervision over broadcasting but had little real statutory
authority. See generally POWE, supra note 8, at 54-60 (detailing the Secretary's attempts to regulate
broadcasting under the Wireless Ship Act of 1910 and the Radio Act of 1912). The 1927 Radio Act
was superseded by the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1988).
15. See, ag., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 108-50 (1983). Others call
it a raw power grab. See, eg., Hazlett, supra note 8 at 152-65 (arguing that the Radio Act of 1927
departed from ordinary First Amendment principles in a self-conscious attempt to benefit powerful
incumbent radio broadcasters and members of Congress at the expense of weaker broadcasters,
would-be broadcasters, consumers, and the U.S. treasury).
16. The leading article supporting this position is Ronald H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
17. If we were to regulate print as we do broadcast, we might establish a Federal Paper
Commission, with members appointed by the President, with the job of allocating the right to
communicate in print (or perhaps allocating newsprint itself) among the populace without regard to
who owns what. See Jonathan Weinberg, Questioning Broadcast Regulation, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1269, 1271-72 (1988) (book review). Instead, we rely on a property-rights system: in order to write
my thoughts on a piece of paper, copy the paper, and distribute the copies to others, I must first own
the paper and the copier, or have permission from their owner(s) to use them. These rules structure
our mass communications system in far-reaching ways: only those who own paper, photocopiers,
printing presses, and the like, and those operating at their sufferance, can engage in mass
communications. See infra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
18. On economic efficiency, see Coase, supra note 16, at 18:
Quite apart from the malallocations which are the result of political pressures, an
administrative agency which attempts to perform the function normally carried out by the
pricing mechanism operates under two handicaps. First of all, it lacks the precise
monetary measure of benefit and cost provided by the market. Second, it cannot, by the
nature of things, be in possession of all of the relevant information possessed by the
managers of every business which uses or might use radio frequencies, to say nothing of the
preferences of consumers for the various goods and services in the production of which
radio frequencies could be used.
See also id. at 27 ("It is sometimes implied that the aim of regulation in the radio industry should be
to minimize interference. But this would be wrong. The aim should be to maximize output.").
19. See generally sources cited supra note 8.
20. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
21. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2401-02 (1992).
Government licensing of speakers in accordance with vague or uncertain standards generally violates
the First Amendment because it "makes it difficult to distinguish... between a licensor's legitimate
denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial power," and intimidates would-be speakers
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
ulate speech on the basis of its content; in the rare cases in which content
restrictions are allowed, they must be clear and specific. 22 The broadcast
regulatory system, however, is essentially defined by vague and inscruta-
ble standards used to control both the identity of the persons licensed to
own stations23 and the content of what those persons may say.24 While
our First Amendment philosophy decries vagueness and discretion in
government regulation of speech, the broadcast regulatory system posi-
tively celebrates them. While First Amendment jurisprudence denies
government the power to license speakers (or to reward or punish their
speech) on the basis of its own views as to what private speech would best
serve the "public interest," the broadcast regulatory system places that
government power at its core. The interference rationale cannot justify
any of this.
The inconsistency of our regulatory scheme with First Amendment
philosophy, however, is not the end of the story. In this Article, I take
the argument a step further: I believe that while our broadcast regula-
tory scheme is fundamentally flawed, the situation is more complicated
than the critics of broadcast regulation have allowed.25 It is complicated
in part because our freedom-of-speech philosophy, which I have
described as inconsistent with our broadcast regulatory system, itself
conflicts with much of what we know about the world. That philosophy
is rooted in the notion that we process speech on a rational level, "that
there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opin-
ions and rational conduct,"2 6 and that we can thus properly treat speech
as a competition of ideas in a metaphorical marketplace. It further
assumes that this rational competition of ideas is substantially unaffected
by the huge disparities in economic resources available to various speak-
ers and proponents of different views.
None of these assumptions, however, is completely true. Our public
debate is to a large extent "dominated, and thus constrained, by the same
into "censoring their own speech." City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750,
757-58 (1988).
22. See, eg., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (striking down a state flag-misuse statute as
vague).
23. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) (setting
out criteria governing FCC comparative licensing process). See generally infra text accompanying
notes 66-109.
24. See, eg., Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049 (1987) (stating that the FCC's
"fairness doctrine," in effect for over 50 years, "necessarily involves a vague standard, the
application and meaning of which is hard to predict"), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). See generally infra text accompanying notes 110-32.
25. Cf Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1976) ("The very weakness of [the
arguments supporting current broadcast regulation] suggests that there is something more here than
first meets the eye.").
26. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 24 (Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1956) (1859).
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forces that dominate social structure."27 It is doubtful that the market-
place of ideas meaningfully exposes all ideas to scrutiny; the system is too
pervasively dominated by large commercial gatekeepers that are unlikely
to give time to less-conventional or offensive views.28 Moreover, individ-
uals' reactions to speech are largely determined by experience, psycho-
logical propensities, societal roles, half-submerged prejudices, and
socialization.2 9 The packaging and frequency of messages may be more
persuasive than the rational force of their arguments. The emotive and
experiential impact of messages often may be more important than their
rational impact.30
I propose in this Article that the two problems I have discussed-
the inconsistency of our broadcast regulatory system with core First
Amendment philosophy, and the fact that that philosophy itself lacks
factual mooring-are linked. Broadcast regulation is marked by a cru-
cial procedural failing-it relies on ad hoc, situationally sensitive judg-
ments by regulators seeking to advance a vaguely defined "public
interest." Ordinary freedom-of-speech philosophy is marked by a sub-
stantive failing-it refuses to recognize the ubiquity of inequality and pri-
vate power as a limitation on freedom. Relying on insights developed by
authors associated with critical legal studies, I will argue that the respec-
tive failings of our broadcast regulatory and First Amendment philoso-
phy are central to the link between them. They are, I suggest, two sides
of a single coin.
Our freedom-of-speech philosophy can be seen as reflecting a larger
worldview emphasizing individualism and a sharp public-private dis-
tinction. In this worldview, the private sphere is the natural home of
individual freedom, and the government should not intervene in that
sphere except in exceptional circumstances. Values are for each individ-
ual to choose; they are neither objective nor communally determined.
Paternalism has no place in government decisionmaking. The law
should restrain government arbitrariness and bias through clear, black-
letter rules.
In contrast, our system of broadcast regulation can be seen as
reflecting a competing worldview. That worldview emphasizes the com-
munity rather than the individual. It stresses that government plays a
27. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781, 786 (1987); accord Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1985); see
also CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 201-21 (1977) (arguing that the business
elite molds public opinion through the media).
28. See TODD GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 92-93, 189-90, 192, 254-55 (1983) (discussing
television networks' reluctance to air controversial programs); EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM
CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 16-18
(1988) (emphasizing advertiser influence over broadcast programming).
29. See infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
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pervasive role in structuring private ordering, and that dependence and
constraint characterize the so-called "private" sphere. Because, under
this approach, values are objective or communally determined, govern-
ment paternalism is often appropriate. Government actors should apply
the law through individualized, situationally-sensitive decisionmaking.
The contradiction between the two worldviews I have described
helps explain why the conflict between ordinary free speech philosophy
and our system of broadcast regulation is inescapable: our overall speech
law is glaringly schizoid. Both our broadcast regulation rules and our
conflicting First Amendment philosophy reflect important but incom-
plete visions found throughout our legal system. These two visions can-
not be reconciled, but neither can they be wholly suppressed. As a result,
while calls to "fix" our broadcast system by making broadcast more like
print have substantial merit, doing so will not make the broadcast sys-
tem's problems go away. No change in the law could do that.
In Part I of this Article, I explain the inconsistency of our system of
broadcast regulation with ordinary First Amendment philosophy; in Part
II, I discuss the inadequacy of that philosophy itself. In Part III, I
attempt to situate both our free speech philosophy and our system of
broadcast regulation within the larger framework of the competing
worldviews I have discussed. In Part IV, I take a look at the doctrinal
consequences of all this, asking if there is any way to build a workable
regulatory structure for the electronic mass media.
I
PUBLIC-INTEREST LICENSING AND THE FREE SPEECH
TRADITION
A. A Quick Tour of Free Speech Philosophy
I will argue in this Part that public-interest licensing of broadcast
speakers is inconsistent with usual First Amendment philosophy. To
make that point, I will start by setting out a brief and incomplete sketch
of that philosophy. I will return to that sketch later;31 my goal now is
simply to introduce a few relevant themes.3"
Ordinary First Amendment philosophy emphasizes the ability
of every citizen to speak freely in the "marketplace of ideas"; government
has only a limited prerogative to interfere with that speech. Public
debate must incorporate a wide diversity of speakers and views.
Government may play no role that allows it the opportunity to limit or
skew that diversity. The resulting marketplace of ideas is a forum in
which individuals, and society as a whole, can decide what is true and
31. See infra text accompanying notes 374-81.
32. See generally Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1282-85 (discussing ideals underlying First
Amendment doctrine).
1110 [Vol. 81:1101
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right.33 Free speech, further, does not merely advance the discovery of
truth; it fosters political self-government.3 4 Some see it as definitional to
the process of self-determination that constitutes democracy.35 Some see
it as arming the people with the information and ideas that they need to
govern themselves. 36 Some see it as providing a check on the state appa-
ratus for the benefit of a citizenry not involved in the daily workings of
government.3 7 In any event, government may not assert any control over
the processes of mass communication that would bias those processes,
and it may not limit the agenda of public debate: that debate must be
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. ' '38
This view of freedom of speech incorporates a vision of the citizenry
as ultimate sovereign, for whose sake open debate must be preserved, and
of the government as untrustworthy, insecure, and inclined to suppress
criticism in covert or overt ways.39 That vision has important doctrinal
consequences.40 The government may not, without good and sufficient
reason, restrict individuals' ability to speak.4' Such an action, even if
designed to serve legitimate goals and neutral as to the content of the
speech, must bear a burden of justification under the First Amendment.42
33. See infra notes 176-92 and accompanying text. For alternative visions of free speech
focusing on the right of individual self-expression, see generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) (advocating a liberty-based theory of the First
Amendment); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
4-7 (1966) (focusing on the right of the individual to self-fulfillment through speech); infra note 179
and accompanying text.
34. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771-72, 776-77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1936). See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964) (confirming First Amendment protection of paid political advertisements).
35. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 267, 279-83 (1991).
36. See Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), quoted in Eric G. Olsen,
Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEx. L. REv. 505, 506 (1979).
37. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521; cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that the "dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit ...
governmental suppression of embarrassing information").
38. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
39. See BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 20.
40. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan
and the United States, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 615, 643-45 (1991) (discussing the implications for
broadcast regulation of U.S. constitutional philosophy).
41. See, eg., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (striking down a ban on picketing on
the sidewalks in front of the U.S. Supreme Court building).
42. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding city regulation of
public music concerts after finding the regulations content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down content-
neutral ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills). See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46 (1987). The government may preclude individual
speech on, or using, government property, assuming that that property is not deemed a "public
forum," but even there the government regulation must be substantively reasonable and viewpoint-
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1101
Government restrictions of speech on the basis of content are partic-
ularly disfavored. 3 The government has little power to restrict speech
merely because the communicative impact of that speech may be harm-
ful. The government may restrict speech based on its communicative
impact when necessary "to further a state interest of the highest order, '
but may not do so simply to uphold its own general notion of the public
interest or to advance its own values.4 5
Further, the government may not, as a general matter, restrict indi-
viduals' speech because of things they have said in the past 46 or things
they propose to say in the future.47 Thus, in 1931 the Supreme Court
struck down a law allowing state authorities to secure an injunction
against the publication of a "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory"
newspaper.48 The publisher of such a newspaper would have been sub-
ject to suit for damages under then-existing constitutional doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Court said, to allow the government to seek a court
order forbidding further publication would be "the essence of
neutral. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (upholding, as reasonable, a
regulation prohibiting solicitation of funds on Postal Service premises).
43. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHi. L. REV. 20, 29-35 (1975) (arguing for the use of the equality principle to protect against
content censorship); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (exploring the content-based/content-neutral distinction under the First
Amendment). But see Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1657 (1987) (arguing that constitutional libel law should make distinctions based on
content).
44. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (government may
punish a speaker for "words... intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder").
Modern First Amendment philosophy thus rejects the approach of cases such as Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919), that the
government may criminalize speech with the "natural tendency and reasonably probable effect" of
impeding government objectives. Justice Kennedy has questioned whether even compelling
justification and narrow tailoring should be sufficient to save a content-based restriction outside of
"historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar," Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York
State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 514 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), but
he had to twist into a pretzel to avoid the consequences of those words in Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.
Ct. 1846, 1858-59 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (upholding ban on electioneering outside polling
places).
45. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959) (striking down
a statute that prohibited the exhibition of films portraying "acts of sexual immorality . . . as
desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior") (quotation omitted). But see City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding an ordinance restricting the location of adult
theaters); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (approving an order enjoining the
exhibition of "obscene, pornographic films").
46. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985)
(construing a statute to avoid government registration of certain investment advice newsletters).
47. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing
injunction sought by the United States against publication of the Pentagon Papers); id. at 714-15
(Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 724-25 (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 730 (White, J., concurring).




Licensing schemes, indeed, are inherently suspect even when they
do not incorporate explicit content distinctions. In 1938, the Supreme
Court considered a city ordinance forbidding any person to distribute
written material without first obtaining permission from a government
official. The Court held that the ordinance "strikes at the very founda-
tion of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and
censorship."50
Finally, to the extent that the government can at all limit individu-
als' ability to speak through a licensing-like process, it must rely on neu-
tral, objective, and mechanical criteria and procedures. Because
government "discretion has the potential for becoming a means of sup-
pressing a particular point of view,"51 any licensing requirement must
contain "narrow, objective and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority."52 "If the permit scheme 'involves appraisal of facts, the exer-
cise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion' by the licensing
authority, 'the danger of censorship and of abridgement of our precious
First Amendment freedoms is too great' to be permitted."53
Thus, a few years ago, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordi-
nance giving a government officer discretion, within the bounds of the
"necessary and reasonable," to grant or deny permission to place news-
paper vending machines on public sidewalks.54 The Court conceded that
there might be circumstances in which the city could legitimately deny a
permit: the vending machines might be found to interfere with other
uses of the sidewalks. The ordinance was unconstitutional, however,
because the city's discretion was not limited by clear-cut rules. The
vague regulatory scheme made "post hoc rationalizations by the licensing
official and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria ... far too easy." 55
It could prevent courts from detecting government's "illegitimate abuse
of censorial power," and could therefore "intimidate[] parties into cen-
49. Id. at 713.
50. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
51. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1992) (quoting Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981)).
52. Id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
53. Id. at 2401-02 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) and
Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)).
54. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); see also
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (invalidating an ordinance giving the city
discretionary control over public demonstrations); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958)
(invalidating an ordinance giving the city discretionary control over solicitation by dues-charging
organizations); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (invalidating an ordinance giving the
city the discretionary control over public worship meetings); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)
(invalidating an ordinance giving the city the discretionary control over use of sound amplification
devices).
55. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758.
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soring their own speech."'5 6 The regulatory scheme was particularly
"threatening" because it involved a "multiple or periodic licensing
requirement," ensuring that newspapers were "under no illusion regard-
ing the effect of the 'licensed' speech on the ability to continue speaking
in the future."57
B. The Nature of Our Broadcast Regulatory System
Broadcasting is speech.5 Indeed, much of broadcasting is political
speech, in a quite noncontroversial sense of "political." The innocent or
naive, therefore, might expect it to be covered by the rules I have set out
above. In fact, though, our broadcast regulatory system takes a path of
its own. I shall explore that path at some length in order to make clear
how far it wanders from the route of ordinary free speech philosophy.
The central requirement of our broadcast system is set out in the
Communications Act of 1934:11 "No person shall.., operate any appa-
ratus for the transmission of ... communications ... by radio" except
with a license granted by the Federal Communications Commission
[FCC], a government agency." The FCC is to grant a license to an
applicant only "if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served
thereby";6" the term of that license may not be longer than five to ten
years, depending on the medium.62 The Commission may renew the
license only on the basis of a similar finding that renewal would serve the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity."63
56. Id. at 757-58.
57. Id. at 759-60; see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (invalidating a
licensing scheme as enforced against sexually oriented businesses engaged in First Amendment
activity).
58. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (noting that "radio
[is] included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment").
59. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1988). Under the statute, the FCC exercises regulatory authority
over all forms of interstate communication via spectrum or wire, excluding federal governmental
uses. See id. §§ 152, 305. The FCC succeeded the Federal Radio Commission, which regulated
broadcasting under the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (superseded 1934). A variety of
sources provide useful general background on the law made by the FCC. They include STANLEY M.
BESEN ET AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION: NETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE FCC (1984); T.
BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE (3d ed. 1993);
DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 683-904 (5th ed. 1990); DOUGLAS H.
GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA (2d ed. 1991); ERWIN G.
KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (3d ed. 1982); VINCENT MOSCO,
BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). "Radio," in this context, refers to the electromagnetic spectrum
generally; "communications ... by radio" thus include television, unknown when the statute was
enacted in 1934.
61. Id. § 307(a); see also id. § 309(a) ("public interest, convenience, and necessity").
62. Id. § 307(c). Television licenses are granted for a term of five years; radio licenses for a
term of seven years; and nonbroadcast licenses (for dissemination of radio communications to
someone other than the general public, as in taxi or ambulance radio services) for a term of ten years.
63. Id.
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The holder of a broadcast license is required to operate in the public
interest. The nature of this requirement, however, has been hazy over
the years. Near the beginning of our broadcast regulatory history, the
Federal Radio Commission elucidated the public interest as follows:
Broadcasting stations are licensed to serve the public and not for
the purpose of furthering the private or selfish interests of individ-
uals or groups of individuals .... In a sense a broadcasting station
may be regarded as a sort of mouthpiece on the air for the com-
munity it serves, over which its public events of general interest,
its political campaigns, its election results, its athletic contests, its
orchestras and artists, and discussion of its public issues may be
broadcast."
More recently, the FCC has described operation in the public interest as
relating to the provision of nonentertainment programming responsive to
community needs.65
Three key problems arise for the Commission in implementing its
public-interest mandate. First, when several applicants seek mutually
exclusive broadcast authorizations, how is the agency to decide whose
licensure would best serve the "public interest"? Second, when a licensee
has completed one or more license terms and is seeking renewal, how is
the Commission to evaluate whether that licensee's speech to date has
adequately served the "public interest"? Finally, how is the Commission
to decide when a licensee's speech during the license term has deviated so
far from the "public interest" that it warrants some sort of punishment?
1. Selecting the Licensee
During the FCC's first thirty years, procedures for selecting among
competing would-be licensees were unabashedly discretionary and con-
tent-sensitive.6 The FCC exercised particularly broad power in deciding
which of two qualified applicants for a broadcast license would better
serve the public interest. It saw its role as one of reaching, in each
unique instance, "an over-all relative determination upon an evaluation
of all factors, conflicting in many cases. ' , 61 In one case, for example, the
agency chose an applicant because the Commissioners saw it as more
likely to "encourage broadcasts on controversial issues or topics of cur-
rent interest to the community," to "cooperat[e] with civic interests,"
and to "provide ... opportunity for local expression."6 On appeal, the
64. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), modified on other grounds,
37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
65. See Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1091-92
(1984), on reconsid., 104 F.C.C.2d 357 (1986), rev'd in part sub nom. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 812 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
66. See Weinberg, supra note 40, at 655-56.
67. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
68. Id. at 358. Further, the winning applicant's proposed staffing plan seemed to the
1993] 1115i
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1101
D.C. Circuit upheld that emphasis on the applicant's proposed program-
ming: "[I]n a comparative consideration, it is well recognized that com-
parative service to the listening public is the vital element, and programs
are the essence of that service."69
Because this process was so highly discretionary, it was susceptible
to considerable hidden bias. In the 1950s, the Commission was stung by
allegations that Commissioners had solicited and received bribes in
licensing proceedings.70 Moreover, the success or failure of many license
applicants appeared to be determined by their Democratic or Republican
political leanings.7 The Commission thereafter sought to inject more
formality into the comparative process. Its 1965 Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings laid out a plan for a more mechanical
examination of applications.72
Under the current regime, inaugurated by the 1965 Policy
Statement, the Commission compares competing applicants primarily
with reference to three factors: (1) the extent and size of the applicants'
holdings in other media outlets;73 (2) the extent to which the station
owners personally would participate in management (with bonuses to be
added if they were local residents), had participated in local civic affairs,
had experience in the broadcast field, or were members of minority
groups;74 and (3) the size of the audience that the applicants' proposed
Commission to promise "a much more effective provision for program preparation and
presentation." Id. at 358-59.
69. Id. at 359 (footnote omitted). The court, however, ordered that the matter be remanded to
the Commission on the ground that certain engineering data attached to the prevailing application
had never been sworn to by the applicant. Id. at 354-56.
On the comparative criteria developed by the FCC before 1965, see generally H. Gifford Irion,
FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1959).
70. See Investigation of Regulatory Commissions and Agencies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 553-1934 (1958)
(Miami channel 10 affair); id. at 4889-935, 5055-266, 5297-348, 5497-535, 5621-45 (Pittsburgh
channel 4 affair); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS 194-203, 252-53
(1959).
71. Specifically, applicants owning newspapers that had endorsed Eisenhower in the preceding
election were more successful in FCC comparative proceedings than applicants owning newspapers
that had endorsed Stevenson. See Bernard Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's
Foot, 47 GEo. L.J. 655, 689-94 (1959).
72. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
73. The Commission stated in 1965 that it would disfavor applicants with outside media
holdings, in order to promote "a maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass
communications." Id. at 394. It would consider the significance of an applicant's interests in other
media to be a function of the extent of the applicant's stake in the other media; the degree to which
the other media were in, or close to, the community being applied for; and the degree to which the
other media were significant in terms of size, regional or national coverage, and influence. Id. at
394-95.
74. See id. at 395-96; see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Under
FM Broadcast Assignments, 101 F.C.C.2d 638, 645-47 (1985), aff'dsub nom. National Black Media
Coalition v. FCC, 822 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1987), the FCC also awards an enhancement credit to
operators of daytime-only AM stations seeking FM licenses. In Mid-Florida Television Corp., 69
F.C.C.2d 607, 651-52 (1978), set aside on other grounds, 87 F.C.C.2d 203 (1981), the FCC awarded
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signals could reach.75
This approach, however, has not succeeded in converting the pro-
cess from a discretionary to a mechanical one. Indeed, it works quite
badly.76 Comparative hearing results are neither consistent nor predict-
able.77 The Commission has found no meaningful and fair way to tally
up an applicant's strengths and weaknesses, or to compare one applicant
to another; it has referred to "slight," "moderate," "substantial," "dis-
an enhancement credit for female ownership, but that preference seems to be moribund following
Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992), declaring it unconstitutional.
75. See, eg., Susan S. Mulkey, 4 F.C.C.R. 5520, 5521 (1989) (granting a slight comparative
preference for superior coverage). In the 1965 Policy Statement, the Commission stated that it
would also consider (1) the applicant's proposed program service, to the extent that the differences
between the proposals were "material and substantial," going "beyond ordinary differences in
judgment" to demonstrate one applicant's "superior devotion to public service," 1 F.C.C.2d at 397;
(2) an applicant's record as licensee of other broadcast outlets, if "unusually good" in the sense of
showing "unusual attention to the public's needs and interests, such as special sensitivity to an area's
changing needs through flexibility of local programs designed to meet those needs," or "unusually
poor," as manifested by "a failure to meet the public's needs and interests," id. at 398; and (3) the
applicant's character (that is, whether it has been found guilty of criminal or other bad acts), id. at
399. An addendum to the 1965 Policy Statement added the availability of auxiliary power
equipment as an additional comparative factor. See Addendum to Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings, 2 F.C.C.2d 667 (1966).
Today, however, as a practical matter, the Commission rarely allows proposed program service
or past broadcast record to be placed in issue. See Random Selection (Lottery), 4 F.C.C.R. 2256,
2266 n.17 (1989) (describing current comparative process). But see Simon Geller, 90 F.C.C.2d 250,
273-76 (1982) (granting an applicant substantial preference for proposed programming), remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
When those factors are put in issue, they are "seldom" or "only in extraordinary cases" dispositive.
Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2666
(1992). The Commission has deleted character from the list of comparative criteria; character is
now considered only in connection with the minimum qualifications for licensing. See Policy
Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179 (1986). Auxiliary
power, similarly, no longer plays a significant role.
An unrelated factor, not mentioned in the 1965 Policy Statement, however, has played a
dispositive role in the comparative process. Under 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1988), the FCC is required to
award licenses so as to provide "fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service." Where
applicants are proposing to serve different communities of license, and the Commission determines
that one of those communities should be preferred under § 307(b), the Commission eliminates all
applicants not proposing to serve that community. See FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349
U.S. 358 (1955); WHW Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 753 F.2d 1132, 1134-38 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Random
Selection (Lottery), 4 F.C.C.R. at 2258 (notice of proposed rulemaking).
76. The comparative hearing process has been the target of virtually unceasing criticism. The
Commission itself recently stated that the process "can be described most charitably as laborious,
exceedingly time consuming, expensive and often result[ing] in choices based on, at most, marginal
differences." Random Selection (Lottery), 4 F.C.C.R. at 2256. See generally STEPHEN R. BARNETr
ET AL., LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 107 (1988)
(comparative hearing process is "absurd," and has attracted "devastating criticism that is now
virtually unanimous"); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 53-73
(1962); Robert A. Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing
Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39-55 (1971); Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications
Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 237-43 (1978); Weinberg,
supra note 40, at 657-58.
77. See Random Selection (Lottery), 4 F.C.C.R. at 2258-59; BARNETT ET AL., supra note 76,
at 107; Robinson, supra note 76, at 238-40.
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tinct, .... clear," and "enhanced" "pluses," "merits," "demerits" and
"preferences," and has sought to balance them via "administrative
'feel.' "78 Often, competing applicants for a broadcast license differ only
marginally in terms of the criteria the Commission has set out. As a
result, the FCC's choices among them are necessarily arbitrary.79
The foundational problem is that nobody has devised reliable
mechanical criteria for figuring out which broadcast applicants, if
licensed, would best serve the "public interest." It is doubtful that the
Commission can by any means find the "best" applicant of a group in
which all satisfy basic qualifications; but it is certain that the
Commission's purportedly uniform, objective standards are not doing the
78. See, e.g., Simon Geller, 102 F.C.C.2d 1443, 1452-53 (1985); Cowles Fla. Broadcasting,
Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 411, 414, 416, 422 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 598
F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979). Geller was a comparative hearing
upon license renewal treated by the Commission as if it were an initial hearing. Cowles was a
comparative hearing upon license renewal. Comparative renewal hearings and initial hearings are
similar in their inability to balance comparative factors in any meaningful or satisfying way. See
infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Merrimack Valley Broadcasting, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 680, 682 (1984); Greater
Wichita Telecasting, Inc., 96 F.C.C.2d 984, 994 (1984) (Rivera, Comm'r, concurring); Alexander S.
Klein, Jr., 86 F.C.C.2d 423, 424-25 (1981). Commissioner Robinson thus complained in Cowles that
while it would be "almost invariably.., insufficient for making the choice" if the Commission were
to confine itself to verifying applicants' minimal qualifications, the Commission's efforts to go
beyond that verification, and decide which is truly the best applicant, have been "productive of
nothing but senseless waste of resources." Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d at 444
(Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
The Commission's basic qualifications for licensing are themselves to some extent subjective as
well. See, eg., Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir.) (FCC not required to grant a license to
an otherwise qualified sole applicant who has not "demonstrate[d] an earnest interest in serving a
local community by evidencing a familiarity with its particular needs and an effort to meet them"),
cert denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962). While the FCC has achieved some uniformity by embodying these
judgments in published rules, rather than in ad hoc decisions in individual cases, the rules themselves
have changed over time. For example, while the Commission requires broadcast applicants to be of
good "character," see supra note 75 and accompanying text, it has shifted over time on the issue of
how good one's character must be. Compare Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102
F.C.C.2d 1179, 1196-98 (1986) (limiting the categories of felony convictions which establish bad
character for purposes of basic qualifications) with Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing,
5 F.C.C.R. 3252 (1990) (expanding the range of misconduct relevant to character to include all
felony convictions), on reconsid., 6 F.C.C.R. 3448 (1991); see also Licensee Participation in Drug
Trafficking, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1617 (1989). See generally Character Qualifications in
Broadcast Licensing, 87 F.C.C.2d 836 (1981).
The Commission similarly has shifted its views of the point at which the nature and extent of an
applicant's media holdings is such that the "public interest" absolutely precludes the applicant from
being awarded a given license. See, e.g., Revision of Radio Rules & Policies, 7 F.C.CR. 2755 (1992)
(relaxing limits on multiple ownership). See generally GINSBURG Er AL., supra note 59, at 180-207.
Regulation in this area necessarily involves the drawing of arbitrary lines, and the inquiry has had its
own political content. In News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the
court struck down a statute barring extensions of existing waivers of a rule generally prohibiting
common ownership of a daily newspaper and a broadcast station in the same market. The only two
waivers outstanding when the statute was enacted applied to properties owned by Rupert Murdoch.
The law is thought by some to have been passed in part because of Senator Kennedy's frustration
with Murdoch's Boston newspaper. See Allan R. Gold, Kennedy vs. Murdoch: Test of Motives, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1988, at A13.
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job."° The agency thus has had to choose between making subjective
determinations, overtly or covertly, in aid of making the best possible
selections, or following the mechanical rules at the cost of making selec-
tions that do not necessarily serve the statute's larger "public interest"
goals.
The Commission itself is dissatisfied with the existing comparative
licensing process." The D.C. Circuit recently directed the Commission
to reconsider whether its "integration" preference, relating to the partici-
pation of owners in management, in fact advances the public interest in
any meaningful way.82 The Commission has proposed to eliminate from
the comparative process all of the factors currently considered other than
the extent and size of the applicants' holdings in other media outlets (a
criterion the FCC proposes to rethink), the size of the audience the appli-
cants' signals would reach, and minority status.8 3 It has proposed to add
to the list of comparative factors a preference for applicants promising
not to sell or otherwise transfer the station for at least three years, 4 and
perhaps another for applicants who successfully request the allotment of
new broadcast frequencies through rulemaking. 5 It has proposed to tote
up the preferences through an "objective and rational" point system
rather than the present, more amorphous, approach. 6
The Commission hopes, through these changes, to be able to reach
"swifter, more certain choices," avoiding the need to rely on "subjective
and imprecise" factors that emphasize "relatively slight distinctions
80. Thus Commissioner Wiley's dissent in Cowles:
I personally cannot believe that the American public derives any benefit out of the existing
process by which we attempt to apply objective criteria (for example, integration of
ownership and management) to the largely subjective (and, in most cases, unanswerable)
question of which applicant will provide the best future service.
Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d at 431 (Wiley, Comm'r, dissenting). See generally
STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 72-89 (1982); Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication
and the Rule of Law, 54 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 7-8 (1960); Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria
Choice Processes: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88
YALE L.J. 717 (1979) (arguing that the FCC cannot choose licensees on a principled basis so long as
it seeks to base its decisions on incommensurable criteria).
81. See Random Selection (Lottery), 4 F.C.C.R. 2256 (1989) (characterizing comparative
process as inefficient, costly, and of doubtful benefit to the public).
82. See Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 57 (1992). The
Commission defended the integration preference in Anchor Broadcasting, 8 F.C.C.R. 1674 (1993).
83. See Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7
F.C.C.R. 2664 (1992). The agency has also proposed to continue the existing "day-timer"
preference, and has left open the question of whether to continue granting a preference based on
applicants' past or proposed local residence. Id. at 2667-68.
84. Id. at 2668. This preference would revive, in large part, the "anti-trafficking" policy
discarded in the early years of the Reagan administration. See Transfer of Broadcast Facilities, 52
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081 (1982).
85. See Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7
F.C.C.R. at 2668.
86. Id. at 2668-69.
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among the applicants." 7 It is hardly clear, though, that the new propos-
als will avoid the dilemma posed by comparative licensing so far: the
agency cannot simultaneously have an objective and nondiscretionary
selection process on the one hand, and a process adept at "select[ing]...
the applicant that will best serve the public interest"88 on the other.
Indeed, it seems likely that the Commission's proposal will cause many
(if not most) comparative proceedings to end in ties, with two or more
applicants sharing the same number of points. The Commission's propo-
sal leaves open the question of how these ties are to be broken, but
appears to favor random selection or a first-to-file preference. 89 Both of
these minimize agency discretion, but neither is well-tailored to selecting
the "best" applicant as that concept has been conventionally understood.
2. Renewal
Discretion and subjectivity play significant roles in the renewal of
licenses as well. When a new applicant seeks to be awarded a license in
place of the incumbent, the FCC must again hold a comparative hear-
ing.90 The Commission must consider incumbent and new applicants in
a single comparative proceeding, not "unreasonably weighted" in favor
of the incumbent licensee. It must decide, on the basis of that compari-
son, whose licensure would best serve the public interest.91 In evaluating
the incumbent's record, the Commission must look to the station's
nonentertainment programming, in particular its local news and public
affairs programming, and it must evaluate how the licensee has
responded to community needs and problems. 92 It grants the incumbent
licensee a "renewal expectancy" preference on a showing that its past
record has been "sound, favorable and substantially above
mediocre." 93
87. Id. at 2664.
88. Id. at 2665.
89. Id. at 2668-69. The Commission also suggested the possibility of giving the license to the
applicant with the greatest broadcast experience, but cautioned that that approach might
disadvantage women and minorities-something that would, in the Commission's view, cause the
plan to violate statutory law. See id. at 2667, 2669.
All this suggests that the Commission's recent proposal may simply be a backhanded way of
reviving its 1989 suggestion to award new broadcast licenses through random selection. See
Random Selection (Lottery), 4 F.C.C.R. 2256 (1989). The FCC abandoned this initiative in the face
of nearly unanimous opposition from the industry and the bar. See FCC Revamping Comparative
Hearing Process, BROADCASTING, May 14, 1990, at 31; Few Choose to Follow FCC's Bouncing Ball,
BROADCASTING, June 19, 1989, at 50.
90. See Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (interpreting 47
U.S.C. § 309(e)).
91. Id. at 1214; see also Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).
92. See, e.g., Radio Station WABZ, Inc., 90 F.C.C.2d 818, 840-42 (1982), aff'd sub nom.
Victor Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 722 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
93. Monroe Communications Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting
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The Commission has expressed its unhappiness with the compara-
tive process; evaluation of the incumbent's past service, it has pointed
out, is once again subjective, uncertain, and content-sensitive. 94 It has
attacked the comparative renewal process in two ways. First, it has
urged that the law be changed more nearly to guarantee renewal.95
Second, notwithstanding its statutory obligation to conduct a compara-
tive hearing when an incumbent is challenged on renewal by a new appli-
cant, the FCC has been reluctant ever to find that the "public interest"
would be better served by the new applicant. 96 It gives the renewal
expectancy "primary weight ... vis-d-vis the other comparative crite-
ria." 97 Indeed, it has sometimes been quite creative in its efforts to "bal-
ance" the various comparative factors and still come out with the largely
preordained result.98
Cowles Broadcasting, Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d at 1006, aff'd sub noma. Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC,
683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983)).
94. See Formation of Policies & Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 4 F.C.C.R.
6363, 6363-64 (1989).
95. The Commission, for example, has proposed to grant all incumbent broadcasters a
presumption of entitlement to renewal expectancy, and thus to renewal, upon compliance with FCC
rules requiring each licensee to maintain certain files for public inspection. Id. at 6365.
96. The Commission did, in one notorious case, deny renewal to a Boston television station in
favor of a new applicant. See WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The
Commission had decided, because of the unique procedural history of the proceeding, to treat the
incumbent as if it too were a new applicant. "To say that WHDH shocked the broadcast industry
would be an understatement." GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 59, at 114; see also Simon Geller, 90
F.C.C.2d 250, 270 (1982) (treating a radio broadcaster as if it were a new applicant and denying
renewal on that basis).
97. Formation of Policies & Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 4 F.C.C.R. at
6363 (describing existing process).
98. In 1976, for example, Cowles Florida Broadcasting was the incumbent licensee of WESH-
TV, Channel 2, in Daytona Beach, Florida, when a group calling itself Central Florida Enterprises
sought to take the license away. Cowles had violated the law by relocating its main studio to the
larger city of Orlando; further, its corporate parent had been involved in mail fraud. There was little
question that Cowles' was the inferior application when it came to outside media interests,
ownership participation in management, and minority ownership. Its record of public service,
moreover, was hardly impressive to the unbiased eye. See Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 60
F.C.C.2d 372, 441-42 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting). The Commission, however, after
"weighing" all of these factors, nonetheless granted Cowles the license on the theory that Cowles'
record of broadcast service in its three years as the incumbent licensee gave it a decisive edge. Id. at
417-22; see also id. at 439 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting) (comparative renewal proceedings are
"not a real contest between two applicants, but a pretend game played between the Commission and
the public. The outcome of the game is predetermined; the art (and the sport) is to maintain interest
until the inevitable outcome is registered .... It rather resembles a professional wrestling match
The D.C. Circuit reversed. Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979). On remand, the Commission found for Cowles again, setting
out its rationale in a more self-consciously mechanical manner. This time, with some misgivings, the
court of appeals affirmed:
[MV]e are still troubled by the fact that the record remains that an incumbent television
licensee has never been denied renewal in a comparative challenge. American television
viewers will be reassured, although a trifle baffled, to learn that even the worst television
stations-those which are, presumably, the ones picked out as vulnerable to a challenge-
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As with initial licensing, the Commission has found conflict between
its desire to reduce uncertainty and discretion in the license renewal pro-
cess on the one hand, and the basic "public interest" structure of the
underlying law on the other.99 In one recent case, for example, the
Commission first granted, but then, after a judicial rebuke, was forced to
deny renewal to a UHF licensee that had converted to a pay-TV scram-
bled movie service. The licensee had shut down its local studios and was
running conventional programming only between 6:00 and 7:00 in the
morning. I  The Commission, in comparing this licensee to a competing
applicant, could hardly give it public-interest credit based on its news, its
public affairs programming, or its attention to community affairs-none
were in evidence. 101 It ultimately denied the licensee any renewal expec-
tancy, and consequently denied it renewal. The licensee, it held, had
engaged in a "wholesale abandonment of public service
programming."10 2
One might respond to this story by challenging the legal premise
underlying the court's and the Commission's actions: why should news
and public-affairs programming be the primary touchstone of the public
interest? Aren't movies in the public interest as well? Is it not "the the-
ory of our Constitution"1 0 3 that all speech is in the public interest?
The problem is that the Communications Act is generally under-
stood to require the Commission, when choosing among broadcast appli-
are so good that they never need replacing. We suspect that somewhere, sometime,
somehow, some television licensee should fail in a comparative renewal challenge, but the
FCC has never discovered such a licensee yet.
Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983).
99. The Commission's unhappiness with the comparative process, on the other hand, has not
been motivated entirely-or even primarily-by the arcana of legal theory. See infra notes 404-05
and accompanying text.
100. See Video 44, 4 F.C.C.R. 1209 (1989), rev'd sub nom. Monroe Communications Corp. v.
FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 354, 356 (D.C. Cir.), on remand, 5 F.C.C.R. 6383 (1990).
101. The Commission initially granted renewal anyway, in part by giving the licensee credit for
news and public affairs programming it had run before converting its format. The agency reasoned
further that the licensee had made some minimal effort to run nonentertainment programming even
after converting, and that subscription TV's commercially risky and uncertain nature excused the
station's initial failings. Id. at 1211-12.
The D.C. Circuit reversed. The Commission, said the court, had lost sight of the public-interest
determination. The point of the renewal expectancy, it prompted, was that a licensee's programming
record, as reflected in its news, public affairs and nonentertainment programming, is generally
probative of its future responsiveness to community needs. It was unlikely that Video 44's
programming record before its drastic and apparently permanent format change would be probative
of future behavior. Monroe Communications Corp., 900 F.2d at 355-56. (Another issue in the case
was presented by the sexually explicit nature of some of Video 44's programming, which included
"adult" films. The Commission had declined to consider this factor in ruling on Video 44's renewal
application, see id. at 356-59, but it is possible that the issue played an atmospheric role in the court
of appeals' treatment of the renewal expectancy issue.)
102. Video 44, 5 F.C.C.R. 6383, 6385 (1990) (quoting Video 44, 102 F.C.C.2d 419, 462 (1985)
(ALJ initial decision)).
103. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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cants and making renewal decisions, to make the choice that best serves
the "public interest." If the Commission were to take the view that
any and all speech is equally in the public interest, it could not find any
applicant superior to any other. It is programming, after all, that is at
the heart of the Communications Act's public-interest mandate.
Broadcasters have no meaningful impact on our public life except
through their programming; the government has no significant commu-
nications-law interest in regulating the identity of broadcast licensees
except insofar as their identity affects the content of broadcast speech."°
The Commission initially elevated news and public-affairs reporting
precisely so that it could make the statute's "public interest" determina-
tion in a more tolerable, more objective, manner. Selecting broadcasters
on the basis of their commitment to local public-affairs reporting wasn't
necessarily the best course from the perspective of the "public interest"
in its largest sense, but it gave the Commission some workable basis on
which to make choices. In the case just mentioned, the Commission ini-
tially sought to eliminate unpredictability and subjectivity by simply rul-
ing for the incumbent; the D.C. Circuit responded that to do so would be
to subordinate the statutory directive that some speakers are more in the
"public interest" than others, and that the FCC was to ensure that those
most in the "public interest" had the licenses. It is unlikely, however,
that any "public interest" standard the FCC can capably administer will
end up having much to do with the public interest.
What about the renewal process when there is no competing appli-
cant? In theory at least, even when nobody is opposing a license renewal,
the broadcaster seeking renewal "must run on his record, and the focus
of that record is whether his programming has served the public inter-
est."10' 5 Before the Reagan administration, the FCC required even
uncontested renewal applicants to submit extensive data concerning such
matters as their nonentertainment and children's programming, the
number of public service announcements they had broadcast, and their
compliance with FCC requirements for ascertainment of community
needs and interests.10 6 In the agency's view, this was the only way it
104. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-84 (1990) (FCC and Congress
appropriately concluded that greater minority ownership of broadcast outlets would result in greater
diversity of broadcast speech.).
105. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting FCC
brief), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984); see also Monroe Communications Corp., 900 F.2d at 355
(observing that the question on renewal is whether the broadcaster, based on its past record, is likely
to perform meritoriously in the future).
106. See Black Citizens for a Fair Media, 719 F.2d at 409. As early as 1927, radio stations
applying for renewal were asked to set forth the average amount of time they devoted to
"entertainment," "religious," "educational," "agricultural," and "fraternal" programs. See Public
Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
BROADCASTING 148, 150 (Frank J. Kahn ed., 4th ed. 1984).
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could make the necessary "public interest" determination. 7
In the early 1980s, the FCC abandoned that approach. It stopped
requiring that uncontested renewal applicants submit programming
information, and it announced that it would no longer review program-
ming in connection with such applications. 10 8 While in theory licensees
are still required to provide nonentertainment programming responsive
to issues of concern to the community, the Commission now makes the
necessary public-interest finding in uncontested cases via a "presump-
tion" that the applicant has complied with the statutory requirement.' 0 9
This, of course, again avoids the concern that the "public-interest" deter-
mination will introduce ambiguity and subjectivity into the renewal pro-
cess. Like the Commission's approach in comparative renewal cases,
though, its cost is the agency's failure to look to the "public interest" in
any individualized way.
107. The agency would grant uncontested renewal applications routinely, by staff action, if they
appeared to satisfy certain quantitative guidelines relating to such matters as minutes of commercials
per hour and overall percentages of local, informational, and nonentertainment programming.
Applications that did not satisfy those guidelines were subjected to expensive processing delays.
After World War II, the Commission took an especially aggressive stance in this area: it set a
number of renewal applications for hearing because of inadequate balance among program
categories, insufficient unsponsored programming, insufficient local live programming, insufficient
discussion of public issues, or excessive commercialization. See Eugene J. Roth, 12 F.C.C. 102
(1947); Howard W. Davis, 12 F.C.C. 91 (1947); Community Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 85 (1947).
The Commission did not in fact deny any renewals on these grounds, and violent industry
opposition, see, e.g., Hearings on S. 1333 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), caused the agency to adopt a more subdued
approach.
Under guidelines adopted in 1961, FCC staff would check for compliance with quantitative
guidelines in the areas of noncommercial programming, local live programming, nonnetwork
programming, and "sustaining" (unsponsored) programming. They would check to see if
commercialization limits were being exceeded, and would look for "adequate explanation" if
programming were missing in any of the following categories: entertainment, religious, agricultural,
educational, news, discussion (forum, panel, or roundtable), and talk. See Revision of Programming
& Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1078 n.3 (1984), on reconsid., 4 F.C.C.2d 357
(1986), rey'd in part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 812 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Lee Roy McCourry, 2 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 895, 896 (1964) (setting UHF application for
hearing because applicant had proposed 70% entertainment, 30% education, and no programming
in the other categories). See generally KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 59, at 196-97.
In 1973, the agency published its processing rules for the first time, including commercialization
limits and a requirement that stations program a minimum percentage of nonentertainment
programming. Amendment to Delegations of Authority, 43 F.C.C.2d 638 (1973). The Commission
revised those rules in 1976 to require scrutiny of local and informational programming as well.
Amendment to Delegations of Authority, 59 F.C.C.2d 491 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984); Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), aff'd in part sub nom. Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Revision of
Applications for Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, and Television
Licensees, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 740 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v.
FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
109. Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1093.
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3. Misconduct
This brings us, finally, to the question of how the Commission treats
those incumbent licensees who are accused of serious misconduct, such
that renewal, it is argued, would disserve the public interest. How suc-
cessful has the FCC been at locating the "public interest" in this arena?
The FCC has denied broadcast renewal applications on a variety of
grounds.'10 In several cases, its decision not to renew a license was based
at least in part on the content of the licensee's speech."' 1
With regard to its content restrictions, the FCC once again has not
110. Grounds for nonrenewal have included misrepresentations to the Commission,
unauthorized transfers of control, technical violations (e.g., being unable to stick to the assigned
frequency), and "character" failings. See John D. Abel et al., Station License Revocations and
Denials of Renewal, 1934-69, 14 J. BROADCASTING 411 (1970); Fredric A. Weiss et al., Station
License Revocations and Denials of Renewal, 1970-78, 24 J. BROADCASTING 69 (1980). Commission
case law in these areas too has been criticized as subjective. See Brian C. Murchison,
Misrepresentation and the FCC, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 403, 420 (1985) (characterizing FCC case law
regarding nonrenewal as a sanction for the licensee's misrepresentations to the Commission as
"drift[ing] on a sea of subjectivity"). Beginning in 1971, the FCC began a crackdown against
fraudulent billing practices, and denied or revoked eleven licenses on that basis. Weiss et al., supra
at 76. The initiative, however, was relatively short-lived; a later Commission eliminated the rules
against fraudulent billing. See Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1500 (1986).
The single most sweeping denial of renewal ever undertaken by the Commission was Alabama
Educ. Television Comm'n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975), a single decision affecting eight licensees
affiliated with the state-run Alabama public television system. The Commission denied renewal to
those licensees because the system discriminated racially in programming and in employment; it
allowed them, however, to apply for the vacated licenses in competition with other applicants.
111. See United Television Co., 55 F.C.C.2d 416, 423 (1975) (FCC denied renewal based on the
licensee's broadcast of religious programming offering numbers game picks, "special money-drawing
roots," and "spiritual baths" in return for monetary donations), aff'd sub nom. United Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1046 (1978); Star Stations of Ind.,
Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 107 (1975) (FCC denied renewal based in part on licensee's use of newscasts
"as a vehicle to publicize [his] preferred candidate [in a political race]-not as an exercise of news
judgment, but as a deception of the public"); Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461
(1975); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), on reconsid., 27 F.C.C.2d 565
(1971) (FCC denied renewal application of station largely devoted to religious fundamentalism and
the views of the political right wing on the ground that the licensee had violated the fairness
doctrine, and had, when it acquired the station, deceived the Commission about its intention to
broadcast certain religious and political programming), aff'd on arguably narrower grounds, 473
F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C.
250 (1962) (FCC found that the station had broadcast coarse, vulgar, and suggestive material and
had not met community needs; it found further that the licensee had exercised inadequate control
over the station and had lied to Commission in claiming lack of knowledge of objectionable
material), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843
(1964); see also Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania Radio Station WXPN (FM), 69 F.C.C.2d
1394 (1978) (listeners complained that college radio station broadcast indecent speech; FCC denied
renewal on the ground that the licensee had inadequately supervised station operation); Hawaiian
Paradise Park Corp., 22 F.C.C.2d 459 (1970) (setting renewal application for hearing on a variety of
grounds including fairness doctrine, personal attack, and political broadcasting violations), reconsid.
denied, 26 F.C.C.2d 329 (1970) (licensee withdrew application); Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38
F.C.C. 1143 (1965) (FCC granted short-term renewal to a station that had engaged in discriminatory
and one-sided programming regarding racial issues), rev'd sub nom. United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (directing FCC to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether it
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avoided subjectivity and vagueness. The agency, for example, has in
greater or lesser degree regulated indecency on the air;"12 its efforts in
that regard have surely exposed it to charges of subjectivity." 13 Perhaps
emblematic are Commissioner James Quello's comments on the annual
"Bloomsday" broadcast of readings from James Joyce's Ulysses by a
Pacifica radio station: Quello was quoted as saying that the readings
should not be broadcast because their language was "stuff you deck
someone over. I'm amazed it made it as a classic."' t 14
The most well known of all of the FCC's essays at content regula-
tion over the years, however, was the "fairness doctrine." Pursuant to
the fairness doctrine,' the Commission required each licensee not only
to devote a reasonable percentage of time to covering "controversial
issues of public importance" in its service area, but to cover those issues
"fairly," by providing a "reasonable opportunity" for the presentation of
opposing points of view."16
Fairness enforcement was subjective.' ' In order to enforce the fair-
should deny renewal outright); Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964) (FCC granted renewal after
inquiring into sexually explicit programming and possible Communist affiliations).
112. The Commission regulates "indecent" broadcast speech under 18 U.S.C. § 1464. See, e.g.,
Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.2d 5297
(1990), vacated sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC proscription
of indecent language against a First Amendment challenge); Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992).
113. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 8, at 162-90; Lili Levi, The 11ard Case of Broadcast Indecency,
20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 49, 112-38 (1992-93).
114. See Winer, supra note 8, at 379 (quoting (Bleep) (Bleep) (Bleep) (Bleep) And Yes I Said Yes
I Will Yes, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1987, at 35). The Commission has declined to rule on whether
Ulysses is in fact indecent under ruling law. See GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 59, at 547 (citing a
letter from FCC Mass Media Bureau to William J. Byrnes, June 5, 1987).
115. The roots of the fairness doctrine can be traced back to Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3
F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281
U.S. 706 (1930); the Commission codified the doctrine in Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13
F.C.C. 1246 (1948). Ten years later, Congress inserted into the Communications Act a reference to
"the obligation imposed upon [broadcasters] under this chapter to... afford reasonable opportunity
for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
The D.C. Circuit later ruled, though, that Congress had not adopted the fairness doctrine as a
"binding statutory directive"; it had merely recognized the Commission's promulgation of the
fairness doctrine as an existing "administrative construction." Telecommunications Research &
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
116. See Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10-17 (1974),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
The doctrine was motivated by the fear that the few station owners lucky enough to receive
broadcast licenses would have "unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders,
to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the
air only those with whom they agreed." Justice White articulated the concern: "There is no
sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open
to all." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
117. See generally Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 7, at 169-76 (arguing that the fairness
doctrine is inescapably incoherent). But see BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 123 (arguing that the
fairness doctrine is no more subjective than are other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence).
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ness doctrine, the Commission needed some substantive vision of what
ground a discussion had to cover in order to be fair; it needed some cen-
terline from which to judge whether a given issue was "controversial"
and whether coverage was "balanced." There is, however, no Platonic
midpoint of the political spectrum. In one case before the FCC, thus, a
conservative group argued that CBS news reporting relating to military
and foreign affairs was slanted towards the view that the United States
should decrease its national security efforts.118 One could not think
about this claim, though, without first identifying an appropriate base-
line: in order to decide whether CBS' views were unbalanced, one
needed a standard for comparison. There was no reason why the "unbi-
ased" view had to be that national security efforts remain exactly the
same.
As a practical matter, the Commission made those fairness judg-
ments by looking to its understanding of what was politically controver-
sial in the America of the time." 9 This approach was problematic in two
ways. First, it meant that whether a licensee violated the fairness doc-
trine depended on the Commission's perhaps idiosyncratic perceptions of
the current political debate. The FCC, for example, throughout the
1960s and 1970s, never considered the appropriateness of illegal drug use
a "controversial" issue:120 it was clear to the Commission that all
responsible people considered illegal drug use to be degrading and
wrong, and thus that there was no meaningful controversy. Large seg-
118. See American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). The Commission rejected the claim on the ground that "national
security" was too broad an issue for fairness consideration. See id. at 448-51.
119. Thus, when an NBC documentary addressed the issue of "the overall performance of the
private pension system and the need for governmental regulation of all private pension plans" in a
manner the FCC deemed unbalanced, the Commission based its conclusion that pension reform was
"controversial" on the fact that proposals then before Congress relating to pension reform "were
opposed in whole or in part by 'various groups . .. including the National Association of
Manufacturers, several labor unions, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and the Nixon
administration.'" Accuracy in Media, 44 F.C.C.2d 1027, 1034 n.3, 1039 (1973) (quoting the
Broadcast Bureau's decision below), rev'd sub nom. NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1141 (D.C. Cir.
1974), vacated as moot, id. at 1180, cert denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). NBC did not contest this
point.
Actually, while the details of pension reform were widely disputed at the time, there was greater
consensus regarding the need for some pension reform. Even those who argued that pension reform
shouldn't "throw out the baby with the wash water" agreed that there were "loopholes that need[ed]
closing." NBC, 516 F.2d at 1145 (quoting transcript of program). Whether one viewed support for
pension-law reform as a "controversial" position thus depended in significant part on one's own
position on the political spectrum, which in turn defined whose views one took seriously, and whose
one relegated to the fringe.
120. See Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d 409,
415 (1971) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (describing the FCC as having "repeal[ed the
applicability of the fairness doctrine to this subject"), aff'd, Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
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ments of the American population, however, disagreed.1 21 More funda-
mentally, tying fairness to current political debate was inherently
subjective. Under ordinary First Amendment philosophy, no one polit-
ical view is more "fair" than any other. To identify the "fairness" cen-
terline with the status quo was both arbitrary and politically loaded.
The Commission repealed the fairness doctrine in 1987.22 Any sub-
jectivity introduced by that doctrine into broadcast law is now gone.J23
This raises an ultimate question: is subjectivity a necessary, inherent
aspect of public-interest content regulation, or is it merely a chance
121. See, e.g., HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS (1971); infra notes
124-28 and accompanying text.
On another topic, see Polish Am. Congress v. FCC, 520 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1975)
("Polish jokes" presented no issue under the fairness doctrine because petitioners did not establish
"any controversy in this country concerning the intelligence or other qualities of Polish Americans")
(quoting the Broadcast Bureau's decision below), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976). Petitioners
sought a fairness ruling, of course, precisely because they believed that a controversy did exist-that
many Americans saw Poles as stupid, and that broadcasters should not be allowed to present only
one side of that story.
122. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
The Commission had concluded two years earlier that the doctrine "unnecessarily restrict[ed]
the journalistic freedom of broadcasters" and "actually inhibit[ed] the presentation of controversial
issues of public importance." Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C,2d
145, 147 (1985). Broadcasters, it had stated, were inhibited from presenting controversial material
because they feared having to defend their "fairness" in expensive and burdensome FCC
proceedings. Id. at 161-69. Fairness enforcement worked against the expression of controversial
views because its principal targets were those presenting programming that complainants,
themselves typically in the mainstream of society, "found to be abhorrent or extreme." Id. at 189.
Fairness enforcement, the agency had said, involved the government in "evaluating the merits of
particular viewpoints" and the "reasonableness of... selected program formats," id. at 189, 191; it
created the opportunity for government intimidation of broadcasters on political grounds, id. at 193-
94.
Relying on those conclusions, the Commission in 1987 declared that the fairness doctrine
"violates the First Amendment and contravenes the public interest." Syracuse Peace Council, 2
F.C.C.R. at 5043. It was unconstitutional because it "reduce[d] ... the public's access to viewpoint
diversity," id. at 5052, and was unnecessary to achieve viewpoint diversity. The doctrine therefore
constituted gratuitous government interference with speech. Id.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). Judge Williams, joined by Judge Wald in relevant part, voted to
affirm solely on the basis of the agency's "public interest determination ... without reaching the
constitutional issue"; he was "persuaded that the Commission would have found that the fairness
doctrine did not serve the public interest even if it had foregone its ruminations on the constitutional
issue." Id. at 656, 657. While he found no adequate basis for the Commission's insistence that the
net effect of the fairness doctrine was to reduce the coverage of controversial issues, he nonetheless
concluded that the Commission's decision was legitimate; it rested on the permissible factual finding
that the fairness doctrine had substantial deterrent effects on the same scale as its expression-
generating ones, and on the permissible normative policy judgment that governmentally deterred
speech was a greater evil than governmentally coerced speech was a good. Id. at 665.
123. For now, anyway. Congress in 1987 passed a bill reinstating the fairness doctrine;
President Reagan vetoed it. Veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, 23 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 715 (June 19, 1987). A similar bill is now pending in Congress. See Fairness in
Broadcasting Act of 1993, H.R. 1985, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Its proponents hope that
President Clinton will be more supportive.
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aspect of doctrines the Commission happens to have set in place? I
believe that it is inherent; one more story may help explain why.
The Commission in the early 1970s received a Department of
Defense briefing regarding what it characterized as "a subject of current
and pressing concern": "lyrics of records played on broadcasting sta-
tions... tending to promote or glorify the use of illegal drugs as [sic]
marijuana, LSD, 'speed,' etc."12' 4 The agency responded by issuing a
public notice explaining that it would contravene licensee "responsibil-
ity" for a broadcaster to play a record without "a management level
executive... knowing the content of the lyrics," making the judgment
whether the record "promotes... illegal drug usage," and on that basis
making a judgment whether playing the records would promote the pub-
lic interest. 125 The FCC stressed that "when there is an epidemic of ille-
gal drug use-when thousands of young lives are being destroyed...
the licensee should not be indifferent to the question of whether his facili-
ties are being used to promote the illegal use of harmful drugs."'1 26 Such
indifference, inconsistent with the broadcaster's duties as a "public
trustee.., who is fully responsible for.., operation in the public inter-
est," could "jeopardize" a broadcaster's license. 127 The D.C. Circuit
124. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d at 409.
125. Id. Commissioner Robert E. Lee expressed the "hope that the action of the Commission
... will discourage, if not eliminate the playing of records which tend to promote and/or glorify the
use of illegal drugs.... Obviously ... the licensee will exercise appropriate judgment in determining
whether the broadcasting of such records is in the public interest." Id. at 410 (Robert E. Lee,
Comm'r, concurring). Commissioner Houser expressly agreed. Id. at 411 (Houser, Comm'r,
concurring). Commissioner Johnson dissented, although taking pains to state that he personally
"happen[ed] to believe in getting high on life-the perpetual high without drugs." Id. at 415
(Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
The Commission's action was taken under the general public-interest standard; the agency
never took any action regarding drug use under the fairness doctrine. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
126. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 31 F.C.C.2d 377, 378
(1971), aff'd sub nor. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 914 (1973).
127. Id. at 379-80. Several weeks after its initial notice, Commission staff provided broadcasters
with a list of 22 songs, supplied by the Department of the Army, "brought to the attention of the
FCC in connection with the subject of so-called drug-oriented song lyrics." Id. at 379 n.5.
Notwithstanding Commissioner Johnson's protest that "many of the song lyrics singled out.., by
the... Defense Department... have nothing whatsoever to do with drugs," Licensee Responsibility
to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d at 414-15 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting),
broadcasters circulated the document as a "do not play" list; some apparently dropped the
recordings of any artists thought to be pharmaceutically suspect. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
478 F.2d 594, 603 (D.C. Cir.) (statement of Bazelon, J., on motion for rehearing en banc), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
On reconsideration, the Commission repudiated the list, and emphasized that it was neither
barring "a particular type of record" nor threatening to discipline licensees for the decision to play
"a particular record." After all, licensees could reasonably reach differing judgments as to whether a
particular song in fact promoted drug use, and the agency was not in a position to review such
individual judgments. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 31
F.C.C.2d at 378.
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found no constitutional infirmity in the agency's not-so-veiled threat. 128
The FCC's public notice, and the D.C. Circuit's decision upholding
it, were reviled by First Amendment commentators129-- and rightly so.
Yet the Commission is charged with ensuring that broadcasters conduct
themselves in the manner best designed to promote the public interest.
Under that standard, it is long-settled law that broadcasters, as public
trustees, "must assume responsibility for all material . ..broadcast
through their facilities."' 130  If the "public interest" requirement is to
have meaning, it is only natural that broadcast licensees should have to
"assume responsibility" as well for the possibility that certain program-
ming might lead some benighted souls into addiction, or worse.131 It is
true that this conflicts with traditional First Amendment philosophy,
under which the government's ideas about whether certain speech
promotes the public interest are almost always irrelevant. 32  The
Commission's grapplings with the counterculture, though, suggest that
the source of that conflict is not individual FCC decisions, but the entire
enterprise of "public interest" regulation of speech.
C. Public-Interest Licensing and Free Speech Philosophy
1. The Essential Conflict
It is easy to criticize our broadcast regulatory system. The whole
licensee selection process is somewhat silly: whichever person the FCC
selects for the license can sell out to a third party shortly afterwards, and
the Commission may not block that transaction on the ground that the
transferee seems less qualified than the applicants it had recently turned
down.133 In addition, television's organization around local licensees
now seems quaint. Most citizens receive their TV news and entertain-
ment programming primarily from nationally-based, unlicensed net-
works and cable programmers, largely without regard to the identity of
local broadcast licensees. The identity of local broadcast licensees may
128. Yale Broadcasting Co., 478 F.2d at 597-99.
129. See, eg., POWE, supra note 8, at 176-82.
130. Commission En Bane Programming Inquiry (1960), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note 106, at 191, 199.
131. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit concluded on review, "for the Commission to have been less
insistent on licensees discharging their obligations would have verged on an evasion of the
Commission's own responsibilities." Yale Broadcasting Co., 478 F.2d at 599.
132. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
133. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988) (forbidding the Commission, in considering an application
for license transfer, to "consider whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity might be
served by the transfer.., of the... license to a person other than the proposed transferee"); see also
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 405-06 (1965) (Lee,
Comm'r, concurring) (arguing that a system in which the Commission's "tortuous and expensive
hearing" can be followed by a sale to an entity to whom the FCC would not have awarded the
license in the comparative proceeding is'one "hell of a way to run a railroad"). But see supra text
accompanying note 84 (setting out a Commission proposal to grant a preference to applicants who
promise not to sell or transfer the station for at least three years).
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well help determine the amount and nature of purely local news and pub-
lic-affairs programming, but that programming seems almost peripheral
to the larger world of TV broadcasting. 134
The characteristic of our broadcast regulatory system relevant to
this Article, though, is more basic and should by now be fairly obvious:
it is that the system conflicts in almost every respect, and gratuitously so,
with conventional freedom-of-speech philosophy. When viewed against
the backdrop set out earlier in this Article, the broadcast regulatory
system seems nothing short of astonishing. Under ordinary First
Amendment philosophy, the decision whether speakers or speech
advance the "public interest" is not one for government; government is
specifically disabled from making that choice. The government may not
impose content restrictions simply to advance its own notions of the pub-
lic interest, and it surely may not make licensing decisions based on con-
tent. Any licensing requirement that the government does impose must
incorporate "narrow, objective, and definite standards." 135 Because any
such scheme unacceptably threatens censorship and suppression of par-
ticular points of view, no licensing scheme can involve "appraisal of
facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion ... by
the licensing authority." 136 Such criteria threaten "illegitimate abuse of
censorial power,'"137 and encourage self-censorship. Most "threatening"
are periodic licensing requirements, which ensure that speakers are
"under no illusion regarding the effect of the 'licensed' speech on the
ability to continue speaking in the future." '138
The FCC, by contrast, grants licenses, decides whether those
licenses will be renewed, and decides what licensees will be permitted to
say, on the basis of a vague "public interest" standard. The agency has
not been successful at importing objective content into that criterion. Its
licensing decisions are necessarily arbitrary; because they are neither con-
sistent nor easily predictable, they present the opportunity for political
bias and are not easily susceptible of useful review. The FCC has explic-
itly evaluated broadcasters and would-be broadcasters based on the con-
tent of their speech, proposed and past. This process has been
unavoidable, given a statutory scheme in which the crux of the renewal
decision is whether the licensee's programming has served the public
134. The approach may have made more sense in an earlier world in which the primary sources
of television news and public affairs programming were local rather than national. It was not until
the 1960s that the networks extended their flagship news shows from 15 to 30 minutes. Alfred C.
Sikes, Remarks on Broadcast Journalism and the Public Interest at the Alfred I. DuPont-Columbia
University Awards Ceremony (Jan. 16, 1990), in 1990 FCC LEXIS 388.
135. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1992) (quoting
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
136. Id. at 2401-02 (citation omitted) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305
(1940)).
137. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988).
138. Id. at 759-60.
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interest.139 That scrutiny too, though, has been subjective and highly
discretionary."4
The broadcast regulatory system, in short, violates all of the rules; it
is in sharp conflict with ordinary First Amendment law. To give govern-
ment the discretionary power to decide who can speak and who cannot,
based on what the speakers have already said or propose to say, gives it
wholly unacceptable influence over the thought processes of the commu-
nity. To erect a body of mass communications law under which the gov-
ernment grants some persons, but not others, a "license" to speak, makes
it a crime to speak without a license, adopts no neutral or objective stan-
dards to govern who will get a license and who will not, considers the
content of proposed speech in making the licensing choice, reviews peri-
odically whether it will take away the rights of current licensees, reserves
the authority to consider licensees' past speech in making that choice, all
in the name of encouraging that speech that best serves the "public inter-
est," seems just about as far from the law demanded by conventional
freedom-of-speech philosophy as it is possible to get.
2. The Red Lion Rationale
How can we possibly fit government licensing of broadcasters into
the First Amendment model? The traditional explanation for our broad-
cast regulatory system, adopted by the Supreme Court without dissent in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 141 is that "there are substantially
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate." In consequence,
it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
139. -See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
140. Robert Post has suggested that because the FCC is making judgments based on community
standards, its decisionmaking should not be dismissed as subjective; rather, it is intersubjective. The
agency is making its determinations not as a matter of mere personal whim, but as a matter of
community values. As a result, while those decisions may be controversial, they should not be
classed as arbitrary. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601, 624-26
(1990) (discussing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
Ordinary First Amendment doctrine, however, typically has treated such decisionmaking as
still too dangerous for speech regulation. Hustler, thus, exemplifies the Court's usual approach; the
Court there found an "outrageousness" standard too uncertain to support the imposition of
damages. 485 U.S. at 55. While the determination of obscenity under Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), is indeed dependent in part on community standards, that approach is the exception
rather than the rule.
141. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court in Red Lion was called upon to decide the validity of a
Commission rule requiring broadcasters to offer "a reasonable opportunity to respond" when,
"during the [broadcaster's] presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an
attack is made on the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or
group." Id. "at 373-74 (quoting the then-current version of 47 C.F.R. § 73). The Court upheld the
constitutionality and statutory basis of the rule, its specific application in the case before the Court,
and the larger "fairness doctrine" from which it had been derived. See id. at 375-401. Justice
Douglas did not participate. See id. at 401.
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broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish. If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there
are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same
"right" to a license; but if there is to be any effective communica-
tion by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be
barred from the airways. 142
The need to avoid interference on the airwaves thus calls for a govern-
ment agency to limit the number of broadcast speakers, and to patrol
them to make sure they stay on their assigned frequencies. Further,
because the selected licensees have no right to their licenses, the govern-
ment can require them to speak on behalf of the larger excluded commu-
nity, acting as trustees or fiduciaries for the "public":
[A]s far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are
licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused.
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitu-
tional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a
radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens .... [T]he
Government [may] requir[e] a licensee.., to conduct himself as a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which
would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 143
Any other result, the Court warned, might limit access to the means of
broadcast communications to a few persons or corporations; that could
lead to the "monopolization" of broadcast discourse by a few private
licensees, ending any possibility of "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail."'"
The reasoning set out in Red Lion, unfortunately, does not resolve
the conflict I have identified. The Red Lion rationale requires two logical
steps. The first is that the physical fact of broadcast frequency interfer-
ence necessitates administrative allocation of broadcast rights; the second
is that that administrative allocation should take the form of public-inter-
est licensing. Much attention has been given recently to attacks on the
first step of this reasoning. As Ronald Coase argued more than forty
years ago, the mere fact that 100 persons cannot, using a particular piece
of frequency spectrum, all broadcast at power levels of their choosing,
does not prove that we need an administrative agency to exclude some of
them. We might instead use a property-rights system, under which the
right to use spectrum is bought and sold like any other resource. 145
142. Id. at 388-89.
143. Id. at 389.
144. Id. at 390.
145. See Coase, supra note 16, at 25-35; see also BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 87-90 (discussing
and criticizing broadcast regulation in light of Coase's analysis); SPITZER, supra note 8, at 9-27
(same); Harry Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON.
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Government would enforce those property rights through the courts, and
the system could work, after a fashion, without the need for any adminis-
trative mechanism.1 46
I want to focus attention, though, on the second step of the tradi-
tional rationale: assuming that one concedes the value or usefulness of
some form of administrative allocation of broadcast rights, it by no
means follows that we therefore must adopt public-interest licensing. 147
Almost none of the conffict I have described between conventional First
Amendment philosophy and our system of broadcast regulation derives
from administrative allocation of broadcast rights as such; it derives,
rather, from the peculiar nature of the licensing system we have adopted,
which gives the government great discretion over the identity of licensees
and the content of their speech. 148
That discretion is surely not inevitable. Nothing in the nature of
administrative allocation requires that the government have the sort of
control over the identity of broadcast speakers, and the content of their
speech, that our current system gives it. Comparative issues could be
resolved by lottery, auction, or other means; there is no need for the
government to undertake intrusive inquiry once a license is awarded.
From the perspective of conventional free-speech philosophy, the discre-
tionary power that our current system gives the government over speech
is simply gratuitous.149
15, 30-32 (1967) (same); William W. Van Alstyne, The Mdbius Strip of the First Amendment:
Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. REV. 539, 553-58 (1978) (same).
The interference problem is widely recognized as one of defining separate frequency
"properties"; it is logically unconnected to the issue of who is to harvest those frequencies.
To confuse the definition of spectrum rights with the assignment of spectrum rights is to
believe that, to keep intruders out of (private) backyards, the government must own (or
allocate) all the houses.
Hazlett, supra note 8, at 138.
146. But see Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1274-77 (expressing doubt whether a pure market-
based system would function efficiently).
147. See Kalven, supra note 145, at 37-38; see also Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of
Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990, 1058-59, 1062-66 (1989) (describing a broadcast
regulation system in which an administrative body allocates broadcast rights but has no content
regulatory role).
148. Take the town meeting which is often thought of as a model of free speech in
operation. If the Chairman is keeping order he has problems somewhat like those of
broadcasting. Not everyone can talk at once nor can they talk too long since time is scarce
nor can they talk far off the point. The speakers are in effect "licensed" by the chairman,
yet no one has ever said that this spoiled the game. What is understood by us all here is an
implicit standard limiting the chairman to [viewpoint-neutral] regulation.
Kalven, supra note 145, at 47-48 (footnote omitted); see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575-76 (1941) (upholding as constitutional a state parade licensing scheme requiring the licensing
board to limit itself to content-neutral "considerations of time, place and manner" relating to "the
convenience of public use of the highways").
149. This is not to say that the government need not have some policy role; any administrative
allocation plan will necessarily require the government to make public-policy choices. A regulatory
agency must address such questions as where to place each service (such as FM radio, UHF
television, and land mobile radio) on the frequency band; how wide a portion of the frequency band
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I am not seeking here to argue that the United States should have
adopted any particular allocation scheme for broadcasting, whether
administrative or market-based. 150 My point, rather, is the philosophical
incompatibility of public-interest licensing with the ordinary rules: given
what I have described as the vagueness, unpredictability, subjectivity,
and content control inherent in our public-interest licensing system, one
cannot accept that system without suspending ordinary First Amend-
ment thinking in favor of a different, and inconsistent, philosophy. 5 1
Nor can public-interest licensing be reconciled with conventional
free-speech philosophy on the basis of Red Lion's concern that public-
interest licensing is necessary, in light of the scarcity of spectrum, to
avoid an undesirably concentrated marketplace of ideas controlled by the
wealthy. Allocating licenses through lotteries would serve that end at
least as well; it is by no means clear why we should substitute a system
involving profound government discretion over speech. (Indeed, it is
doubtful that public-interest licensing does much serve the end of avoid-
to allocate to each service; how to distribute stations geographically; how much spectrum to allot to
each station; and how much power and antenna height to allow each station. Weinberg, supra note
40, at 642 n.112.
AM radio allocation in this country, thus, was premised in part on the Federal Radio
Commission's General Order 40, which structured the broadcast system by prescribing the power
levels available to stations on each frequency, and hence the number of stations that could be
accommodated on each frequency, and how far their signals would reach. See 1928 F.R.C. ANN.
REP. 48 (as found in Supplemental Report for Period from July 1, 1928 to September 30, 1928);
Weinberg, supra note 40, at 648. That allocation turned out to be flawed: the combination of
General Order 40 with early allocation decisions favoring urban applicants and the first-come-first-
served approach the FCC relied on after 1939, see id. at 653-54, ended up to some extent depriving
rural areas of service. See Id. at 654.
In licensing television stations, the FCC took a completely different tack, promulgating a Table
of Assignments that filled up the frequency band by assigning at least one channel to each of 1,274
different communities. In so doing, the Commission again made policy judgments regarding where
broadcast licenses should be located, whether to favor large or small communities, and so on. That
plan was also flawed. It limited the number of signals available in the major markets because of the
Commission's insistence on assigning many small communities their own television stations (which
sometimes turned out not to be economically viable) rather than serving those communities through
powerful metropolitan stations. See id. at 654-55 & 654 n.169; see also Robinson, supra note 76, at
259-61 (deploring the industry structure produced by the Commission's "misdirected and
ineffectual" regulation). The crucial point, though, is that while the government in an
administrative allocation scheme has the power to make important policy choices shaping the
broadcast structure, it need have no discretionary power over the identity of particular licensees or
the content of their speech.
150. For argument that any administrative allocation system would be inferior to a market-
based plan, see Spitzer, supra note 147, at 1062-65.
151. See BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 71-73; see also Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1405, 1416 (1986); Kalven, supra note 145, at 15-18; Van Alstyne,
supra note 145, at 574. But see Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128-
29 (7th Cir. 1982) (cable franchising procedures that were assertedly "political," "devoid of
standards," and "create[d] the potential for denying a franchise on invidious grounds" could
nonetheless be constitutional; "it is a fair question how far the courts should go in making
municipalities rewrite their cable television ordinances to prevent dangers that may be largely
hypothetical.").
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ing domination by the wealthy, since licenses---once awarded-can be
freely sold in the marketplace to the highest bidder. 152) In short, our
broadcast regulatory scheme, emphasizing the government's broad dis-
cretion in protecting the citizenry from the media and from concentra-
tions of private wealth, may well be justifiable on its own terms, but it
cannot be reconciled with the ideology we apply in other free-speech
contexts. 153
How-and why-did we come to adopt an approach so inconsistent
with our ordinary philosophy? A variety of commentators have
addressed this question; 154 1 will not repeat all of their answers here."55
152. See Weinberg, supra note 40, at 617 n.3; supra note 133 and accompanying text.
Distributing the right to a commodity on an egalitarian basis but allowing that right to be freely
transferred on the market is unlikely to produce an ultimate distribution much different from that
which the market would have produced in the first instance. See James Tobin, On Limiting the
Domain of Inequality, 13 J.L. & ECON. 263, 268 (1970). Congress could end the free marketplace in
already-awarded licenses by repealing the last sentence of 47 U.S.C. § 310(d), but public-interest
licensing would remain a gratuitously intrusive way of avoiding market distortions.
Moreover, if one accepts the notion that the ordinary First Amendment rules should be
suspended for broadcasting, because too few persons can participate in broadcasting to generate a
working marketplace of ideas, it is difficult to avoid reaching the same conclusion with regard to the
print media. Print markets, like broadcast markets, are neither well-populated nor competitive. See
BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 94. The Supreme Court has declared those facts regarding print
markets to be legally irrelevant. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254
(1974). There is no obvious reason why the scarcity analysis should not be the same for broadcast.
Indeed, the argument can surely be made that print outlets are more scarce than broadcast outlets.
While all but 4% of the public have access to five or more television stations, see Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5054 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1019 (1990), remarkably few members of the public have access to more than one local daily
newspaper, see id. ("[O]nly 125 cities have two or more local newspapers."); C. Edwin Baker,
Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2115 (1992) (reporting that in 1986,
only 28 cities had separately owned and operated daily newspapers). But see Spitzer, supra note 147,
at 1018 (arguing that neither print nor broadcast is inherently more scarce).
In any event, it is by no means apparent why broadcasting should be regarded as a
"marketplace" of its own at all, separate from all other forms of speech, rather than as simply part of
a larger marketplace of ideas also encompassing other forms of media. See Fairness Doctrine
Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 198-202 (1985) (treating traditional broadcast
services, new electronic media and print as all part of a larger information services marketplace);
L.A. Powe, Jr., "Or of the [Broadcast] Press, " 55 TEX. L. REV. 39, 55-56 (1976).
153. Our regulation of cable television further demonstrates the conflict; the regulatory scheme
is today finding itself vulnerable to attack on traditional freedom-of-speech grounds precisely to the
extent that it has adopted features, such as monopoly franchising and access regulation, typical of
public-interest licensing. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396, 1403-04 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply broadcast regulation precedents to justify regulation
of cable), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto,
648 F. Supp. 1465, 1470-75 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
154. See, e.g., POOL, supra note 15, at 108-29, 136-38; see also Hazlett, supra note 8; Jora R.
Minasian, The Political Economy of Broadcasting in the 1920s, 12 J.L. & EcoN. 391 (1969)
(discussing the history of broadcast regulation).
155. William Mayton has argued that Congress, in passing the Communications Act of 1934,
never intended the FCC to have more than modest "traffic cop" powers relating to the assignment of
wavelengths and power levels and the control of interference. See Mayton, supra note 8, at 728-39,
750-54. Professor Mayton's argument is useful but overstated. Congress, in setting out the public-
interest standard for licensing in the Radio Act of 1927, may well have had the "traffic cop" role
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The most important explanation begins from the fact that our early
broadcast law was written before the development of contemporary
freedom of speech law. The Radio Act was passed in 1927; the
Communications Act in 1934. Modem First Amendment philosophy,
well-established as it is now, did not begin to take shape until about the
same time. 156 Near v. Minnesota, 1 57 one of the first cases in which the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a First Amendment claim, 158 was not
decided until 1931, four years after the passage of the Radio Act. When
the Radio and Communications Acts were enacted, what we now think
of as ordinary First Amendment philosophy was still in embryonic form.
The case that Lee Bollinger has termed "the fullest, richest articulation
of the central image of freedom of the press" '159 -New York Times Co. v.
primarily in mind. All influential parties agreed from the start, though, that choosing licensees
would require more subjective attention to the public interest; Secretary Hoover referred to licensee
selection as "a very large discretionary or a semi-judicial function." See generally 1 HARRY P.
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 92, at 770-71 (1949) (quoting Fourth National Radio
Conference 8 (1926)).
As the Federal Radio Commission went about the business of broadcast regulation between
1927 and 1934, it asserted a variety of extensive powers well beyond the "traffic cop" model, basing
decisions on the content of applicants' speech. See, eg., Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio
Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (affirming FRC denial of license renewal to a broadcaster
who attacked local government officials, the bar association, organized labor, and religious groups),
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931)
(affirming FRC denial of license renewal to a broadcaster who used his station to prescribe medicines
he sold). See generally POOL, supra note 15, at 122-29. Congress was aware of those facts in 1934,
and yet carried over the Radio Act's "public interest" language into the Communications Act. See
Kalven, supra note 145, at 25.
In any event, Professor Mayton focuses his argument on FCC powers outside of the
comparative arena. Congress in 1934, though, plainly intended the FCC to make a judgment
somehow in comparative licensing cases, and one would be hard-pressed to argue, in light of
contemporary administrative practice, that Congress saw the agency as making those judgments via
lotteries or auctions. The congressional scheme thus called upon the FCC to make policy judgments
in comparative cases of the sort ultimately codified in the Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). And if Congress intended the FCC to deny licenses in
comparative cases based on such extrastatutory considerations, it is not a powerful argument (nor
was it the law under the Radio Act) that the agency should be disabled from making similar policy
judgments in noncomparative contexts. Under such a regime, any broadcaster, initially
unchallenged, not conforming to the FCC's policies for comparative cases would simply lose its
license at the first challenge.
156. See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 4 (1991).
157. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
158. In Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), a case with clear First Amendment shadings, the
Court had reversed a conviction of an International Workers of the World organizer under the
Kansas Criminal Syndicalism Act, on the ground that the sole evidence presented by the state-a
copy of the IWW constitution-insufficiently demonstrated that the IWW advocated criminal
syndicalism within the meaning of the statute. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931),
the Court struck down as vague a state statute prohibiting the public display of a "red flag... or
device of any color or form" as a "sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to organized government."
The Court found the statute unclear as to whether it would preclude "peaceful and orderly
opposition to government by legal means." Id. at 369.
159. BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 2.
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Sullivan Q-6owould not be decided until 1964. That the drafters of those
statutes were not sensitive to later constitutional developments should
not be surprising.
On the other hand, it is surprising that we paid so little attention
to the conflict in the years that followed. The most important First
Amendment theorists of this century, including Alexander Meiklejohn
and Thomas Emerson, supported public-interest licensing. 161 The opin-
ion in Red Lion, upholding public-interest licensing, was approved by all
participating members of the Court, including First Amendment "abso-
lutist"162 Justice Black. 163 Public-interest licensing is still the law of the
land, sixty-four years after the Radio Act was enacted. The ACLU,
whose very mission is the protection of constitutional rights, maintains
its support for the fairness doctrine.1 4 If the situation were merely that
Congress innocently established in the 1920s and 1930s a system that
later turned out to be problematic under contemporary constitutional
law, one would think that we would have done something about it by
now.
The problem, I believe, is a deeper one. My analysis so far has
assumed the completeness and correctness of ordinary freedom-of-speech
thinking. The continuing strength of public-interest licensing, however,
derives from the fact that ordinary First Amendment philosophy is itself
problematic. Broadcast law, I will argue, reflects concerns about the
dangers posed by concentrations of private media power, and the degree
to which private institutional and economic power can skew the reason-
ing process of the community. These concerns, which find no place in
First Amendment philosophy, are nonetheless real and legitimate. To
appreciate this point, it is useful to go back and look at freedom-of-
speech law more generally.
II
THE FREE SPEECH TRADITION REEXAMINED
In this section of my discussion, I will examine American freedom-
of-speech philosophy primarily by focusing on the central image of the
"marketplace of ideas." I will first make the argument that the market-
place image is indeed central: it is both historically and doctrinally at the
heart of modern First Amendment philosophy. I will next argue that the
metaphor is flawed and that those flaws matter. The marketplace meta-
160. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
161. See sources cited in BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 91.
162. See Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 552-54 (1962).
163. There were, however, dissenting voices among prominent scholars: the losing briefs in Red
Lion were signed by, among others, Harry Kalven, Herbert Wechsler, and Archibald Cox, See Fiss,
supra note 151, at 1416 & n.28.
164. See Norman Dorsen, Talking Liberties, Civ. LBERTIES, Winter 1990-91, at 16.
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phor's instrumental vision is that free discussion can best be achieved
when government plays no role in the marketplace of ideas (other than
the enforcement of property rights in communications resources, and
other common-law support for private ordering). Two descriptive prem-
ises are implicit in that vision. The first is that enough members of soci-
ety, in the absence of an active government role, have a meaningful
opportunity to speak and to convince others of their views. The second
is that our discourse is essentially rational: that people process speech
for the most part on a rational level, and choose to adopt one belief
rather than another as a result of this reasoning process. Neither of these
premises, though, seems true.
The image of the "marketplace of ideas" has played a crucial role in
free-speech thinking. 6 ' Milton, as far back as the seventeenth century,
supported his argument against government licensing of speech by invok-
ing the image of truth and falsehood grappling in "free and open encoun-
ter." In such a conflict, he asked, "who ever knew Truth put to the
wors[t]"?166 John Stuart Mill articulated the philosophy at length two
centuries later. 167 Still later, Justice Holmes conjured up the vision in
classic words:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. 168
The metaphor began to play a major role in American thought after
our 1930s rejection of Lochner169 and acceptance of a new judicial phi-
165. See BAKER, supra note 33, at 12 (marketplace theory "dominates [First Amendment
thinking] both rhetorically and conceptually"); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15 (1982) (the argument that free speech is valuable because it leads to
the discovery of truth is "the predominant and most persevering" of all arguments historically
employed to justify the free speech principle).
166. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in IV THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON
293, 347 (Frank A. Patterson et al. eds., 1931).
167. See MILL, supra note 26, at 19-67.
168. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). American
courts, indeed, have invoked that theme regardless of whether they were upholding or rejecting the
free speech claim. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (stating that "speech
can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest
government policies," yet upholding convictions of Communist Party leaders); id. at 550
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The history of civilization is in considerable measure the
displacement of error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to
other truths.").
169. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Day-Bright Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
1993] 1139
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1101
losophy hostile to the idea of natural, inherent individual rights.' °
Under progressive views of the judicial role in the early-twentieth cen-
tury, individual "rights" had value only to the extent that they advanced
societal goals in a particular historical context; the legislature was to
decide the degree to which recognizing a particular individual claim
would benefit society as a whole. 171 This presented a problem for those
who would grant judicial protection for free speech rights. On what the-
ory could the courts overrule a legislative determination that the value of
punishing certain speech exceeded the value of protecting it?
The solution, advanced by Zechariah Chafee (among others), was
that judges should protect speech because of its role as the basis of demo-
cratic society, rather than as a discredited natural right. 172 Free speech
not only promoted the societal interest in "the attainment and spread of
truth ... as the basis of political and social progress,"'173 but also sup-
ported the democratic process, whose results the judges were bound to
170. Courts in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries had commonly seen free speech
claims as presenting no issues substantially different from those posed by economic regulation. See,
eg., In re Garrabad, 54 N.W. 1104, 1107 (Wis. 1893) (describing the issue raised by a parade permit
ordinance as substantially identical to that posed by Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886),
because both cases concerned arbitrary executive control over the exercise of a protected right-in
the one case parading in the streets and in the other engaging in the laundry business); see also Rich
v. City of Naperville, 42 Ill. App. 222, 223-24 (1891) (parade permit); Frazee's Case, 403, 30 N.W.
72, 74 (Mich. 1886) (same). Prior to the Lochner era, thus, state courts commonly rejected speech
claims on the ground that free speech was a "condition[] of civil liberty" subject to regulation under
the police power like any other. State v. McKee, 46 A. 409, 413-14 (Conn. 1900); see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 30 N.E. 79, 79 (Mass. 1892) (upholding regulation of public speech,
relying in part on Quincy v. Kennard, 24 N.E. 860 (Mass. 1890), a case upholding the city's power
to regulate the raising of swine).
The Lochner era offered free speech claimants an avenue to expanded legal protection. The
petitioner in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), thus, emphasized that he was not merely
raising a free speech claim; he invoked the spirit of Lochner by arguing that the legislature had
abridged a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. See Jonathan Weinberg, Gitlow v.
New York and "The Fundamental Personal Rights and 'Liberties' Protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" 17-18 (April 1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). The Supreme Court accepted that characterization of the issue. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 664. In
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927), the Court framed the free speech question before it
in terms of whether the state statute was "an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power
of the State." Justice Brandeis, arguing in favor of expansive free speech protection in that case, at
one point found himself relying on five cases nullifying economic regulation in which he had
dissented:
Prohibitory legislation has repeatedly been held invalid ... where the denial of liberty
involved was that of engaging in a particular business. The power of the courts to strike
down an offending law is no less when the interests involved are not property rights, but
the fundamental personal rights of free speech and assembly.
Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). After the demise of Lochner, this argument
was no longer available.
171. See generally GRABER, supra note 156, at 69-74 (describing Roscoe Pound's "sociological
jurisprudence").
172. See id. at 122-59 (chronicling Chafee's contributions to constitutional free speech
doctrine).
173. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 137 (1941).
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respect. 174 The idea that free speech would guarantee a working demo-
cratic process made acceptable the courts' withdrawal from the task of
protecting individual economic rights. 17  The marketplace metaphor
underlay this vision of free speech as valuable because of its role in pro-
moting both the attainment of truth and democratic self-government.
Since that time, the marketplace metaphor has served as the basis
for essential First Amendment doctrine. 176 Its faith in the ultimate func-
tioning of the communicative process, for example, is at the heart of
Justice Brandeis' injunction that "[i]f there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the [proper response to subversive advocacy] is more speech,
not enforced silence." 177 The marketplace metaphor is pivotal in our
thought.178 It is not the only vision that has played a role in modern free
speech protection; modern First Amendment philosophers have con-
structed impressive and well-accepted arguments that free speech should
be protected because it advances goals connected to individual auton-
omy, self-realization, and human dignity.' 79 These arguments too, how-
174. See id. at 361.
175. See id.; J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 390-92.
176. The exact phrase did not appear in a Supreme Court opinion until Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). For a survey of the development of the
metaphor, see David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition,
95 YALE L.J. 857, 875-904 (1986).
The selection of the "marketplace" as the ruling metaphor here is in one respect curious: it is
used to support government withdrawal from the "market for ideas" notwithstanding our nearly
complete acceptance of vigorous government involvement in the "market for goods." One
commentator has called this incongruity "really quite extraordinary." R.H. Coase, The Market for
Goods and the Market for Ideas, PAPERS & PROCS. OF THE 86TH ANN. MEETING OF THE AM.
ECON. Ass'N 384, 386 (1974); see also Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964).
177. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Language can
be found in Justice Brandeis' brilliant concurrence supporting just about every modem theory of the
First Amendment. Advocates of the First Amendment as a path to individual self-fulfillment, thus,
can note Brandeis' approving statement that "[those who won our independence believed that the
final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties"; they "valued liberty both as
an end and as a means." Id. at 375. Advocates of a "safety valve" theory of the First Amendment
can cite Brandeis' exhortation that the Framers knew "that order cannot be secured merely through
fear ... ; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies." Id. The basic
idea that free speech promotes truth and provides its own inoculation against "noxious doctrine,"
id., however, seems to me particularly central to the opinion.
178. See generally BAKER, supra note 33, at 7-12 (discussing the central role of marketplace
theory in the Court's development of First Amendment law).
179. See, e.g., id.; Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963) (discussing "self-fulfillment"); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (arguing that the "true value" of free speech is
"individual self-realization"). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 119 (1989) (categorizing consequentialist and nonconsequentialist justifications for a free-
speech principle). In addition, while free speech justifications that focus on the role of speech in a
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ever, often rely on the core premises of the marketplace metaphor.180
The idea that the value of free speech lies in its advancement of such
goals as the discovery of truth and democratic self-government is suffi-
ciently at the core of our First Amendment philosophy that it would be
troubling to find it seriously flawed.1 8' Nonetheless, it is flawed. Others
have made this argument before, 18 2 but the point is usually treated as of
little practical relevance. Proof of the weakness of the marketplace meta-
phor is seen as "an insight more fundamental than we can use." '83 I
think, though, that the flaws in the marketplace metaphor are both real
and important. In order to examine them, I will discuss the metaphor
more closely.
The marketplace metaphor is central to a wide range of First
Amendment philosophies. Scholars see the marketplace as important
because it yields truth, which is in turn seen as intrinsically or instrumen-
tally valuable.' 84 They see it as important because it yields information
and ideas useful to the process of democratic self-government;18 they see
it as itself a part of self-government. 86 All of these approaches, though,
political democracy in large part present special cases of the truth discovery argument, see
Greenawalt, supra at 145-46, some of those arguments seem independent of the marketplace
metaphor. See BAKER, supra note 33, at 28-30; SCHAUER, supra note 165, at 35-46. In particular,
Robert Post's focus on public discourse as a necessary constituent of self-determination, and thus
democracy, does not require the marketplace metaphor. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake:
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Post,
supra note 35, at 279-83. For Post, an empirical challenge to the factual basis of the marketplace
metaphor is almost always irrelevant. The concept of individual autonomy must remain central to
First Amendment law in any event, "as a moral ascription that marks the boundaries of our
commitment to democratic self-government." 64 U. CoLo. L. REV. at 1132.
180. See infra note 209.
181. It is standard wisdom that the rich variety of First Amendment theories protects First
Amendment doctrine from attack. Even where one theory is insufficient standing alone, the
"synergy" between the various theories provides additional strength. See L.A. Powe, Jr.,
Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172, 182 (1987). This does not mean, though,
that we should simply ignore the flaws in the marketplace metaphor. The inadequacy of the leading
philosophical justification supporting one of the most celebrated provisions of American
constitutional law is at best odd. At worst, it is a signal that something somewhere is very wrong,
182. See, eg., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 964 (1978); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV,
L. REV. 1641 (1967); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1; MacKinnon, supra note 27.
183. Kalven, supra note 145, at 30 (describing Coase's proof that broadcast licenses could be
allocated through the market).
184. See, first and foremost, MILL, supra note 26. For a somewhat skeptical perspective, see
Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 699, 706 (1991)
("So what? Why is it good for a society to have more truth?").
185. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 22-27 (1948).
186. Under such a theory, some see the creation of socially accepted truth in the marketplace as
part of the process through which the community, as a community, constructs its world. This view
adds the trappings of democracy to the skeptical position, often attributed to Justice Holmes, that we
should define truth by reference to whatever emerges from the process of open discussion. This
approach has appeal as a response to modern claims that truth is inherently subjective, and thus
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share a common theme. The desired value-whether truth or democ-
racy-is seen as best emerging from total competition among conflicting
ideas and viewpoints. When First Amendment philosophers seek truth,
they reason that truth is most likely to emerge when we expand the mar-
ketplace, and the scope of ideas expressed, and sweep away all impedi-
ments to free discussion. 187 Democracy, similarly, can be most nearly
attained only when all can participate in the open process of debate.188
How is this full competition among conflicting ideas to be achieved?
According to the instrumental vision central to the metaphor, free dis-
cussion can best take place when government plays no role in the compe-
tition of ideas." 9 Governmental involvement is seen as likely to constrict
vital interchange; the ideal model of full and complete exchange of views
thus is that of discussion in the "private" sphere.
Two descriptive premises are implicit in this instrumental vision.
The first premise is that enough members of society, in the absence of an
intrusive government role, have meaningful opportunity to speak and to
convince others of their views. If too few members of society had that
opportunity, we could not count on a large and diverse population offer-
ing "the multitude of ideas that are the fuel of the engine for advancing
knowledge."19 Marketplace theory supposes that powerless sectors of
that population are in a meaningful position to offer ideas. It supposes
that ideas can be meaningfully evaluated without regard to the level of
political, economic, and social resources available to their proponents.
Otherwise, there is little reason to believe that the marketplace would
yield either truth or democratic self-determination.
The second premise is that our discourse is essentially rational: that
people process speech on a rational level, and choose to adopt one belief
rather than another as a result of this reasoning process. This, as Kent
Greenawalt has noted, seems especially vital to the force of the market-
place metaphor:
[P]erhaps on deeper questions, people do not make reasoned judg-
ments about competing positions but merely acquire reinforce-
ment of views that conform with social conventions or serve their
particular interests or unconscious desires. In that event, the
hardly "discoverable" through a Millian marketplace of ideas. It seems particularly vulnerable,
though, to the question of why democracy "commits us to the results of a marketplace of ideas
rather than, say, the results of democratically determined suppression." Greenawalt, supra note
179, at 154.
187. See, eg., SCHAUER, supra note 165, at 16.
188. Id.
189. In fact, adherents of the marketplace metaphor do not contemplate that the government
will play no role in regulating speech; they expect the government to enforce property rights in
communications resources, and otherwise to provide common-law-based support for private
ordering. Marketplace ideology, though, does not treat this as "real" government regulation. See
generally infra Part III.
190. SCHAUER, supra note 165, at 27.
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"marketplace of ideas" . . gives little promise of yielding truth
even in the long run, particularly if the disproportionate influence
of a few centers of private power over what gets communicated is
likely to be exercised in favor of dominant and comforting
views. 191
The problem is that neither of these premises seems true. Scholars
have attacked them as problematic, indeed wholly unjustified.192 Before
I evaluate the strength of these premises, though, I want to take a
moment to consider whether their accuracy is as vital to the success of
the metaphor as I have assumed. Some scholars argue that marketplace
theory is well-founded even though the marketplace does not perfectly
promote truth. Even if economic, political, and social inequality distort
the marketplace, they argue, and even if the irrationality of discourse
cripples it further, the marketplace is a success, and marketplace theory
is worth preserving, because it leads us towards truth better than do
other approaches. t 93 This conclusion is especially secure, they argue,
because free speech protects goals such as self-realization that are not
usually associated with the marketplace metaphor at all. 194
A. Do the Premises of Marketplace Theory Matter?
I believe that the flaws of marketplace theory are important.
Marketplace philosophy disables the government even from addressing
serious distortions of the marketplace resulting from imbalances of pri-
vate power.1 95 It is hardly obvious that truth will always be better served
without government intervention than with.
This defense of marketplace theory, moreover, slights the costs that
marketplace theory imposes. A philosophy shunning any government
involvement in the "open and unregulated market for the trade in
191. Greenawalt, supra note 179, at 135. Professor Greenawalt continues, though, that "It]he
critical question is... how well [truth] will advance in conditions of freedom as compared with some
alternative set of conditions." Id. (emphasis added).
192. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 182.
193. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 33, at 17-22 (evaluating the argument).
194. See supra note 179 and accompanying text; see also L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the
Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 243, 281 (arguing that we cling to conventional First
Amendment philosophy not because of "a naive belief that truth is knowable or that the electorate
will rationally choose it," but because of "the simple recognition that no theory requiring people to
stop speaking (or stop listening) better fits with our traditions than the one we have adopted").
195. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (rejecting an argument, in support of
campaign finance law, based on an asserted government interest in "equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections": "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some.., in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment"). In the words of Owen Fiss, marketplace theory seeks to protect individuals'
speech autonomy by placing a "zone of noninterference ... around each individual," and prohibiting
"the state (and the state alone) ... from crossing the boundary." Fiss, supra note 27, at 785.
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ideas" 196 has significant disadvantages. Speech, after all, can do harm;;197
marketplace theory leaves the government largely powerless to protect
individuals from such harm. First Amendment theory and doctrine
respond to that concern by de-emphasizing the link between speakers
and the harms speech can cause.1 98 For example, speakers are not held
responsible, unless tremendously stringent tests are met, for entirely fore-
seeable criminal actions they inspire third parties to take; those third par-
ties are seen as independent moral agents, whom the state ought to
address directly.1 99 This stands in sharp contrast, for example, to prod-
uct liability cases, in which we hold manufacturers responsible for inju-
ries they should have foreseen and could have prevented, even if those
injuries would not have occurred but for someone else's subsequent negli-
gence or criminality.2"
Similarly, First Amendment doctrine often emphasizes the responsi-
bility of victims to avoid or ameliorate any harm that befalls them.01
Public-figure targets of defamation are expected to exploit their own
access to the news media and thus lessen the damage to their reputa-
tions.202 Persons subjected to indecent language in public are admon-
196. SCHAUER, supra note 165, at 16.
197. "[V]irtually everyone writing today in the first amendment area understands, as their
academic elders seemed not to, that speech hurts." L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Communications and the
First Amendment: An Overview, 55 LAWv & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54 (1992); see Frederick Schauer,
The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHics 635 (1993). The Court recently confronted
such harm in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992) (striking down an ordinance
addressed to speech that, in the words of the Court, injured "the basic human rights of members of
groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group
members to live in peace where they wish").
198. See J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 254-61 (1990); cf.
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1318 (1992) (stating that courts use
causation concepts as "judicial tools" to limit and assign responsibility).
199. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the state may not
prohibit advocacy of violence or criminal acts except where that advocacy "is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"). The Supreme
Court used parallel reasoning some 30 years earlier in holding that a local government may not
restrict handbill distribution in order to reduce littering: "There are obvious methods of preventing
littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets."
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). See Balkin, supra note 198, at 258-59 (discussing
Schneider).
200. See Balkin, supra note 198, at 259-60 (discussing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), which deals with an automobile manufacturer's responsibility to provide a
"crashworthy" vehicle); Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321,
1345 n.76 (1992) (discussing intervening fault by plaintiffs).
201. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 647-48.
202. Indeed, the law presumes that "public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1974). Lee Bollinger has characterized this statement as "an unfair ploy by the Court, an avoidance
maneuver by which it tries to minimize the degree to which we should care about the pain inflicted
under our rules.... [I]t simply is wrong to suppose that the pain inflicted by defamatory statements
about public officials and figures is not our responsibility or concern." BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at
25.
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ished to "avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities.., by averting
their eyes."203 We are reluctant to find that the targets of speech need
government protection; we typically stress their ability to look after their
own interests. First Amendment theory is thus hostile to the feminist
argument that women are unable adequately to defend themselves
against the effects of pornography because they are victims of a sex-based
system of subordination and repression smothering their voices.24 In
the employment realm, by contrast, we take for granted that employees
may not have complete freedom of action in defending themselves from
workplace demands contrary to public policy; we recognize that employ-
ers may have economic power that substantially constrains their employ-
ees' choices.20 5 In product liability cases, similarly, we tend to hold
manufacturers responsible for consumers' predicaments; we assume that
consumers may lack the information, alternatives, or expertise they need
to avoid the danger presented by defective products. 20 6 Yet the same
plaintiff judged "helpless in consumer transactions" is treated as an
independent, uncoerced moral actor, "adept and competent," able to
look after her own interests in the marketplace of ideas.20 7
203. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The government, similarly, is told to
ameliorate the harm presented by subversive speech by responding with "more speech." See, e.g.,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
204. See Balkin, supra note 198, at 260-61. See generally Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male
Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); MacKinnon, supra
note 27.
205. This recognition lies at the heart of much of our employment law, reflected in rules ranging
from maximum hours regulation, to workplace safety rules, to the incorporation of a sexual
harassment proscription into Title VII.
206. This approach is sufficiently pervasive as to control even "failure to warn" cases, where the
manufacturer is held liable for consumer misuse flowing from the manufacturer's failure to supply
adequate instructions. See, eg., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976). One might
argue that the manufacturer here is being punished for the content of its speech; yet we can find the
defendant responsible because we categorize the case as relating to product-liability law rather than
to expression.
207. Balkin, supra note 198, at 260; see also Coase, supra note 176, at 384-85; Post, supra note
179, at 1130-32 (describing the difference in approach as essential to democracy).
First Amendment doctrine concedes that in particular circumstances individuals may be
powerless to avoid the harms of certain speech. The most obvious example is private-figure
defamation; while positing that "[t]he first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help-using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 344 (1974), the Supreme Court has recognized that private individuals do not enjoy
meaningful "access to the channels of effective communication," and thus may have no "realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements." Id. On the other hand, this solicitude for the victims of
defamation is limited to cases in which the harmful speech was narrowly focused to target a
particular individual victim. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (striking down an
ordinance designed to prevent a Nazi demonstration notwithstanding arguments that the
demonstration would amount to group libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). The idea that individuals may be powerless to avoid the harms caused
by speech similarly underlies the "captive audience" rationale for upholding speech restrictions. See,
e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (holding
that a city may limit access to advertising space on public transit in order to protect "the right of the
commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy"); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
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This vision of society helps justify the costs that a libertarian speech
theory imposes.20 8 Any evil done by speech is laid at the doorstep of
those who have failed to disseminate the appropriate counter-speech.
The assumptions implicit in this vision, however, amount to a repack-
aging of the two earlier premises of equality and rationality in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. The marketplace of ideas is thought to work,
notwithstanding distorting influences, because the individuals participat-
ing in it are free and uncoerced, readily able to distribute their own com-
peting messages, which will be considered in the marketplace in accord
with their merits. The premises underlying the marketplace metaphor,
thus, are even more important than they seem at first glance; we cannot
avoid examining them by relying on an escape mechanism that takes
them for granted.20 9
Were we to reject the premise that individuals can participate effec-
tively in the marketplace, we would have to give much more serious con-
sideration to the desirability of government involvement in the
marketplace designed to counterbalance the distorting influence of pri-
vate power and wealth.210 We would have to think hard about the mag-
U.S. 726,748-49 (1978) ("To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he
hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow."). In the First Amendment tradition, however, such cases tend to be treated as part of a
limited, sharply demarcated exception to the otherwise universal reality of autonomy. There is little
reliance, as there is in the economic sphere, on the idea that imbalances of power or information
routinely limit individuals' ability to avoid or mitigate the harm that speech can do.
208. FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOcIETY 425-29 (1981) provides a
good illustration; for a criticism of that book on essentially this ground, see Frederick Schauer, Free
Speech and the Assumption of Rationality, 36 VAND. L. REV. 199, 205-09 (1983) (book review).
209. Indeed, because this escape mechanism tends to be implicit even in non-marketplace-based
theories of free speech, those theories too rest on marketplace premises. Some free speech theorists
suggest that speech should be given unique protection from government intrusion because of its role
in individual self-development and self-realization, or its connection to individual dignity and equal
respect. See, eg., Redish, supra note 179; David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974). Those theorists,
however, must reconcile special protection for speech with the fact that conduct serving the same
values is easily regulable. They tend to fall back on the view that the harms caused by speech are not
as problematic as those caused by conduct. See Schauer, supra note 197, at 640-41; HAIMAN, supra
note 208, at 20-21. That assumption, however, often reaches back to the vision I have just described;
it is because the marketplace can "correct" the damage done by speech that we need not take that
damage seriously.
210. This is something we almost never do. The Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1976), rejected the argument that the "governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" justified a statutory limit on
independent political campaign expenditures; it declared that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment."
There are isolated exceptions to this rule. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990), may provide one; the Court there upheld a state statute barring political contributions in
candidate elections from corporate treasury funds. The Court found legitimate the state's desire to
prevent the "distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
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nitude of the effects of inequality in the marketplace, the extent to which
government action could minimize those effects, and the dangers of such
government intervention.2"1 We ultimately might conclude that the dan-
ger posed by self-interested bureaucrats meddling with public discourse
is so great that we are better off with a rule of strict government
noninvolvement even in a decidedly unfree marketplace of ideas.212 But
we could not blandly rely on the metaphor of the free and unfettered
marketplace, and we would have to question whether such a biased dis-
course really has the salutary effects that are said to justify highly protec-
tive free speech doctrine.
Were we to abandon the premise of rationality, we still might feel
that government control of public discourse is so pernicious as to make
desirable a rule that speech should be unrestrained by government. But
we would have to reevaluate whether the marketplace's limited contribu-
tion to the discovery of ultimate Truth justifies our toleration of the
harms that unrestrained speech can do and that speech-restrictive laws
are often intended to prevent. We would have to question whether we
should maintain our current commitment to free speech nearly across the
board, or whether-at least in certain contexts-restricting speech might
do more good than it is likely to do harm.213
B. Are the Premises of Marketplace Theory Correct?
Modern First Amendment philosophy depends heavily on the
assumptions of equality and rationality. And yet those assumptions-
part of what Jerome Barron referred to as the "romantic view of the first
corporation's political ideas." Id. at 660. Red Lion provides another. See infra notes 329-31 and
accompanying text.
211. Government action to remedy such inequality would present difficulties. I have already
discussed the problems inherent in one attempt-the fairness doctrine-to remedy the inequality of
resources available to present different viewpoints. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
A wholehearted attempt to ensure all individuals' complete equality of opportunity to advance ideas
would require a radical transformation of our media system, effected through "state intervention of
tremendous scope." BAKER, supra note 33, at 46; see also ScHbIDT, supra note 10, at 18-22
(contemplating modes of expanded access); Stanley Ingber, The First Amendment in Modern Garb:
Retaining System Legitimacy, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187, 216-19 (1987) (book review) (warning of
the dangers of extensive government involvement in a system of expanded access). The difficulty of
finding solutions, though, ought not to cause us to deny the existence of the problem.
212. See generally Blasi, supra note 37.
213. These questions ultimately relate to a more general attack on marketplace theory (or on
any consequentialist justification for a free speech principle): the argument that an unrestrained
marketplace of ideas will best lead us to Truth proves, at best, that free speech has important
benefits. It does not provide any way to balance the benefits against the harms of free speech; much
less does it provide a blanket rule that, in that balancing, the free speech claim should (almost)
always win. See SCHAUER, supra note 165, at 28-29.
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amendment"214--are more than problematic. 215  They form a myth
structure that corresponds only faintly to reality.216 I will first discuss
the assumption that a genuinely wide range of diverse views compete in
the marketplace of ideas, on an essentially even playing field, notwith-
standing the differing economic, political and social resources available
to the ideas' proponents. I will next discuss the assumption that people
rationally process new information and ideas that the marketplace makes
available to them.
1. Equality
The first crack in the plaster of the romantic conception is simply
this: effective mass communication requires access to communications
technology. That technology is expensive; printing presses,
teleprompters, broadcast engineers, and satellite transponders cost
money. As a result, "virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.1217  The fact
that some have access to these resources, and that others do not, gro-
tesquely skews the balance of effective communication. In the modem
marketplace of ideas, those with extensive institutional or financial
resources can speak more loudly than those without; the average person
has little ability to speak in any but the softest of voices. 218 As A.J.
Liebling put it, freedom of the press in this country is guaranteed only to
214. Barron, supra note 182, at 1642; see also JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FOR WHOM? at xiv, 320-21 (1973). Professor Barron's "romantic view" should not be confused with
the First Amendment "romance" that Steven Shiffrin has championed. Professor Shiffrin argues
that the point of the First Amendment is "to protect the romantics- . . . the dissenters, the
unorthodox, the outcasts." It is "affirmatively to sponsor the individualism, the rebelliousness, the
antiauthoritarianism, the spirit of nonconformity within us all." STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5 (1990). This is a different notion of romance;
Shiffrin's profound and subtle views are far removed from the First Amendment orthodoxy I have
been describing.
215. See generally BAKER, supra note 33, at 12, 15 ("At least within the academic world, the
assumptions.., are almost universally rejected"; the marketplace metaphor's "power and popularity
[are] quite curious" in light of the metaphor's "obvious dependence on incorrect assumptions.").
216. See Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1271.
217. Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). See generally Balkin, supra note 175, at 407-10
("To put it bluntly, the more property one has, the greater one's ability to compete in the
marketplace of ideas, just as in the ordinary marketplace.... [T]o the extent that one does not own
the means of communication, one must bargain with others to obtain access."); Stephen L. Carter,
Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581, 581-82 (1984) (book
review) (considering "the threat posed when access to information is controlled ... by those private
interests able to spend enough money to purchase access for their points of view").
218. See Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1282-83; see also BARRON, supra note 214, at 325-26
(tracking the "inequality in capacity to communicate ideas"); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
609 (1982) (criticizing the Court's decisions in Buckley and First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978)). Professor Powe makes this point as well, see Powe, supra note 194, at 263, although he
emphatically disagrees with Judge Wright as to its significance.
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those who own one.2 19
This problem flows from our application of marketplace of ideas
theory to a society characterized by marked inequalities in economic,
social and political power. Access to communications resources mirrors
access to other sources of power and resources: those without communi-
cations resources have little opportunity to contribute to political or
other debate.22 A rule directing government to enforce property rights
but otherwise barring it from interfering with the speech flowing from
that skewed distribution of societal resources does not yield substantive
equality in ability to influence the public debate. Rather, it guarantees
further inequality; debate carried out against that backdrop will be
"dominated, and thus constrained, by the same forces that dominate
social structure., 221
There is thus a pervasive skew in the "real world" marketplace of
ideas-that is, debate involving words spoken by politicians, would-be
politicians, grassroots activists, corporate spokespersons, and other peo-
ple not employees of, or under contract to, media corporations. 222 It
would surely be an oversimplification to identify wealth as the single
force dominating that ideological marketplace, and it would be palpably
incorrect to claim that the side with more money prevails in every public
debate. 223 But it would be equally untrue to claim that wealth is only
219. A.J. LIEBLING, THE PREss 32 (1975). The issue of access to the press, in fact, is not quite
so simple. A person might have greater control over or access to the means of communication
because he owns a press (or a television station, or any other mass communication resource); because
he is associated with an institution that owns one; because he is associated with an institution that is
otherwise involved, directly or indirectly, with the mass communications industry; or because he has
access to specialized nonprofit publishers (such as law reviews). Nonetheless, the number of
Americans so blessed is relatively small. The ordinary citizen fits in none of these categories, and
when it comes to mass communication, that citizen is out of luck.
220. For a mainstream affirmation of this principle, see BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 137; for a
more radical one, see Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance [Postscript 1968], in ROBERT P. WOLFF
ET AL., A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81, 118-19 (1969):
The chance of influencing [public opinion], in any effective way .... is at a price, in dollars,
totally out of reach of the radical opposition.... [Free competition and exchange of ideas
have become a farce. The Left has no equal voice, no equal access to the mass media and
their public facilities-not because a conspiracy excludes it, but because, in good old
capitalist fashion, it does not have the required purchasing power.
221. Fiss, supra note 27, at 786; see also Fiss, supra note 151, at 1412-13; Baker, supra note 182,
at 980 (noting that the marketplace "reinforces currently dominant views").
The general principle here is the familiar clash between formal and substantive equality;
formally equal treatment of people who are differently situated may perpetuate substantive
inequality, at least in the short term.
222. That I characterize these speakers, including such modem celebrities as David Duke, as all
operating in the real world is perhaps just an example of the absurdity of the modern era.
223. See Fiss, supra note 151, at 1412. Indeed, not all parts of society reflect the same political
influences; it is often charged today that "politically correct" views predominate on college
campuses. At least one commentator with conservative leanings, though, does not find this too
upsetting, noting that "the rest of us have them right where we want them." JOE QUEENAN,
IMPERIAL CADDY 132 (1992).
Leftist intellectuals with hare-brained Marxist ideas get to control Stanford, MIT, Yale,
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one of many factors exerting power in that marketplace, with an insignifi-
cant effect on the overall representation of views. Access to wealth and
institutional resources regularly plays an important distorting role in the
political marketplace.224 More fundamentally, economic, social, and
political power help define the general boundaries of the mainstream
within which an idea must fall in order to be taken seriously, rather than
merely ignored.225
The world I have discussed so far, on the other hand, is only part of
the modem marketplace. To a huge degree, effective communication in
our society is left in the hands of a specialized set of entities I have not so
far discussed-large, for-profit media corporations, with unmatched
command of communications resources. These corporations are not
obviously and inherently biased, nor are they politically monolithic. On
the contrary, precisely because they are profit-oriented, they often put
considerable power in the hands of artists and commentators who may be
of varying political persuasions.2 26 The contribution made by these
voices to the marketplace of ideas is large. It includes the voices of the
network news, and other major, mass-oriented, advertiser-supported
news media; it includes more narrowly tailored political commentary,
often found in books and magazines; and it includes entertainment,
where the politics may be either implicit or overt.22 7
and the American Studies department at the University of Vermont. In return, the right
gets IBM, DEC, Honeywell, Disney World, and the New York Stock Exchange. Leftist
academics get to try out their stupid ideas on impressionable youths between seventeen and
twenty-one who don't have any money or power. The right gets to try out its ideas on
North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Australia and parts of Africa, most of
which take MasterCard. The left gets Harvard, Oberlin, Twyla Tharp's dance company,
and Madison, Wisconsin. The right gets NASDAQ, Boeing, General Motors, Apple,
McDonnell Douglas, Washington, D.C., Citicorp, Texas, Coca-Cola, General Electric,
Japan, and outer space.
This seems like a fair arrangement.
Id. at 132-33.
224. For one study, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions:
Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505 (1982)
("one-sided" corporate spending generally effective in defeating voter-initiated referenda). For a
particularly colorful example of the use of wealth and communications resources in the political
process, see GREG MITCHELL, THE CAMPAIGN OF THE CENTURY: UPTON SINCLAIR'S RACE FOR
GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA AND THE BIRTH OF MEDIA POLITICS (1992).
225. See LINDBLOM, supra note 27, at 210 (Dissident views are constrained by the "myth of
'balance' in public debate.... The 'balance' of views thus presented to the citizen ... [does] not
much challenge the fundamentals of politico-economic organization in market-oriented systems.");
infra text accompanying notes 292-93. It is unlikely that Ross Perot would have made such a large
political splash for his own theories and views absent his unique access to wealth.
226. CNN, thus, offers its podium both to Jesse Jackson and to John Sununu.
227. Some argue that the role of the mass media simply amplifies the role of wealth in society,
since media corporations are themselves large concentrations of capital, owned and controlled by the
wealthy, and sharing common interests with other major corporations, banks, and government. See,
e.g., HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 28, at 3-14. This analysis without more, though, is
insufficient; it "ignores the observable fact that reporters often initiate stories of their own, that
editors rarely meet with publishers, and that most working journalists have no idea who sits on the
board of directors of the institutions they work for." Michael Schudson, The Sociology of News
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One can paint a picture in which, even though all do not participate
equally in the marketplace of ideas, the media give us a second-best solu-
tion. One might argue that a sufficient diversity of views is relayed by
these media corporations to simulate such a market; that numerous and
diverse ideas are transmitted by authors and artists through the mass
media; and that those ideas compete in the marketplace without substan-
tial skew based on the resources available to their proponents.228 This
argument has surface appeal. The first question one might ask, though,
is why we should expect the ideas transmitted in this manner to be
numerous and diverse. Media professionals themselves, after all, are not
particularly numerous2 29 or heterogeneous.2 30 National journalists tend
to be white and "[b]y all the conventional indicators, . . . solidly upper-
middle-class";2 31 they have been said to operate largely on the basis of a
shared matrix of values.232
The spectrum of views expressed through the media may seem
broad only because it is all we are used to.233 It may seem broad only to
those of us whose opinions are in the same ballpark. Some black schol-
ars, by contrast, argue that mass media images reflect "the racial miscon-
ceptions and fantasies of the dominant white culture." '234 A gay legal
scholar writes that "[o]ur culture... ignores or actively represses infor-
mation about gay issues. '2 35 A colleague recently pointed out to me that
she has seen her own radical feminist politics reflected in the mass media
Production, 11 MEDIA, CULTURE & Soc'y 263, 267 (1989). In a variety of ways, the media do at
least sometimes oppose entrenched power holders. By any stretch of the imagination, President
Nixon during Watergate was such a power holder, and American corporations in recent memory
have found themselves "aghast" at media coverage of a variety of public issues. Id. at 268.
228. Chief Justice Burger seems to have had this in mind when he stated that if the law required
broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements, then "the marketplace of 'ideas and experiences'
would ... be ... heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent .... [Thus,] the views of the
affluent could well prevail over those of others." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123
(1973). His apparent belief was that the mass media currently are unaffected by wealth, and that
that insulation saves the marketplace from a wealth-based bias.
229. Cf BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 27 ("As the number of those who control the gateway to
public discussion decreases," natural marketplace correctives to bias are lost.).
230. See S. ROBERT L1CHTER ET AL., THE MEDIA ELITE 20-53 (1986) (surveying the
backgrounds and attitudes ofjournalists at major media organizations). Lichter concludes that "the
media elite's perspective is predominantly cosmopolitan and liberal." Id. at 32.
231. HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEws 209 (Vintage Books 1980) (1979).
232. See infra text accompanying notes 260-63.
233. See Baker, supra note 152, at 2242 ("In our understanding of the events of the day, we are
largely the products of our press. It is awfully easy to adopt the Whiggish view [that 'it ain't broken,
so don't fix it'] precisely because 'it' is largely 'us.' ").
234. Jannette L. Dates & William Barlow, Conclusion: Split Images and Double Binds, in SPLIT
IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE MASS MEDIA 455 (Jannette L. Dates & Willihm Barlow eds.,
1990).
235. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 584 (1992);
see also id. at 650-51.
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not at all.236
One might argue that the ideas and views relayed through the media
gatekeepers will in general be numerous and diverse, reflecting the ideas
that otherwise would be offered by the population at large, and reflecting
the reception that the population at large would give those ideas, pre-
cisely because the media must respond to the market. Because the media
are profit-oriented, the argument runs, they necessarily will articulate
those ideas that members of the speech-consuming public wish to buy;
the operation of the economic marketplace will thus assure the operation
of the marketplace of ideas.237
I believe that this argument is flawed. Media speakers238 are subject
to several important biases.239 The first and most obvious is a wealth-
based bias. Any medium dependent on advertising takes as its relevant
audience not the citizenry as a whole, but rather that population skewed
on demographic and class lines in order to maximize buying power.
Newspapers and broadcasters make their money by selling audiences to
advertisers, and affluent audiences with the "right" demographics are
much more attractive in that marketplace.2' Advertising pressures thus
favor content preferred by audiences with buying power; it is for this
reason, perhaps, that newsmagazines "tend .. .to universalize upper-
middle-class practices as if they were shared by all Americans."241 The
"marketplace of ideas" the mass media create, in short, is as biased on
236. See also LINDBLOM, supra note 27, at 205 (finding no serious challenge to belief in "private
enterprise [and] a high degree of corporate autonomy"); Political Notes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct.
12, 1992, at 5A (noting exclusion of Libertarian Party candidates from presidential and vice-
presidential debates notwithstanding their being on the ballot in all 50 states).
237. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 546-48 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing
that broadcasters wishing to "maximize ... income will provide the mixture and diversity of ideas
deemed optimum by [their] customers").
238. In this context as well, all participants in the marketplace are not equal; those with greater
resources have greater ability to serve as gatekeepers screening others who wish to speak. To a
profound extent, a top tier of large media entities supplies the news, and, in so doing, helps define the
nation's news agenda. In the context of getting a book into the larger public debate, Time Warner
has far more influence than Tweedlebottom Press. It is the largest media entities, those most fully
integrated into the market, that play the most important role.
239. In using the word "bias," I do not mean to suggest that media speakers are engaged in any
sort of conscious conspiracy, worked out in dark basements by men with large cigars and alligator
shoes. Media professionals, in my experience, are decent and honorable folk. I do mean to suggest
that the range of ideas and views presented by the mass communications media is strongly shaped by
factors relating primarily to the structure of the media marketplace and the nature of the
newsgathering process.
240. See Baker, supra note 152, at 2126-27, 2164-68. The left-wing British Daily Herald, for
example, folded notwithstanding a loyal readership of 4.7 million people--"nearly twice as many as
the readership of The Times, Financial Times and Guardian added together"-because its readers,
while numerous, did not have enough disposable income to constitute a valuable advertising market.
Id. at 2110-11 (quoting James Curran, Capitalism and Control of the Press, 1800-1975, in MASS
COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY 195, 225 (James Curran et al. eds., 1979)); see also GINSBURG ET
AL., supra note 59, at 593-94 (commenting on television shows canceled while still mass hits because
they attracted demographically "wrong" audiences).
241. GANS, supra note 231, at 27.
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economic lines as is the economic marketplace. It is as democratic as a
political voting system weighted by income.242
Another important tilt, in the area of news and public affairs report-
ing, relates to the source of that news:
[R]eporters get the largest share of their news from official gov-
ernment agencies....
One study after another comes up with essentially the same
observation, and it matters not whether the study is at the
national, state, or local level-the story of journalism, on a day-
to-day basis, is the story of the interaction of reporters and
officials.243
This results in part from what Mark Fishman called the "principle of
bureaucratic affinity": given the media's need for a steady, reliable flow
of news information, collected in a cost-effective manner, "only other
bureaucracies can satisfy the input needs of a news bureaucracy.""
Observers have characterized this reliance on leading public officials and
other comparably authoritative and efficient sources for news informa-
tion as the most significant of all the factors helping to determine the
242. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 28, at 16. This is not to say that speech attractive to
the poor and largely anathema to the wealthy is wholly excluded from the marketplace. Time
Warner makes money selling the music of Ice-T, whose views are condemned by political, economic,
and media leaders; one song it distributed described the fictional narrator's intention to kill police
officers. That song, however, was withdrawn after extensive protest from law-enforcement groups
and political figures. Sheila Rule, "Cop Killer" To Be Cut From Ice-TAlbum, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1992, at C15. Indeed, a variety of record companies are now demanding deletion or rerecording of
controversial songs. Sheila Rule, After Ice-T N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at C19. My point, more
generally, is that a marketplace in which ideas are exchanged through economic transactions against
the backdrop of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements is fundamentally different from
the idealized marketplace of ideas, in which that distribution plays no significant role.
243. Schudson, supra note 227, at 271; see also Baker, supra note 152, at 2137 & n.134. See
generally GANS, supra note 231, at 116-45.
244. MARK FISHMAN, MANUFACTURING THE NEWS 143 (1980) (endnote omitted). Large
news agencies need news information on a steady basis, and must concentrate their reporters and
cameras where important news often takes place, where rumors and leaks are common, and where
regular press conferences are held. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 28, at 18-19. To satisfy
this need for news, government agencies often establish huge public-affairs operations. See MARK
YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 6-8 (1983). The Air Force alone, in a single year not too
long ago, issued 45,000 headquarters and unit news releases and 615,000 hometown news releases,
arranged 6600 interviews with news media, and held 50 meetings with editorial boards. See
HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 28, at 20. In military contexts in particular, the government has
unusual opportunities to manage the information made available to the news media. See, e.g., JOHN
R. MACARTHUR, SECOND FRONT: CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA IN THE GULF WAR 146 (1992);
John Barry & Roger Charles, Sea of Lies, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 28, 38-39. The views of
experts supplied by government agencies are taken as authoritative even by the "liberal" media.
During a recently surveyed year, for example, a majority of the guests on the McNeil-Lehrer News
Hour (excluding other journalists) were present or former government officials. HERMAN &
CHOMSKY, supra note 28, at 24-25. Large business bureaucracies make it their business to be
similarly helpful. Mobil Oil, for example, had a public-relations budget in 1980 of $21 million and a
public-relations staff of 73, engaged in part in the production of video press releases for television
news. Id. at 341 n.72.
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content of mass media news.2 45 Government officials are "the most eas-
ily and quickly available, as well as most reliable and productive, source
of news"; they can exert pressure against major media organizations if
those organizations fail to treat them as routine and presumptively credi-
ble sources.246 These factors make it more likely that the view of the
world that pervades the news is consistent with that of the government
and other sources who provide its raw material.247
Other forces push the media towards the conventional and main-
stream. To the extent that media entities are dependent on advertising,
they edit out the "heterodox or the controversial""24 in order to maxi-
mize their advertising reach and to ensure that they do not unsettle
advertisers.249 Broadcast television provides the most obvious example.
As Todd Gitlin has explained, advertisers in the aggregate "functionally
set the outer limits of permissible television., 25 The point is not that
advertisers retaliate or impose pressure in particular cases;25 rather,
because "[n]etwork executives internalize the desires of advertisers as a
whole, '2 2 they, "without even troubling to think about it,... are likely
to rule out any show likely to offend a critical mass of advertisers." '253
Controversy itself is seen as inconsistent with creating a proper envi-
ronment for advertising, a "buying mood. ' 254 At least one network lim-
ited its coverage of the Persian Gulf War because advertisers did not
245. See GANS, supra note 231, at 281-82.
246. Id. at 282; see also id. at 144-45.
247. See GANS, supra note 231, at 145. See generally YUDOF, supra note 244. The fact that the
government controls so much of the raw material of the news introduces a further source of skew:
only mainstream publications are given access to that raw material by being credentialed, for
example, for presidential press conferences, or for access to the theatre of war. See FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PARSING THE PENTAGON PAPERS 6-7 (Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy Research Paper R-3, 1991).
248. Barron, supra note 182, at 1646.
249. See Baker, supra note 152, at 2127-28, 2130-31, 2156-57. As Justice Brennan put it, "[1]n
light of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing their audience, and therefore their profits,
it seems almost naive to expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and
controversiality of material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints." CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dynamics of an advertising-
driven industry also make broadcasters uniquely vulnerable to pressure-group boycotts, whose "net
effect is systematically to reduce offerings, not to expand them." Baker, supra note 152, at 2163; see
id. at 2158-63.
250. GITLIN, supra note 28, at 252.
251. Although there are numerous examples, in the history of American mass media, of
advertisers doing exactly that. See Baker, supra note 152, at 2146-52 (discussing pressures imposed
by tobacco, patent medicine, fruit, cosmetics, coffee, auto, and other advertisers); see also Bruce
Horovitz, Advertisers Influence Media More, Report Says, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 1992, at D2
(discussing a study by Ronald K.L. Collins and the Center for the Study of Commercialism).
252. GITLIN, supra note 28, at 253.
253. Id. at 254; see also Baker, supra note 152, at 2142 (reporting that "advertisers' concerns
result in extensive media 'self-censorship' ").
254. See Baker, supra note 152, at 2153-56; see also GITLIN, supra note 28, at 189 (quoting an
advertising agency executive who describes the TV movie Playing for Time as "honest and
frightening as hell, but I just can't see a client who has a selling job to do placing his spots after
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consider that programming sufficiently "upbeat" to provide a suitable
advertising environment. The network unsuccessfully offered to tailor
war coverage so that commercials would run after segments "specially
produced with upbeat images or messages about the war, like patriotic
views from the home front. '2 55
Nor is it merely advertisers who help ensure blandness in television.
Network executives also feel a need to keep audiences comfortable, and
not to "jar the expectations of the regular TV audience, which they take
to be uneducated, distracted, and easily bewildered. '25 6  Both cable and
broadcast television are deeply committed to the familiar and the com-
fortable, in part because audiences seem to want it that way.257 Thus,
author Bill McKibben describes the 150-channel Fairfax, Virginia cable
television system as "like a pleasant tract housing development of the
mind: tastefully different colors on some of the houses, and every fourth
one with a pair of gabled windows. But no yurts. No caves. No
treehouses. '9 2
58
None of this is to say that there are not many persons active in the
news and entertainment sectors of the mass media who desire change in
the status quo, nor is it to say that those desires are never reflected in
their programming. Indeed, my position is consistent with the argument
of those who assert that the national news media take politically liberal
positions. 259 The media system can favor liberal over conservative views,
scenes that consistently end on such a remarkably low point"); HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note
28, at 17-18.
255. Baker, supra note 152, at 2156 (quoting Bill Carter, Few Sponsors for TV War News, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at DI, D20).
256. GITLIN, supra note 28, at 187.
257. Bill McKibben, TV- Why Even the New Seems Like Dejd K, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992,
§ 2, at 1. The pressures toward conformity can come from a variety of directions, depending on
where the fear of controversy is greatest. Some years ago, ABC required the writers of a movie
sympathetically portraying a homosexual father to add lines in which the character suggested that
his sexual orientation was a "sickness." GITLIN, supra note 28, at 260. A few years later writers
complained that it had become politically impossible to write scripts that would "upset the gay-
liberation lobby." Id. at 260-61 (quoting Earnest Kinoy).
Consistent with their fear of genuine controversy (as opposed to sanitized "issue-of-the-week"
programming) the broadcast networks will not run political advocacy advertisements at all. See Jan
Hoffman, Picture is Jumbled on Which Abortion Messages Can Get on TV, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
1992, at A18. Broadcast policies against running such advertisements, on the other hand, to some
extent grew out of fears that running the ads would trigger fairness doctrine obligations. For a
discussion of political advocacy advertising, see infra note 407.
258. McKibben, supra note 257, at 1. See generally BILL McKIBBEN, THE AGE OF MISSING
INFORMATION (1992) (ruminating on the author's viewing of one cable system's entire, 93-channel
daily programming).
259. The media, and media professionals, have been variously attacked as both irredeemably
liberal and incorrigibly conservative. Compare LICHTER ET AL., supra note 230, at 294 ("[L]eading
journalists are politically liberal and alienated from traditional norms and institutions.") and L.
Brent Bozell III, Annoy the Media, Elect Bush, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1992, at A14 ("The liberal bias
of the mainstream press almost goes without saying.") with HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 28, at
298 (The media "inculcate and defend" conservative principles and the status quo.). This
incongruity can be explained in part, perhaps, by the "hostile media phenomenon" identified in
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within the sphere of acceptable discourse, at the same time as it supports
the existing political and economic status quo by shutting out more radi-
cal arguments for change. Herbert Gans, in his classic study, wrote that
the national news media act within a context of values including "ethno-
centrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pas-
toralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and national
leadership"; 2  these are among the "unquestioned and generally unno-
ticed background assumptions" within which their message is framed.261
The news, according to Gans, reflects an implicit belief that unprincipled
or self-serving actions taken by public officials and other powerful indi-
viduals create "moral disorder" that must be exposed and condemned,
together with an implicit belief in the desirability of controlling and con-
taining "social disorder," viewed from a white, upper-middle-class per-
spective.262 Mass media news thus validates our basic social, economic
and political structures. It also validates the authority of the elite holders
of political and economic power, but only so long as those individuals do
not transgress the media's own moderate-reform-oriented norms.2 63
One can argue that these are good and healthy values for the news
to reflect; one can surely argue to the contrary. One can argue that Gans
has misperceived the situation. But whatever the merits of the values he
describes, or of the media system they appear to inform, if we are looking
for a freewheeling and wide-open marketplace of ideas, this is not it.
There is no reason to believe that the media, either in news or in
entertainment, meaningfully present a genuinely wide or diverse spec-
trum of ideas and information to remedy the failings of the marketplace.
Is all lost? One can take hope from the fact that some ideas and
views are communicated in the existing marketplace, if perhaps only
within a narrow sphere. One might consider the situation tolerable so
long as one believed that in the everyday operation of the marketplace
those ideas were given the sort of serious, "rational" consideration that
the marketplace metaphor seems to contemplate. That assumption too,
however, seems doubtful.
2. Rationality
It is appropriate to take statements in the legal literature about cog-
nitive psychology with a grain of salt. Legal scholars engaging in forays
Robert P. Vallone et al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media
Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577 (1985) (finding
that both pro-Israel and pro-Arab partisans, after viewing identical samples of network television
programming covering the Beirut massacre, saw the news segments as biased in favor of the other
side).
260. GANS, supra note 231, at 42.
261. Schudson, supra note 227, at 279.
262. GANS, supra note 231, at 52-62.
263. Id. at 60-62.
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into that field are venturing far from their area of expertise; it is reason-
able to suspect either that they do not know what they are talking about,
or that they are engaging in selective and out-of-context citation of only
that literature helpful to their arguments. 264 Notwithstanding that cau-
tion, it is useful here to include at least a nod to relevant social-science
literature, in particular that literature addressing the ways in which peo-
ple process new information. In that area, the approach that has
attracted the largest following is a cognitive processing model commonly
known as schema theory; that approach has important consequences for
our current inquiry.265
The gist of the cognitive psychology learning, for our purposes, is
that in order to handle the endless flow of communication sweeping over
them, people necessarily react to each new bit of information by seeking
to fit it into a set of preexisting cognitive structures that provide "simpli-
fied mental models" of the world.2 66 This reliance is well known to trial
264. Legal academics' citation of social science literature may have a lot in common with
lawyers' citation of legislative history; legislative history research, I was told as a newly minted law
clerk, is a matter of "walking into a crowded room and looking around for your friends." But see
Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989)
(encyclopedic discussion of copyright-law legislative history); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (same).
265. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 96-179 (2d ed. 1991);
DORIS A. GRABER, PROCESSING THE NEWS: How PEOPLE TAME THE INFORMATION TIDE 31 (2d
ed. 1988); Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 715
(1981); Robert Axelrod, Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and
Cognition, 67 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 1248 (1973). A variety of studies that do not use the "schema"
terminology nonetheless rely on information-processing models that appear to take essentially
similar approaches. See, eg., ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS,
AND UNDERSTANDINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES 36-68 (1977)
("scripts"); STRUCTURE OF DECISION: THE COGNITIVE MAPS OF POLITICAL ELITES (Robert
Axelrod ed., 1976) ("cognitive maps"); W. Lance Bennett, Perception and Cognition: An
Information-Processing Framework for Politics, in I THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 69,
163-72 (Samuel L. Long ed., 1981) ("preliminary cognitive representations"); Nancy Cantor, A
Cognitive-Social Approach to Personality, in PERSONALITY, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION
23 (Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom eds., 1981) ("cognitive structure"); David L. Swanson, A
Constructivist Approach, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 169, 176-80 (Dan D.
Nimmo & Keith R. Sanders eds., 1981) ("constructs"); see also PAUL CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH:
DIALOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN LIBERTY 59-66 (1988); Paul Chevigny, Pornography and
Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J. 420, 425; Fajer, supra note 235, at 524-27
("pre-understanding").
The schema concept has not gained universal acceptance in the world of social psychology;
some scholars argue that it does not provide a valuable theoretical structure for research. See
generally Susan T. Fiske & Patricia W. Linville, What Does the Schema Concept Buy Us?, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 543 (1980) (concluding that the schema approach is useful
and important). I emphasize schema theory in the pages that follow, but could make most of my
crucial points without it: even scholars who reject schema theory agree that people's penchant for
processing information in a way consistent with their own beliefs tends to defeat "rational"
information processing. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
266. GRABER, supra note 265, at 29.
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lawyers. It is reflected, for example, in the results of a study in which
people were shown a film about a car accident, questioned about it, and
asked, a week later, whether they had seen any broken glass in the film.
There was none, but because schemas267 of car accidents usually involve
breakage, a substantial number of the subjects reported seeing it
anyway.
268
The approach of processing new ideas and information by fitting
them into existing schemas causes problems when people encounter
information that they cannot easily deal with in that manner. People
commonly reject information that challenges the accuracy of their
schemas. They will not always do so; sometimes they may revise a
schema to take into account the new information. But they strongly
resist such revisions, and undertake them only reluctantly. They are
likely instead to deny the validity of the new information, to attempt to
reinterpret it so that it conforms to the schema after all, or to process it
as an isolated exception to the general rule.269 To provide a common-
place example, a man who believes women to be submissive and stupid,
and meets a woman obviously contradicting the stereotype, is likely to
simply develop a new stereotype such as "castrating female" or
"career woman," keeping his original stereotype for most women
and considering his new stereotype to be a kind of exception to
the rule. Eventually, as his experience increases, the number of
stereotypes he has available also increases-mother, princess,
bitch, castrating female, showgirl-and any behavior a female
267. Psychology and political science academics generally use "schemata" as the plural of
"schema," but I suspect that law professors use more than enough Latin already.
268. The subjects were divided into two groups. The first was asked, shortly after seeing the
film, how fast the cars were going when they "smashed into" each other; the second, how fast they
were going when they "hit" each other. Thirty-two percent of the first group, and 14% of the
second, reported broken glass a week later. ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 77-78
(1979); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3-20 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982) (discussing studies in which the subjects' schema-driven reasoning led them to biased
or irrational conclusions).
In an earlier and scarier study, researchers showed white subjects a picture of a subway scene
including a white man carrying a straight razor and confronting a black man. Subjects were then
told to describe the picture to each other, as in the game of "telephone." By the sixth retelling, in
the majority of cases, the final description placed the razor in the hands of the black man, and
several times he was reported as "brandishing it wildly" or "threatening" the white man with it. See
Gordon W. Allport & Leo J. Postman, The Basic Psychology of Rumor (Nov. 19, 1945), in 8
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 61, 66, 78-79 (2d ser., 1946). But see
Molly Treadway & Michael McCloskey, Cite Unseen: Distortions of the Allport and Postman Rumor
Study in the Eyewitness Testimony Literature, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 22 n.1 (1987) (noting
that the Allport and Postman study used no control group, and concluding that the errors could
reflect simple memory failure rather than racial bias).
269. See GRABER, supra note 265, at 174-77, 199; see also William J. McGuire, Attitudes and
Attitude Change, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 233, 275-76 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot
Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985); Mark Pefley et al., Economic Conditions and Party Competence:
Processes of Belief Revision, 49 J. POLITICS 100, 101 (1987).
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performs can fit within at least one of these stereotypic concep-
tions without disconfirming the overarching stereotype.270
Because people interpret ambiguous reality in accordance with their
schemas, those schemas are self-reinforcing; they become more powerful
as they are repeatedly "tested" but never disconfirmed. 27'
This helps explain the oft-noted point that the mass media are more
effective in reinforcing people's existing attitudes than in changing
them.272 People have some tendency to ignore information not relevant
to their existing schemas.273 Once they have made up their minds and
"reached closure" on a particular issue, they are more likely to reject any
new information, whether supportive of or undermining their views.274
Indeed, because people seek out and resonate to information consistent
with their schemas,275 they will support programming that reinforces
their biases. Economic pressures thus lead broadcasters to create such
programming, further reinforcing the status quo. What Walter
Lippmann called "the pictures in our heads" crowd out the outside
world.276
Culturally supplied schemas provide perspectives from which people
view social problems. They provide a "metaphysics, an ethics, an episte-
mology, and a value scheme" that provide context and explanation into
which people can seek to fit new information and ideas.277 They "bear
the imprint of the particular culture in which learning takes place. '278
To a great extent, they are internalized early in life through socialization
in home, at school, by religious institutions, and through the media.279
270. Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in
1 SOCIAL COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 89, 120 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981).
271. See Daniel Goleman, Your Unconscious Mind May Be Smarter Than You, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 1992, at Cl, Cli; see also Fajer, supra note 235, at 525. Fajer argues that "it]his
background set of 'knowledge'" powerfully and resiliently shapes the law. Id. at 513.
272. Louis L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 769-70 (1972). This is not to say that the media are powerless in
affecting attitudes: for the media selectively to reinforce some of a person's attitudes but not others
may well lead to changes in the person's overall complex of beliefs.
273. GRABER, supra note 265, at 186.
274. See id. at 125-26, 130; David L. Protess et al., Uncovering Rape: The Watchdog Press and
the Limits of Agenda Setting, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 19, 31 (1985) (speculating that the media have
more influence on subjects that have not "already reached a 'saturation' level in the public's mind").
275. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 265, at 218-20.
276. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 3 (1922).
277. ROBERT E. LANE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: WHY THE AMERICAN COMMON MAN
BELIEVES WHAT HE DOES 418 (1962).
278. LIPPMANN, supra note 276, at 185; see also LANE, supra note 277, at 417-18 (stating that
members of society interpret observations and experiences through cultural premises); Bennett,
supra note 265, at 122-24.
279. See GRABER, supra note 265, at 184-86. The schools make an especially important
contribution to the socialization process: attendance is compulsory; the audience is unsophisticated;
and children's well-being and future success are made contingent on their learning and internalizing
what is taught to them. See Ingber, supra note 182, at 28-30. Schools thus are successful at
"promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political." Board of
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In the United States, these cognitive structures underlie the substantial
political consensus-the shared generalized norms about market-based
liberal democracy and the "American way"-that characterizes our het-
erogeneous society.28°
This explanation provides grounding for a feminist critique of First
Amendment law. Catharine MacKinnon and others have argued that
pornography reinforces-indeed creates-scripts and schemas of women
as wanting to be taken and used, to be subjected, violated, and possessed.
Pornography "constructs what a woman is" by reference to men's desires
and fantasies.28 Perhaps more fundamentally, it is argued, pornography
reinforces a fundamental schema of sex itself as about dominance and
submission; in that picture, "[s]ubjection itself with self-determination
ecstatically relinquished is the content of women's sexual desire and
desirability." '282 Pornography "tells men what sex means, what a real
woman is, and codes them together in a way that is behaviorally
reinforcing." '283
The results of the schematic coding, according to feminist theory,
are profound. Because the schema objectifies women, it strips them of
credibility in the eyes of those for whom the schema is powerful.284
When women complain of sexual assault and violence, a complaint at
odds with a cognitive structure in which violence and domination are
appropriate and welcome sexual interplay, their voices are not heard or
believed.285 Men for whom that schema has been cued by pornography,
according to some studies, are more likely to condone sexual assault, to
predict that they would force sex on a woman if they knew they would
not get caught, and to view rape victims as less seriously injured.286 To
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for Petitioner); see also
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Other socializing influences include mass media entertainment, which "inculcates the
predominant cultural values and socializes individuals to execute certain roles," reaffirming the
"basic ... stories that structure [our] experience." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, CRITICAL CONNECTIONS: COMMUNICATION FOR THE FUTURE 203 (1990). See
generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 214-18 (1973) (cultural
templates).
280. See GRABER, supra note 265, at 66, 210-11, 254; see also Carter, supra note 217, at 588.
281. MacKinnon, supra note 27, at 17.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 59.
284. Consider
the credibility problems Linda Marchiano encounters when she says that ... in "Deep
Throat"... she... did not feel or enjoy what the character she was forced to portray felt
and enjoyed.... [B]efore "Linda Lovelace" was seen performing deep throat, no one had
ever seen it being done in that way, largely because it cannot be done without hypnosis to
repress the natural gag response. Yet it was believed. ... Yet when Linda Marchiano now
tells that it took kidnapping and death threats and hypnosis to put her there, that is found
difficult to believe.
Id. at 35-36.
285. See id. at 14, 34-36, 63. See generally Dworkin, supra note 204, at 15-19.
286. See MacKinnon, supra note 27, at 52-55. But cf. Powe, supra note 12, at 64 & n.80.
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the extent that such a cognitive structure pervades our society, socialized
through entertainment and otherwise, it becomes more nearly
imperceptible, part of the general cultural background.2"
All this has distressing implications for marketplace theory. To the
extent that our schemas constrain our reactions to new ideas and infor-
mation, our thinking is not characterized by "reason," in the Cartesian
sense. Hobbled by our adherence to long-established mental patterns, we
can hardly create a collective marketplace of ideas that is a place of
unfettered discourse and discovery.288 It is the packaging of an argu-
ment, not its content, that determines how it will be received:2" 9 the
manner in which an argument or news story is focused will influence
listeners' unconscious choice as to which schema they will fit it into, and
thus may drastically change their response.290  Because their schemas
influence what new ideas and information they are willing to accept,
"people's social location... control[s] the manner in which they perceive
or understand the world."2 91 To the extent that our most basic views
and values are relatively immune to rational argument, the marketplace
metaphor seems pointless.
When one considers the cumulative impact of the economic and
psychological attacks on the marketplace metaphor, it seems almost will-
fully blind to excuse the costs that free-speech doctrine imposes by
answering that government may not deny speech its fair opportunity to
prevail in the marketplace. We do not seem to have a working "market-
place" outside a fairly narrowly bounded range of socially acceptable
ideas and values. Debate seems to be possible only within a "community
agenda of alternatives";2 92 it withers outside those borders.2 93
Empirical studies such as these, unfortunately, are even more of a morass for the unwary and
inexpert than is the theoretical material I set out earlier. On the difficulties in interpreting such
empirical work, see, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1290 n.64.
287. See MacKinnon, supra note 27, at 7-8, 20.
288. See Ingber, supra note 182, at 25-27, 34-36.
289. See Baker, supra note 182, at 976-77 (arguing that form and frequency of message
presentation, as well as personal interests and experiences, determine how debate will affect
individuals' understandings).
290. This phenomenon is clearest in the area of opinion surveys. See GRABER, supra note 265,
at 158-60, 261; see also supra note 268. In one recent nationwide survey, 44% of those polled
responded that we spend too much money on "welfare," and only 23% that we spend too little.
Only 13%, though, answered that we spend too much on "assistance to the poor"; on the contrary,
64% told the pollsters that we should spend more. Robin Toner, New Politics of Welfare Focuses on
Its Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, § 1, at 1.
291. Baker, supra note 182, at 967 ; see id. at 976. The differences in schemas caused by social
location may be submerged to the extent that "[p]eople exposed to the same media sources are prone
to tap into similar schemata in response to their shared media cues," GRABER, supra note 265, at
159, but that is hardly an improvement from the perspective of the marketplace metaphor.
292. NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 135 (2d ed. 1980);
see also Ingber, supra note 182, at 73-74.
293. Political and policy ideas, thus, that are considered quite conventional in European
countries (not to mention in countries whose political systems differ more radically from our own)
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All of the criticisms of the marketplace model discussed here have
been raised before,294 yet First Amendment doctrine rolls right along as
if none of them posed a problem. First Amendment jurisprudence
acknowledges their existence-and sometimes concedes their validity-
only to hold that they must be deemed irrelevant to actual law.295 This is
especially true when it comes to concerns about the nonrational effects of
speech, which rarely bear fruit except in obscenity law.29 6 They are tol-
erated in that domain because of the notion that the speech in question
isn't really "speech" at all.2 97 In the vast majority of contexts, we sup-
press even thinking about these issues.
Our inattention to these arguments seems even more odd when one
are not seriously debated in this country at all. This is not to say that people cannot come to accept
ideas opposed by important socializing influences and by politically and economically powerful
institutions. Recent events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe demonstrate that they
can. But the obstacles to that process seem sufficiently daunting as to make the marketplace quite
doubtful as a model or a metaphor.
294. See, eg., BARRON, supra note 214; Allan C. Hutchinson, Talking the Good Life. From Free
Speech to Democratic Dialogue, 1 YALE J.L. & LIB. 17 (1989); MacKinnon, supra note 27.
295. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), explained that even if one conceded that "the public has lost any
ability to ... contribute in a meaningful way to the debate on [public] issues," that "economic
factors . . . have made entry into the marketplace of ideas . . . almost impossible," and that
accordingly "the 'marketplace of ideas' is today a monopoly controlled by the owners of the
market," those concerns were simply irrelevant to analysis of a state right-of-reply statute. The
statute was unconstitutional, without more, because it "[c]ompell[ed] editors ... to publish that
which '"reason" tells them should not be published.'" Id. at 250, 251, 256.
Judge Easterbrook, similarly, writing in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), agreed that "[elven the truth has little chance
unless a statement fits within the framework of beliefs that may never have been subjected to rational
study," for "[p]eople may be conditioned in subtle ways." Id. at 329, 330. Nevertheless, he stated,
"the Constitution does not make the dominance of truth a necessary condition of freedom of
speech"; that the marketplace metaphor fails should have no effect on established doctrine
forbidding the creation of "an approved point of view." Id. at 330, 332.
Campaign finance jurisprudence, finally, has similarly rejected almost all statutory attacks on
the use of private economic power to skew the marketplace of ideas. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 39-59 (1976); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978). But see Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (upholding a statute designed to
ameliorate "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas," by prohibiting corporate treasury expenditures in
support of or opposition to candidates).
296. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (emphasizing the "corrupting
and debasing" impact of obscene speech). Concerns about the nonrational effects of speech
occasionally emerge in other contexts as well. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,
Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (peaceful labor picketing invites "an
automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an idea"); Mark D. Schneider,
Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1490-93 (1982)
(criticizing assertions that labor picketing invites "emotive" responses and therefore does not
warrant First Amendment protection).
297. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992) (characterizing obscenity
and fighting words as not "entirely invisible to the Constitution," and explaining that "the
occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity as 'not being speech at all'" is not
"literally true").
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notices that they are of the sort that we accepted in the economic context
almost seventy-five years ago.298 They rest on the same foundations as
did the arguments used by the legal realists in the 1920s and 1930s to
attack Lochner v. New York 299 That a regime of formal freedom and
equal rights may in fact be unfree and unequal because of gross preexist-
ing inequality in economic or other power is not a new argument, and
surely was not invented by Jerome Barron or Catharine MacKinnon. It
was at the heart of our rejection of Lochner. We long ago accepted these
arguments in the economic context, even while refusing to acknowledge
them in the area of speech.3°°
Why have these claims gotten so little acceptance with respect to
freedom of speech? Different authors have offered different explanations.
Some suggest that we have been unwilling to accept Realist attacks on
formalism in speech law, because doing so would require us to acknowl-
edge the failure of the theory underlying Carolene Products301 and our
rejection of Lochner that courts' enforcement of the value-neutral rules
of the democratic process disposes of any need for them to second-guess
substantive legislative choices. 302 Others argue that the socially domi-
nant accept the marketplace metaphor because it validates their own
socially dominant views.303 One might argue that legal decisionmakers
are resistant to these arguments because they are wary of breaching the
theoretical integrity of First Amendment philosophy, worried that the
entire structure will be threatened; they are not so unhappy with the sta-
tus quo as to be willing to think thoughts that might endanger or com-
promise the theoretical framework. 3°  All of these answers, though,
seem to me still insufficient; in the remainder of this Article I shall
attempt to provide yet another explanation.
III
PUTTING IT TOGETHER
We find ourselves faced with not one but two dilemmas. The first
relates to the failure of broadcast regulation to conform to ordinary free-
298. See Balkin, supra note 175, at 379-82; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 264-66.
299. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
300. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
301. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
302. See GRABER, supra note 156, at 160; Balkin, supra note 175, at 387-97.
303. See, eg., BAKER, supra note 33, at 16; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 206-13 (1987).
304. Cf Frederick Schauer, The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653, 666-67 (1991)
(discussing constitutional theory generally).
Still others offer quite different reasons. Legal academics and legal decisionmakers, some point
out, are intellectuals who traffic in ideas; "self-interest combines with self-esteem" to lead them to
the view that others should be regulated while they should be exempt. Coase, supra note 176, at 386.
Others offer different answers still. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 59-60; Ingber, supra note
182, at 71-85.
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dom-of-speech philosophy; the second relates to the failure of ordinary
freedom-of-speech philosophy to conform to the world we live in. I
believe that these two problems are linked.
A key lesson of Part I is that broadcast regulation is inconsistent
with conventional freedom-of-speech philosophy because broadcast law
gratuitously gives government officials the job of restraining speech not
on the basis of hard-edged, easy-to-apply, nondiscretionary bright-line
rules, but on the basis of subjective and ambiguous standards.
Government officials thus can exercise great discretion as to who can
speak over the air and what those speakers can say. That problem, in
large part, is one of form; the transgression of broadcast law is that it
takes the form of vague directions to government officials to advance
vague values. The key lesson of Part II, by contrast, is that First
Amendment ideology seems incomplete along a substantive dimension; it
is based on a substantively inaccurate picture of what the world looks
like.
In order to bring these two lessons together, I have relied on some
insights developed by authors associated with critical legal studies (CLS).
I have not adopted the entire weave of CLS thinking;30 5 I have taken
selected points that seem to me helpful in understanding the problems
that this Article raises.306 I rely heavily on the technique, common in
CLS writing, of "analysis of paired oppositions": that is, identifying
opposed philosophical tendencies, or procedural forms, that seem perva-
sive in legal decisionmaking °7 CLS writers sometimes use the tech-
305. If any such thing as "CLS thinking" can be identified. Mark Tushnet, one of the
movement's most prolific authors, writes:
As I read articles by and about critical legal studies, I not infrequently find myself puzzled.
The authors of the articles provoking this reaction describe what they believe critical legal
studies to be, and yet the descriptions do not resonate strongly with what I think about the
law .... [I find] people whom I regard as co-participants in the enterprise of critical legal
studies... taking as central to their understanding of cls propositions that I find extremely
problematic, or dismissing as unimportant propositions that I find central ....
Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516 (1991).
Tushnet concludes that "the project of critical legal studies does not have any essential intellectual
component" but is instead a "political location." Id.
306. My attitude towards those insights is somewhat tentative and ambiguous. With regard to
some of them, I am uncertain whether the insight is completely right, or whether it is but "partial
and incomplete truth," MILL, supra note 26, at 56: accurate in some contexts but not in others,
perhaps, or illuminating only some facets of a complex reality. For the most part, I have not stopped
to explore those concerns and doubts in the context of this Article. A key point of this Article, after
all, is that a theory drawn from CLS insights does work-where other approaches do not-in
explaining the particular puzzle of speech law. To spend too much time on the validity of the
insights in areas unrelated to broadcasting would detract from that main point.
307. See Tushnet, supra note 305, at 1524. Examples include Jay M. Feinman, Critical
Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 980-84; Betty Mensch,
Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 759-64 (1981) (book review); see also
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nique of identifying fundamental dichotomies to argue that the body of
law being discussed is incapable of reasoned justification, and, indeed,
incoherent.30 8 I will look to these oppositions, in my own analysis, first
to consider the extent to which ordinary free speech philosophy and
broadcast regulation can be understood as reflecting such opposing poles.
I will later, in the next Part of this Article, consider the extent to which
the oppositions reflected in our speech law are irreconcilable: is there a
way to get the best of both worlds?
I will begin this Part by examining the opposition between the two
procedural options for resolving legal issues known as "rules" and "stan-
dards." Core free-speech philosophy maintains a strong commitment to
rules; broadcast regulation relies heavily on standards. I will next
examine the substantive opposition embodied in Part II of this Article.
That dichotomy opposes a worldview focusing on the freedom and
autonomy inherent in the "private" sphere, unregulated by government,
to a worldview focusing on the pervasiveness of inequality and constraint
throughout the world of private ordering. I will note Duncan Kennedy's
suggestion of a link between rules and the philosophy he refers to as
individualism, and between standards and the philosophy he refers to as
altruism. The opposition of individualism and altruism, I will suggest, is
in turn linked to the opposition of autonomy and constraint. I will then
note the opposition of value subjectivity and value objectivity, as well as
paternalism and nonpaternalism. All of these, I will suggest, can be
pulled together into two, more nearly comprehensive, opposing
worldviews. The first links rules, individualism, a belief in overall private
autonomy, a sharp public-private distinction, value subjectivity, and
nonpaternalism; the other links standards, altruism, a belief in the perva-
siveness of constraint, a denial of the public-private distinction, value
objectivity (or a belief in the communal nature of values), and paternal-
ism. I will suggest, finally, that in important ways the first of these
worldviews is privileged in our law.
Balkin, supra note 198. Some authors have followed Derrida into deconstructionism, seeking to
establish that the twin poles of such dichotomies are each dependent on the other-that while
"rational" thought seeks hierarchically to privilege one pole, each in fact supplements and signifies
the other. See, eg., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 746-
61 (1987); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997,
1007-08 (1985).
Nor need one be associated with CLS to undertake similar analysis. Some of the oppositions I
find in this Article are reminiscent of the distinctions between "democracy" and "community"
drawn in the work of Robert Post, who finds CLS unhelpful. Post rejects the notion that democracy
and community are inherently irreconcilable; rather, they are "distinct and antagonistic but
reciprocally interdependent." Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal
Constitution of Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV 163, 163 (John W.
Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993).
308. Because there are legitimate opposing themes and techniques available to resolve any issue,
no resolution has any special claim to correctness, and no resolution is consistent with all underlying
themes.
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With that background, the missing pieces of the speech law puzzle
fall into place. Core freedom-of-speech thinking looks like a straightfor-
ward exposition of the privileged position; our system of broadcast regu-
lation has much more in common with the nonprivileged pole. The
distinction is not quite so neat as all that; we have reintroduced some
privileged-position law into the broadcast regulatory structure. Still, the
glaring inconsistency of the two bodies of law stems from their roots in
the two opposing worldviews. I suggest, at the end of this Part, that the
basic nature of speech law makes accommodation between the two com-
peting visions much more problematic than in other doctrinal areas.
Individualist free speech philosophy has no point other than protecting
the private citizen from public tyranny. As a result, it raises the public-
private distinction to a level of sacred inviolability. Free speech philoso-
phy plays that role because of the privileged position's roots in main-
stream liberal political philosophy. That philosophy is centrally about
the problem of political despotism. A theory of free speech is in turn
central to that concern. As a result, privileged-position thinking assumes
its most severe form when we start talking about speech.
A. An Initial Framework
It has often been noted that legal issues can be resolved by using
either (1) simple, hard-edged, black-letter rules, causing results to turn
mechanically on a limited number of fairly easily ascertainable facts, or
(2) more nearly ad hoc, informal, situationally sensitive application of
general policy directives.3 °9 I will adopt a terminology popularized by
Duncan Kennedy, referring to the first approach as that of "rules" and
the second as that of "standards."'3 10
The choice between rules and standards seems ubiquitous in legal
309. See Schlag, supra note 307, at 379-80, 383-98; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1991 Term-Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992).
Indeed, the argument has been made that all legal issues can be resolved in each of these two ways.
One might object to this formulation on the ground that all legal solutions are not self-evidently in
one or the other of the two categories; rather, one might argue, it is more appropriate to order legal
solutions along a continuum with polar black-letter and situationally sensitive models at each end.
Because ruleness and standardness exist only along a continuum, according to one commentator, "to
claim that a law is [exclusively] either a rule or a standard is to deny its fundamental reality." David
G. Carlson, Contradiction and Critical Legal Studies, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1833, 1838 (1989) (book
review). For immediate purposes, though, my core argument is simply that it is meaningful and
potentially useful to rely on the two polar models in discussing legal solutions. The fact that so
many legal disputes can so easily be framed in terms of rules versus standards suggests that there is
something to the distinction.
310. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1685, 1685, 1687-89 (1976); see also ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 91 (1975)
(approaching the same dichotomy using the terminology of "legal justice" and "substantive
justice"). The terminology of rules and standards can be traced at least as far back as Roscoe Pound.
See Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV.
475, 482-86 (1933) (also discussing "principles," "conceptions," and "doctrines").
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decisionmaking. In the area of contract law, for example, using a rule-
like approach, we might seek to enforce all contracts supported by for-
mal consideration, subject to sharply and clearly bounded exceptions for
fraud, duress, and lack of capacity. On the other hand, we might take
the view that an element of "fraud" or "duress" is present in greater or
lesser degree in every case, and thus cannot form the basis for a sharply
bounded exception. We therefore might use a standard-like approach to
invalidate contracts if, based on a situationally sensitive analysis, the par-
ties seem to have had markedly unequal bargaining power, or if the con-
tracts simply seem too unfair.311 The rule-like approach promotes
certainty and ease of application, but subordinates concerns about real-
life inequalities in contracting.
In the area of criminal law, similarly, we can constrain the discre-
tion of capital juries in the penalty phase by requiring legislatures sharply
to define the circumstances calling for death in clear, rule-like, nondiscre-
tionary terms. 3 12 We can empower juries to exercise situationally sensi-
tive judgment by requiring that they always be allowed to hear any
conceivably mitigating evidence, and acquit if they so choose.313 The
Supreme Court, in fact, over the past fifteen years has sought to do both
at once, yielding spectacularly incoherent results.3 1 4
What are the consequences of relying on rules rather than stan-
dards, or vice versa? Because no rule exhibits a perfect "fit" with the
311. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 18-19 (1987).
312. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 155, 188-95 (1976).
313. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 303-05 (1976).
314. See generally Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305.
Other examples abound. In the administrative law realm, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) can on the one hand prescribe exactly how many feet wide scaffolding must
be; it can on the other hand simply ban scaffolding that poses "unreasonable" danger. The former,
rulelike approach may ignore a variety of relevant distinctions among work settings, and may be ill-
suited to coping with industry changes. It may, however, be easier and surer of administration than
the latter, standard-like approach, especially where workers have little power. See KELMAN, supra
note 311, at 33-34. On rule-bounded legality versus situationally sensitive bargaining in
administrative regulation, see generally Weinberg, supra note 40, at 623-40.
AFDC benefits law can focus on the "rights" of recipients to benefits based on certain verifiable
factual predicates (rule), or it can grant extensive, situationally-sensitive power to the welfare
caseworker based on her professional judgment (standard). See William H. Simon, Legality,
Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1223-24 (1983). Welfare law over
the last 30 years has moved almost completely from the latter to the former vision. See Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). Neither system, however, has worked particularly well, See
generally THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE (1990).
In the area of private conflict of laws, we can select the appropriate jurisdiction through clear,
hard-edged rules emphasizing uniformity and certainty of result, such as the traditional rule of lex
loci delicti, which refers all conflicts involving any substantive issue in a tort case to the law of the
place of injury. We can, on the other hand, abandon the old rules and rely instead on a more
standard-like, ad hoc, "interest analysis." See generally Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice
of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1623-25 (1985); Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution:
A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 787-99 (1983); Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or
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policies underlying it, application of a rule will on some occasions lead to
results contrary to those policies. Setting eighteen years as the age of
majority for voting purposes excludes from the franchise some who are
quite capable and mature, yet includes many who might be deemed, on a
closer inspection, childish, inexperienced, and immature." 5 Standards,
because they merely restate underlying policies, do not exhibit that prob-
lem. On the other hand, the great advantage of rules (as opposed to
standards) in conventional thought is that rules are said to increase cer-
tainty, predictability, and ease of administration in law application, and
decrease arbitrariness and the possibility of biased enforcement.31 6 Few
of us, after all, would welcome the creation of a government office
charged with the task of examining each of us individually, regardless of
age, and determining whether we were sufficiently experienced and
mature to be allowed to vote.317
The divergent choices we have made in our conventional free speech
philosophy and in our system of broadcast regulation replicate the rules-
standards opposition. Core free-speech philosophy manifests a strong
commitment to rules; it emphasizes at every turn that the law should be
expressed in hard-edged, nondiscretionary terms so as to minimize the
possibility of government discretion, arbitrariness, and bias.318
Situationally sensitive judgment by government officials is forbidden;
government may not make legal results in this area turn on "appraisal of
facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion." '319 The
Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972); Robert A. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus
Choice-of-Law Rules Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975 (1977).
For examples drawn from constitutional law, see Sullivan, supra note 309, at 76-95. For other
examples of the choice between rules and standards in specific doctrinal areas, see Schlag, supra note
307, at 383 n.19.
315. The point of rules, indeed, is that they "screen[] off from a decisionmaker factors that a
sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account," Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988), and thus may require results ill-serving the reasons behind the rules. See
id. at 534-37.
316. See Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1688; Sullivan, supra note 309, at 62-63.
317. For a careful defense of rules, see Schauer, supra note 315, at 538-44. For a recent judicial
discussion of the value of rules in constitutional law, see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct.
1904, 1914-16 (1992); for an attack on the rule thus justified, see id. at 1921-22 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
318. The reader should not confuse the rules-standards issue in regulating citizens' primary
conduct (where First Amendment philosophy insists that speech regulation be cast in the form of
rules), with the issue, one level up, whether rules or standards are most appropriate for determining
whether a regulation is constitutional One can adopt a rules (categorical or absolutist) or standards
(balancing) approach for determining whether a regulation substantively goes too far in suppressing
speech; one can adopt a rule-like or standard-like approach for determining what sort of speech is
worthy of what level of protection. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-2, at 792-94 (2d ed. 1988); Schlag, supra note 307, at 394-98. Whatever the result of those
determinations, though, the law on the books is supposed to consist solely of rules. See generally
Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1989).
319. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2401-02 (1992) (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940)).
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state may not enact vaguely worded restrictions on speech; those are
deemed to inhibit expression by causing people, unsure how the restric-
tions will be applied, to "steer [wide] of the unlawful zone."32 Consist-
ently with the ideology of rule-bounded legality, First Amendment law
insists that only clear and hard-edged rules operate with sufficient pre-
dictability and adequately minimize the possibility of hidden arbitrari-
ness or bias.
By contrast, our broadcast regulatory system foundationally relies
on the situationally sensitive standard: the FCC is told only that it
should take those steps that advance the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity." This is the opposite of the hard-edged rule. The
"vaguish, penumbral bounds expressed by the standard of the 'public
interest' ,321 leave the administrator discretion to advance the legislator's
values, and hold no promise of predictability or protection against bias.
"The statutory standard.., leaves wide discretion and calls for imagina-
tive interpretation. '3 22  As originally enunciated and applied by the
FCC, the Communications Act public-interest standard aspired to intui-
tive, sensitive judgment, largely unconstrained, and closely attuned to the
dilemmas of each individual case.323 The agency was to "bring[] the
deposit of its experience, the disciplined feel of the expert, to bear on
applications for licenses in the public interest.1 324
Standards are also prominent when it comes to regulating broadcast
conduct. Indecency law calls upon the licensee to avoid "patently offen-
sive" programming; the FCC has insisted that offensiveness can only be
gauged through "judgment" and careful consideration of "the many vari-
ables that make up a work's 'context.' "325 The recently enacted
Children's Television Act of 1990 calls upon the Commission in vague
terms to "consider," in reviewing a television renewal application, "the
extent to which the licensee... has served the educational and informa-
tional needs of children. 326 The Commission has not promulgated regu-
lations bounding that inquiry with hard-edged rules.327 The fairness
320. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 372 (1964)).
321. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953).
322. Id. at 90.
323. See Weinberg, supra note 40, at 655-56; supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
324. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. at 91. The FCC later departed from this glorification of
unbounded discretion. See infra text accompanying notes 395-405.
325. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 932 (1987), aff'd in relevant part sub noma.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
326. 47 U.S.C. § 303b (a) (Supp. 11 1990).
327. In part because the Commission has not promulgated limiting rules, it has received
extensive filings asserting that broadcasters have served "the educational and informational needs of
children" through "GI Joe," .The Jetsons," "Super Mario Brothers," and similar programming.
See Edmund L. Andrews, Broadcasters, to Satisfy Law, Define Cartoons as Education, N.Y. TiMES,
Sept. 30, 1992, at Al; Joe Flint, Study Slams Broadcasters' Kids Act Compliance, BROADCASTING,
Oct. 5, 1992, at 40. The Commission has since sought comment as to whether and in what manner it
1170 [Vol. 81:1101
BROADCASTING AND SPEECH
doctrine, although repealed in the late 1980s, remained situationally sen-
sitive to the last. Thus, the formal dichotomy embodied in Part I of this
Article is procedural: ordinary free-speech philosophy is committed to
rules, while broadcast regulation is built around the situationally sensi-
tive standard.
In contrast, in Part II, the distinction is substantive; it relates to a
vision of how the world operates. Conventional free-speech philosophy
is characterized by its image of an atomistic "marketplace" of ideas akin
to the economic marketplace, marked by individual autonomy, competi-
tion, and separateness. 328  It assumes that individuals can participate
meaningfully as individuals in the marketplace of ideas, autonomously
able to speak and to convince others of their views, unaffected by the
skewing or coercive effects of inequalities of wealth and power in the
private sphere. It assumes that people react to speech in rational ways,
choosing to adopt one belief rather than another as part of a willed, cho-
sen reasoning process; it rejects the position that people's views are
largely determined by their schemas, their socialization, their social posi-
tion, or other factors irrelevant to "reason" in the Cartesian sense. The
only meaningful source of constraint in the marketplace of ideas in this
vision is government intervention. Government intervention forces
silence where there would otherwise be speech, limiting the free play of
ideas that would otherwise prevail.
I argued in Part II that the vision of ordinary free-speech philoso-
phy is inaccurate, that its assumptions badly describe reality. Broadcast
regulation reflects that critique. Broadcast regulation is rooted in the
concern that inequality of private power and resources undermines citi-
zens' free interaction. Absent administrative allocation, according to
Red Lion, a few private licensees might "monopoliz[e]" broadcast dis-
course, making impossible "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas. '329 If
government does not enforce a fairness doctrine, in the world of Red
Lion, private holders of media power will be able to exercise "unlimited
private censorship.1 330 Broadcast regulation incorporates the concern
that viewers' tastes and wants are themselves determined, shaped by gen-
eral socioeconomic forces and by the mass media itself: that what view-
ers get from the mass media may help determine what they want. 331 It
might "exemplify and define the [statute's] programming requirements." Revision of Programming
Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 1993 FCC LEXIS 987 (March 2, 1993), at 8.
328. Cf Post, supra note 35, at 284, 293-94 (not relying on the marketplace metaphor, but
nonetheless describing individualism as central to First Amendment philosophy and the democratic
project).
329. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also BOLLINGER, supra
note 11, at 63.
330. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 392.
331. See Balkin, supra note 175, at 379; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 288 ('[P]rivate broadcasting
selections are a product of preferences that are themselves a result of the broadcasting status quo,
and not independent of it.").
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therefore insists that government not simply leave broadcasting to the
control of the marketplace; rather, government must supervise broad-
casting in the "public interest." All this stems from a worldview in
which the unregulated private sphere is marked not by freedom and
autonomy, but-at least to some degree-by domination and constraint.
Just as the procedural differences between free-speech philosophy
and broadcast law are mirrored in the larger legal context, this substan-
tive conflict finds reflections in the larger world as well. A CLS-minded
observer would point out that the interplay between a worldview focus-
ing on the autonomy of actors in the "private sphere" and one emphasiz-
ing the ubiquity of dependence and constraint is not limited to the
narrow confines of speech and broadcast law. Rather, it looks a lot like
an opposition observable in the world of law at large.
Contract law, for example, faces the same choice between ideologies
as does speech law. How ought contract law to approach the issues of
duress and fraud? It might follow mainstream freedom of speech philos-
ophy by treating private ordering in the marketplace as completely free
and autonomous; it would limit its response to concerns of duress, fraud,
and unconscionability by confining those concerns to exceptional, supple-
mentary, sharply bounded doctrinal areas.332
Alternatively, contract law might seek to follow broadcast regula-
tion, and the critique of mainstream free-speech philosophy, by develop-
ing a body of doctrine treating dependence, duress, and constraint as
more nearly pervasive.333 This approach would not treat "private" con-
tract as something presumptively to be left free from "public" intrusion.
Rather, it would incorporate the view that the pervasiveness of unequal
332. This approach incorporates a strong opposition between private and public spheres. The
private sphere is seen as the realm of intentionalism and free choice; the public sphere, by contrast,
as the necessary-evil realm of collective coercion. Constitutional lawyers will recognize this in its
most extreme form as the philosophy of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a useful
summary, see Olsen, supra note 307, at 1502-03.
The approach has its problems. All private contracts, after all, take place against a background
of state-created and state-enforced rights and entitlements; every bargain is thus a function of a legal
system that is not "natural" but political. See Mensch, supra note 307, at 764; see also Sunstein,
supra note 8, at 264-65; Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1273-74. There is no sharp-edged way to
distinguish between agreements entered into as a matter of uncoerced choice, and those that are a
product of impermissible duress; as the Realists pointed out, all choices in this world are
constrained. We make our arrangements only within the existing legal framework and the existing
(significantly publicly determined) distribution of rights and privileges. See John P. Dawson,
Economic Duress--An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 287-88 (1947); Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 605 (1943). On the attempt of
the Second Restatement of Contracts to define "duress" and "unconscionability," see Dalton, supra
note 307, at 1032-39. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
903-10 (1987) (discussing and criticizing the position that any understanding of government
neutrality must depend on assumptions about the "natural" distribution of rights and entitlements).
333. This seems a better description of social reality. "[T]he whole economic structure quite
obviously depend[s] on the law accepting as legitimate countless deals imposed by one party on
another." Dalton, supra note 307, at 1027.
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bargaining power calls for routine public involvement in so-called private
activity. The very existence of that unequal bargaining power would be
seen as resulting from entitlements conferred by law-which is to say, by
government.
334
I will refer to the substantive conflict reflected in ordinary free-
speech philosophy and broadcast law, as well as other areas of the law, as
the opposition of autonomy and constraint. The worldview oriented to
autonomy, in which individuals are seen as acting freely and indepen-
dently to advance their own values, treats human action as the product of
free choice. The worldview oriented to constraint, by contrast, empha-
sizing that our choices are rarely either independent or free, treats
human action as importantly determined by chains of earlier events.335
334. See Hale, supra note 332, at 627-28. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 102-10 (1984) (arguing that legal rules fundamentally constitute and
define private relationships); Olsen, supra note 307, at 1508-09 (attacking the image of the state as a
"noncoercive, neutral arbiter" in the market); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 264-65 (discussing New
Deal reformers' view that government not only "acts" when it disturbs existing distributions, but is
responsible for those distributions in the first instance). On the other hand, the approach is itself
problematic: how can we develop a coherent body of contract doctrine that treats ordinary contracts
as unfree?
335. The conflict of autonomy and constraint is in this sense found in the criminal law. See
generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REv. 959,
959-60, 990-99 (1992). The concept of blame plays an important role in our criminal law. Most of
us believe that it would be wrong to punish someone who was not blameworthy, even if that
punishment in fact deterred the commission of crimes. This belief assumes that we can meaningfully
describe some people as more blameworthy than others. It is obvious, though, that "circumstances
clearly beyond the control of the actor have, at a minimum, a strong bearing on the possibility that
he will commit wrongful acts." KELMAN, supra note 311, at 89. Drug-related violence, for
example, is significantly more common among those living in an environment of urban poverty,
unemployment, and educational deprivation than among those living in better conditions. Since we
only sometimes recognize such circumstances in assessing blame, we tend to waver between
approaches.
On the doctrinal level, this opposition can be seen in a variety of contexts. To what extent
should we impose criminal liability for negligent behavior? A traditional view, now out of fashion,
was that negligence was "natural" to some people, determined, and thus not an appropriate subject
for criminal punishment. Is it appropriate to punish drug addicts for being addicted? Is drug
addiction a "status offense," the punishment of which is unfair because the activity is involuntary?
Or is punishing the addict a reasonable moral response to the initial decision to take the drugs that
led to addiction? In what circumstances should we downgrade murder to manslaughter because the
defendant was "provoked," that is, because his action was a partly determined response to external
circumstances? See id. at 93-94, 95-96. A predisposition toward rules and the salvation of a refuge
in "science" leads us to refuse to find at all blameworthy those who fall within the exceptional,
purportedly hard-edged and sharply bounded category of "insanity." It seems questionable, though,
whether legal insanity coincides with any genuine hard-science medical category. We tend to sweep
under the rug murkier questions of the determinants of human action, in part because we simply
have no good way of dealing with them within the criminal-justice system. See id. at 91, 277-78.
Nor is this conflict limited to the criminal law. In reforming a trust or interpreting a statute or
constitutional provision (say, the Equal Protection Clause), to what extent should we consider the
drafters' views (say, that segregated schools were permissible and appropriate) to be self-created,
chosen, and worthy of respect, and to what extent should we consider them a mere product of their
times, which the drafters would not reaffirm were they to revisit the matter today? The latter course
allows us to disregard their views by treating them as merely socially determined. See id. at 99-101.
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As a result, the concepts of autonomy and constraint are connected to
the philosophical concepts of intentionalism and determinism.336
The opposition of autonomy and constraint is also linked to a con-
flict between political philosophies some have referred to as individual-
ism and altruism. Individualism emphasizes separateness, autonomy,
and self-reliance: one's own ends are viewed as normatively primary,
entitling one to pursue them so long as one respects the basic rights of
others. Altruism, by contrast, emphasizes sharing and sacrifice. Within
the context provided by "the degree of communal involvement or soli-
darity or intimacy," one seeks to help others regardless of their
"rights. ,337
Individualism assumes autonomy by presupposing that people inter-
act freely as individuals, that they choose their contracts and relation-
ships by consulting their own values and are responsible for the choices
they make. It makes sense only with an intentionalist foundation: the
idea that one is entitled to treat one's own ends as normatively primary
presupposes that one's ends are in fact one's own, meaningfully and
intentionally chosen. Its philosophical dilemma is the need to maximize
liberty-individual freedom of action-while maintaining order.338 That
task is incoherent unless it is possible to conceive of meaningful freedom
of action. Similarly, altruism makes more sense in a world characterized
by mutual dependence. It has as a premise that the responsibility for
each of our individual situations is significantly communal, rather than
individual. That premise is unmoored from its foundation if we in fact
are free, individually, to make our own choices, to choose our own lives.
It makes more sense if we live in a world where our lives and circum-
stances are the product of socially determined forces.
Duncan Kennedy suggested, some fifteen years ago, that rules are
linked to individualism, and standards to altruism.339 The connection is
surely not straightforward; law motivated by altruistic concerns may well
be cast in rule-like form 4.3  Concerns about discretion and adminis-
336. See KELMAN, supra note 311, at 86-113. The terminology, however, is misleading. The
determinist philosophy that human agents have no free will, and thus that all actions are fully
causally determined, is not implicated here. See Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be
Radical?, 36 STAN L. RaV. 247, 263 n.53 (1984); John Stick, Charting the Development of Critical
Legal Studies, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 407, 414 (1988) (book review).
337. Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1718; see id. at 1713-18. But see Peter Gabel & Duncan
Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV, 1, 15-16 (1984) (recanting "the whole idea of
individualism and altruism," explaining that "these things are absolutely classic examples of
'philosophical' abstractions which you can manipulate into little structures").
338. See UNGER, supra note 310, at 66-67; see also Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 783-84 (1983).
339. See Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1737-66.
340. Redistributive taxation provides an obvious example; labor and public benefits law provide
others. 17 U.S.C. § 203, providing for the termination of certain transfers of copyright, plants a
nearly impenetrable thicket of rules in order to protect authors and their beneficiaries from pervasive
inequality in the marketplace.
1174 [Vol. 8 1:1101
BROADCASTING AND SPEECH
trability may arise regardless of the lawmaker's individualistic or altruis-
tic perspective.341 Indeed, whether law seems individualistic or altruistic
may depend entirely on the perspective from which one views it.342
The suggestion is important for purposes of this Article, though,
because it implies a link between the procedural and the substantive ele-
ments of our competing approaches to speech regulation. Is there a link
between mainstream free-speech philosophy's adherence to rules, and a
worldview of individualism, autonomy and intentionalism? Between the
broadcast regulatory system's reliance on standards, and a worldview of
altruism, dependence and determinism?
Perhaps there is. Rules, according to Mark Kelman, are linked to
"stereotypical individualism" because they are designed for "the person
who lives by the rules," who "wants to know just what is expected of
him: even if a lot is expected, he can do it, as long as there are no sur-
prises, as long as he can plan his life anticipating and controlling all obli-
gations that he will ultimately be asked to meet." He "does not beg for
fairness or a second look at transactions when things go wrong; conse-
quences are accepted, allowed to fall where they may so long as no one
has explicitly cheated." He is confident of his abilities, going by the
book, to take care of his interests or to live with his failure to do so. 343
By contrast, Kelman contends, a legal regime emphasizing stan-
dards-and thus the need for fact-specific determinations in every case-
rejects the easy assumption that we will all be okay so long as we follow
the rules. It rejects the assurance that formal equality, in the face of
substantive inequality, is the measure of justice. Rather, formal equality
under the rules merely "forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under
bridges."' 3 " We cannot simply assume autonomy in the private sphere.
The ubiquity of dependence and constraint requires the decisionmaker to
look to the barriers to freedom that may be inherent in a specific situa-
tion. "[O]ne has to see whether one's trading partners can actually take
care of themselves; one can't simply presume that their formal legal
capacity is the same as actual capacity." This fact-specific inquiry calls
for "sensitivity and awareness to others, even to others one hasn't volun-
tarily chosen to be sensitive to." '34 5
341. See Schlag, supra note 307, at 420 (arguing that "[b]oth altruism and individualism can
generate arguments for both rules and standards"); Sullivan, supra note 309, at 96-100.
342. Recognition of a tort cause of action, thus, can be seen as altruistic because it emphasizes
the responsibility of the tortfeasor to look out for the interests of others; it can be seen as
individualistic because it ignores any responsibility of the injured to subordinate his own interests so
that others might benefit. Cf. Balkin, supra note 198, at 208-11 (any legal rule can be seen as either
"individualist" or "communalist").
343. KELMAN, supra note 311, at 59-60.
344. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (The Moderm Library 1917) (1894).
345. KELMAN, supra note 311, at 60. "Rules," Kelman concludes, "respect strong, individually
chosen distinctions in relations .... Standards assert that simply living in a community establishes a
relationship of some trust and care .... " Id.
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In sum, relying on Kelman's approach, we can draw a connection
between the rule-boundedness of conventional First Amendment think-
ing and a philosophy of individualism, autonomy, and intentionalism;
between broadcast regulation's reliance on standards and a philosophy of
altruism, dependence, and determinism. Can we take this further?
Consider the opposition between value subjectivity and value objec-
tivity. Mainstream Western political thought,34 6 beginning with Hobbes
and Locke, has taken as foundational the belief that values-theories of
the good-are individual, subjective, and arbitrary.347 While individuals'
values and goals may happen for a time to coincide, that coincidence is
temporary and precarious.348 The state is appropriately seen as "facilita-
tive," seeking not "that particular good lives be led but simply allow[ing]
persons to achieve their own vision of the good."' 349 That, though, is not
the only way to imagine the world; alternatively, one can see values as
objective or as communally determined.
Rules appeal to the aesthetics of precision, to the psychology of denial or skeptical
pragmatism (or, alternatively, of blinding ourselves to imprecision and mistakes or
believing it is girlishly utopian to hope for perfection); standards appeal to the aesthetics of
romantic absolutism, to the psychology of painful involvement in each situation, to the
pragmatism that rejects the need for highfalutin generalities.
Id. at 61.
Kelman's description of rules leads to his ultimate endorsement of an "antirights, antilegalist
approach." "Rules," he concludes, "are the opiate of the masses." Id. at 63, 275. I have serious
doubts whether a move from rules to standards, and from rights to empathy, would in fact advance
freedom. It seems to me that such an approach would tend to suppress minorities of any stripe.
While rule-bound legalism, like any legal system, privileges those already socially dominant, I worry
that communitarian approaches, for dissidents or minorities, may be still worse. See PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146-48 (1991) (observing that minority-group
members can find formal legality empowering by using it to create a legally respected social self, even
as financially comfortable white males can find it alienating and distancing); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356-69, 1381-87 (1988) (arguing that CLS analysis fails to recognize the
realities of the racially oppressed); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 303-07, 314-19 (1987);
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 635 (1990) ("[C]ritical
feminism's central objective should be not to delegitimate [rights-based] frameworks but rather to
recast their content and recognize their constraints."); see also Rebecca L. Brown, A Tribute to
Justice Thurgood Marshall: Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Formalism, I TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 7, 16-17 (1992). In Frances Olsen's study of the family and the market, thus,
the form of social ordering associated with the altruistic ethic is not community but hierarchy. See
Olsen, supra note 307, at 1529-30.
I rely here on Kelman's approach, therefore, not for its normative content but for its descriptive
and explanatory power.
346. I refer here to the body of thought commonly referred to as "liberal" thought,
encompassing the work of such disparate thinkers as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Bentham,
Posner, Nozick, Tribe, and Rawls.
347. See UNGER, supra note 310, at 76; see generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). The text is perhaps oversimplified; some modern liberal writers
reject the position that the liberal state must be strictly neutral between conceptions of the good. See
Stick, supra note 336, at 417.
348. See UNGER, supra note 310, at 81.
349. KELMAN, supra note 311, at 66.
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Both rules and the philosophy of individualism can be seen as linked
to the belief that values are individual, subjective and arbitrary; stan-
dards and altruism, to the belief that values are communal or objec-
tive.350 If we are to decide disputes by reference to standards of
"reasonable" actions or "fair" dealing, after all, we must be able to reach
some sort of shared conception of what it means to be "reasonable" or
"fair. '31  Rules require no such moral dialogue for their application;
they can be applied, as standards cannot, in a world in which values are
individually, even randomly, chosen, shared only by chance.352 Value
subjectivity, in turn, is linked to individualism: where there exists no
objective or meaningfully shared understanding of the Good, there is no
justification for collective attempts to run individual lives.353 By con-
trast, altruism can see the state not as a means to facilitate the exogenous,
pre-existing goals of its individual members, but as a means to the collec-
tive development of shared ends.35 4
Consider the opposition between a philosophy embracing paternal-
ism and one rejecting it.355 Value subjectivity and individualism seem to
forbid paternalism. If values are entirely subjective, there is no basis for
any conclusion that an individual's choice is the "wrong" one for her; it
may in fact accord with her own subjectively chosen preferences. Not to
respect it is not to respect the boundaries between people that individual-
ism demands.
Once again, though, it is possible to imagine an alternative philoso-
phy. That philosophy might take one of two forms. First, it might
attack the notion that people's choices in fact reflect their desires.35 6 The
fact that all choices are constrained by circumstance causes people rou-
tinely to make choices they view as unsatisfying. The "choice" to take an
unsafe job may maximize utility under the circumstances, but may have
little to do with the chooser's desires in a more general sense. Moreover,
on a psychological level our desires are marked by profound ambiva-
lence. Mechanically identifying them with our choices oversimplifies
350. See UNGER, supra note 310, at 76-81; Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1766-71.
351. See KELMAN, supra note 311, at 61. The belief that we cannot, Kelman suggests, is crucial
to the void-for-vagueness doctrine: "The law 'Don't do bad' is the paradigm of vagueness precisely
because people's accounts of what is bad are unshared, subjective." Id. at 78; see also Schauer, supra
note 315, at 512 n.8.
352. See Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1768-69.
353. See id. at 1770-71; KELMAN, supra note 311, at 61-62.
354. See Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1771-72.
355. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 572-73
(1982); see also KELMAN, supra note 311, at 137-41.
356. More basically, it might attack the notion that people have independent, exogenous desires;
an alternative view might stress that the "very structure of individual perception, belief and desire,
and thus the terms of individual choice, are already shaped by culture and ideology even before the




them to the point of parody.357
Second, an alternative philosophy might challenge head-on the basic
theme of nonpaternalism that government should be structured so as
uncritically to facilitate the effectuation of people's desires. In ordinary
life, Kennedy has argued, we often act to influence people's choices in
order to cause them to do things we believe to be in their own interest.
Paternalism in that sphere, he has suggested, reflects a moral imperative
not simply and mindlessly to defer to others' decisions, but rather to help
them make important judgments, difficult as that may be, because we
care about them. We are responsible for them, because we share in a
community.35 8
We can link up all of these oppositions into a comprehensive expres-
sion of two antagonistic worldviews. One worldview links rules, individ-
ualism, a belief in overall private autonomy, a sharp public-private
distinction, value subjectivity, and nonpaternalism; the other links stan-
dards, altruism, determinism, a belief in the pervasiveness of constraint,
value objectivity (or a belief in the communal nature of values), and
paternalism. 359
I have so far presented each of these oppositions as relating two
evenly balanced positions. Is that appropriate, or are some poles more
equal than others? I would argue that the opposing worldviews I have
hypothesized do not occupy equal places in American law. Consider first
the opposition of rules and standards. Rules have the decided advantage.
The whole notion of the Rule of Law places at the center of our legal
thinking the idea that judges should be applying hard-edged rules that
leave little room for interpretation or discretion. In that way we have a
government of "laws, not men."1360 The fact that law application some-
times works best as a nuanced, nonrule-bound, discretionary process
seems like a necessary evil, an exception to the way that legal reason-
ing-that is, rule application-is supposed to work. Standards give the
judge or agency independent power that we then scurry about trying to
figure out how to constrain. A well-stocked law library contains scores
357. See KELMAN, supra note 311, at 126-33; cf Sunstein, supra note 8, at 287-88 (contrasting
"democratic aspirations" and "consumption choices"). See generally FLANNERY O'CONNOR, WISE
BLOOD, reprinted in THREE BY FLANNERY O'CONNOR 8 (2d ed. 1964) ("[F]ree will does not mean
one will, but many wills conflicting in one man. Freedom cannot be conceived simply. It is a
mystery ....").
358. See Kennedy, supra note 355, at 631-49.
359. This vision is developed in KELMAN, supra note 311, at 15-150.
360. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUrION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960) ("The conception of
freedom under the law... rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general
abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another man's
will and are therefore free."); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[O]urs is a government of laws, not of men, and ... we submit
ourselves to rulers only if under rules."); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law ofRules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing that courts should, to the extent possible, announce clear rules
and avoid situationally sensitive analysis).
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of books about the "problem of discretion"; there are no books, however,
about the "problem of rules. '36" Rules are what law is about. Standards,
as a result, are what we use in the cases when it seems that rules won't
work.
Consider next the question of individualism and altruism. It is hard
even to think about altruism as part of a legal structure; the very word
"altruism" suggests action beyond that which is legally required. 362 The
structure of the law we know is Hohfeldian; its core is a nucleus of legal
freedom equated with autonomy, rights, and obligations. It is therefore
individualistic. Altruistic concerns enter only as a supplement, an "after-
the-fact adjustment[] to a pre-existing legal structure that has its own,
individualist, logical coherence. ' 363 Altruistic notions provide "a periph-
ery of exceptions to the core doctrines. ' 3 4
As one considers the remaining oppositions, though, things begin to
seem more complicated. In the legal vision of the turn of the century, the
individualistic autonomy of actors in the private sphere was paramount,
both as a normative good-indeed, as the definition of freedom-and as
the only legally cognizable reality.365 In this post-Realist age, though,
the boundaries are muddier. Lochner is no longer good law. We premise
much of the modern administrative state on the recognition that the eco-
nomic sphere is in important degree marked by domination and con-
straint, that government refusal to intervene is not necessarily
empowering. The government plays an unabashed public-law role in
labor relations, the relation between manufacturer and consumer, and in
a host of other formerly "private" interactions.366
In some respects the old approach still applies; the criminal law, for
example, appears still to be built on what Meir Dan-Cohen calls the "free
will paradigm. ' 367 While the criminal law does not always adhere to the
intentionalist position, affirming individual autonomy and moral respon-
sibility in the sphere of private ordering, we tend to view departures
361. KELMAN, supra note 311, at 292.
362. See Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1717.
363. Id. at 1719.
364. Id. at 1737. In classical legal thought, thus, individualism was the ethic of the
marketplace, which was in turn the domain of law. Altruism was the ethic of the family, which was
"delegalized." See Olsen, supra note 307, at 1520-22.
365. See Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1728-31; Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream
Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 13, 23-26 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). Mensch
emphasizes that legal thinkers of the time did not deny the existence of inequality and coercion in the
private economy; rather, they deemed those factors simply not cognizable within the logical
structure of the law. (Even at the time, on the other hand, the law was not free from opposing
concerns; consider, for example, the paternalistic motivations underlying the anti-lottery statute
upheld in Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)).
366. This shift is manifest in private law as well as public. See, eg., Balkin, supra note 198, at
259-60 (describing nonprivileged assumptions in modern product liability law).
367. Dan-Cohen, supra note 335, at 959.
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"somewhat apologetically, as exceptions to the free will idea." '68 Once
again, "the picture of responsibility is that of a core and a periphery. '369
Yet the ubiquity of paternalist concerns (for example, in government
safety and health regulation) demonstrates the importance of such con-
cerns in our law. Paternalism has a particularly bad image in our legal
culture. We associate it both with Stalinist notions of how the "vanguard
class" will teach the rest of us where our true interests lie, and with racist
and sexist depictions of blacks and women as children, not really under-
standing their own interests or competent to protect them. 370 Notwith-
standing widespread condemnation, though, its role is undeniable.
Where does this leave us? Some scholars take the view that with
respect to all of the paired visions I have discussed-rules vs. standards,
individualism vs. altruism, value subjectivity vs. value objectivity, inten-
tionalism vs. determinism, nonpaternalism vs. paternalism-mainstream
legal thought still treats the former term as privileged, the latter as non-
privileged.37' Privileged legal discourse presents a vision of the world in
which people presumptively are free, independent, "self-determined sub-
jects," '372 interacting in a world free of coercion or meaningful inequality,
choosing their own values and their own destinies. The privileged term is
assumed to provide the presumptively appropriate way to resolve dis-
putes; the nonprivileged approach (although it may be frequently
resorted to) is seen as extraordinary, in need of special justification, ille-
gitimate except in-the context of sharply bounded exceptions to the gen-
eral rule. The privileged approach, moreover, is seen as accurately
describing the world in all but exceptional cases.
As a result, while both privileged and nonprivileged attitudes are
present in the law, it is the privileged position that shapes our thinking
about the law, and about the world upon which the law acts. We tend to
downplay the nonprivileged description of reality; we treat nonprivileged
thinking as applicable only within exceptional, sharply bounded spheres.
In part, we accept the privileged vision because of doubt that we could
workably, consistently with freedom, structure the legal system to take
into account the nonprivileged realities-say, that people's actions are in
368. Id. at 960.
369. Id.
370. See KELMAN, supra note 311, at 138; Kennedy, supra note 355, at 588-90; see also
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (justifying
exclusion of women from the bar in part on the ground that women should be "protected and
defended" by men).
371. See KELMAN, supra note 311, at 290-95. All this is reminiscent of the deconstructionist
position that any definition necessarily involves a hierarchical opposition. Deconstructive practice,
though, calls for a demonstration that the hierarchy is false: that whenever A can be termed the rule
and B the exception, the same sort of reasoning can be used to term B the rule and A the exception.
See Balkin, supra note 307, at 747 (arguing that "[a]ny hierarchical opposition of ideas, no matter
how trivial, can be deconstructed" to show that the privileged status is an illusion).
372. KELMAN, supra note 311, at 290.
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important part not "chosen" but socially determined, or that people
might sometimes be better off if they did not get what they choose-and
we respond by denying that the nonprivileged realities are real at all.3 73
I will assume the validity of this position, by using the terms "privi-
leged" and "nonprivileged," throughout the rest of this discussion. I
don't think that in its strongest form it is crucial to my reasoning,
though. Most of the analysis that follows relies only on my central argu-
ment that we can find two overarching worldviews reflected in the law,
each incorporating normative and descriptive elements, and each incor-
porating one pole of the various paired oppositions I have discussed.
B. Explaining Speech Law
This background places free-speech philosophy and broadcast regu-
latory doctrine in a new light. Core First Amendment philosophy looks
like a straightforward exposition of the "rules" position. As discussed
earlier, it reflects the individualistic ideology of rule-bounded legality; it
is fundamentally rationalist and intentionalist. It reflects an essential
commitment to the view that we are each masters of our fate and cap-
tains of our soul, that the law need not concern itself with the determin-
ing effects of either social or psychological reality.
Core freedom-of-speech thinking seems grounded at its root in a
thoroughgoing commitment to value subjectivity. Its guiding principle is
that government cannot seek to suppress speech advocating disfavored
values, for we cannot meaningfully say in this context that any values are
wrong or should be disfavored. Under the Constitution "there is no such
thing as a false idea."'374 Rather, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our consti-
tutional constellation," it is that we cannot use the mechanism of govern-
ment to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion." '375 Indeed, this is the ideological
root of the marketplace metaphor: it is because there is no way for us to
fasten on objective truth or justice that we must let all ideas compete-
that we can never say "enough," that we know what the truth is, and
that the good done by free competition of ideas in a given case is out-
weighed by the harm done through the propagation of a false idea.
376
Core freedom-of-speech thinking rejects paternalism, the notion that
373. See id. at 275-79, 283-84 (arguing that we tend to deny the existence of problems for which
there is no ready legal solution).
374. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
375. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
376. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330-31 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The matter is not in fact quite so simple. A person who believes in the
existence of objective truth may follow core freedom-of-speech thinking on the theory that free
competition in ideas is the best way to arrive at that truth. I believe that theory to be problematic, as
I explained supra Part II. More important, though, is the fact that such a person is constrained by
the marketplace metaphor to behave as if truth were subjective.
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the community can regulate speech because it fears that the choices citi-
zens could make in response to speech might not be in their own inter-
ests.377 Such regulation is inconsistent with the individualism I have
discussed; it is seen as denying each person's fundamental autonomy to
decide what to believe and what to reject.378 Given the foundational
assumptions that our choices in response to speech are free and rational,
and that each of us has an equal right to select his or her own values,
with no way to characterize any value as right or wrong, there is simply
no room for government second-guessing of citizens' reactions to speech.
Outside of the exceptional case, all beliefs, by hypothesis, are rational
elaborations of valid (although arbitrary) values. There is no basis for
government to make the judgment that people would be better off hold-
ing other views or making other choices.
Core freedom-of-speech thinking rests on a strong public-private
distinction, coupled with a rejection of government regulation except in
sharply bounded, exceptional cases.379 It does not wholly close its eyes
to the possibility that private coercion could impermissibly threaten the
marketplace of ideas, so that government should appropriately act to
protect that marketplace; it recognizes, for example, that police must act
to protect the speech of a speaker physically threatened by an angry
mob.380 What is crucial, though, is that such challenges to the model are
not seen as endemic; rather, they are recognized only as limited, confined
377. But see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding
paternalistic regulation of truthful advertising for lawful casino gambling). Posadas fell within a
"commercial speech" area in which conventional First Amendment thinking applies at best
incompletely; Philip Kurland nonetheless characterized that opinion as reminiscent of Alice in
Wonderland and Kafka's The Castle, in which "words take on new meanings and bureaucracy
triumphs over the rule of law." Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company:
"'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 SUP. Cr. REV.
1, 2.
378. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-14
(1972) (arguing that "harms to... individuals which consist in their coming to have false beliefs as a
result of... expression" cannot justify legal restrictions on speech because such restrictions would
be inconsistent with treating citizens as "equal, autonomous, rational agents"). But cf T.M.
Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 519, 532-34
(1979) (noting that considerations of "justified paternalism" and of costs associated with unregulated
expression militate against too-sweeping a condemnation of such regulation).
379. Indeed, First Amendment thinking can coherently reject government regulation precisely
because it maintains a strong public-private distinction. It views the property-based market
mechanism as essentially private, not "regulation" at all, and ignores the governmental hand
necessary to make it go. See Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1273-74. Robert Post explains that the
public-private distinction is essential to First Amendment thinking without regard to its empirical
basis; even without such basis, he argues, the distinction is needed as a matter of "moral and political
ascription" if we are to retain democratic self-determination. Post, supra note 179, at 1128.
380. This is the doctrine of the "heckler's veto." See Fiss, supra note 151, at 1416-17
(describing the doctrine as an "established part" of the free speech tradition). But see Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (sustaining the conviction of a street corner speaker arrested after
ignoring police orders to stop speaking because of the restlessness of the crowd).
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exceptions to the overall rule of private ordering.3 81
Broadcast law, by contrast, has much more in common with the
opposing pole. It is built around the situationally sensitive standard, the
procedural mode of the nonprivileged pole.382 It reflects a profound fear
that inequality of private power and resources undermines citizens' free
interaction. It reflects a belief that viewers' tastes and wants are not
endogenous, but are themselves shaped by outside forces. There is no
room in the ideology of autonomy, after all, for a fear of "private censor-
ship"; in that vision, all citizens can participate freely in the marketplace
of ideas so long as government does not interfere. The fear of private
censorship makes perfect sense, though, from the vantage point of the
nonprivileged concern with substantive inequality in the marketplace.
Consistently with the nonprivileged position's fear of the distorting
effects of economic inequality, broadcast law directs the government to
regulate private broadcasters, through the "public interest" standard,
with the goal that they speak as if they were freed from market pressures.
Consistently with the nonprivileged position's rejection of the public-pri-
vate distinction, FCC regulations relating to broadcast industry structure
(as well as the now-defunct fairness doctrine) reflect the desire to create
and reorient "private" institutional structures in the interest of promot-
ing greater equality in the speech forum.3 83
Broadcast regulation incorporates the paternalist concern that what
viewers choose through the marketplace ("American Gladiators," say, or
"America's Funniest Home Videos") may not be what is best for them.
Our broadcast regulatory system insists that stations carry public-affairs
programming whether viewers want to watch it or not. We subsidize
public broadcasting stations at least in part on the theory that viewers'
tastes may be improved through exposure to more highbrow
programming.
The broadcast-law requirement that the government scrutinize
broadcast licensees for their service to the public interest is revealing in
its identification of both problem and solution. As for the problem, the
law reflects the nonprivileged (determinist, paternalistic) concern that
381. See supra note 207.
382. See supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 395-405 and
accompanying text.
383. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1992). The FCC has put in place national multiple
ownership rules, limiting the number of stations a licensee can own or control nationwide in a given
service, id. § 73.3555 (d); rules limiting the number of broadcast stations a licensee can own or
control in a single market, id. § 73.3555 (a), (b); and rules limiting joint ownership of a newspaper
and broadcast station in a single community, id. § 73.3555 (c), (e). Other relevant regulation of
industry structure includes the preference in licensing for applicants with smaller and less extensive
holdings in other media outlets, see supra note 73 and accompanying text, and a variety of
preferences given to minority license applicants and licensees, see generally Metro Broadcasting, Inc.




because the market is skewed and viewers' tastes are themselves shaped
by the market, viewers are imperfect decisionmakers as to what is in their
own interests. The solution offered is for the government to regulate pro-
gramming in the "public interest": this reflects the nonprivileged (altru-
istic, not individualistic) worldview in assuming that there is such a thing
as the "public interest," distinct from the mere sum of individual inter-
ests, which the government can be empowered to seek.384 It reflects the
nonprivileged belief that government action can promote freedom, rather
than restrain it.
Red Lion reflects the nonprivileged pole as well in its understanding
of the role of broadcast licensees. Licensees are not classic, individualis-
tic, First Amendment speakers; rather, they are formed in the altruistic
mold. A broadcast licensee is a "proxy or fiduciary," with the function
of "present[ing] those views and voices which are representative of his
community. ' 385 Much the same can be seen in Red Lion's description of
First Amendment rights; there too, the Court seemed to diverge sharply
from the individualist tradition, speaking of the "collective right" of the
''people as a whole" to have the broadcast system function consistently
with First Amendment values.386
In a variety of ways, broadcast law appears to depart from the pure
nonprivileged model. First, it can be argued that a broadcast law hewing
unreservedly to the nonprivileged pole would place greater emphasis on
direct content regulation. The privileged-position model, emphasizing
the autonomy of the private sphere, requires some "sufficiently close
nexus" 387 before the state can be held responsible for its mere failure to
prevent private action. Thus, for example, there is no violation of the
Equal Protection Clause if the government stands idly by while a person
engages in racial discrimination in her private life or workplace. But the
view of the state more nearly consistent with the nonprivileged pole
rejects that distinction. It contends that governmental ordering is perva-
sive throughout the nominally private sphere, and that the government is
384. Cf UNGER, supra note 310, at 81-82 (arguing that in individualist philosophy, groups have
no values apart from the individual and subjective goals of their individual members). Laurence
Winer thus invokes Ayn Rand in arguing that broadcasting ought to be regulated in accord with
core First Amendment principles; he denies that there exists any "such thing as the 'public interest'
(other than the sum of the individual interests of individual citizens)." Winer, supra note 8, at 379
(quoting AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 123, 126 (1967)).
385. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). For the Court's later
apparent departure from that view, see infra notes 406-14 and accompanying text.
386. 395 U.S. at 390. As then-Commissioner Robinson pointed out, the apparent position of the
Red Lion Court that "the First Amendment gives positive rights to listeners/viewers to dictate what
speakers shall tell them" is incoherent as a statement of individualist Hohfeldian relations;
understood in that manner, it "makes nonsense of the First Amendment; in fact, it stands it on its
head." The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 706-07 (1976)
(Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
387. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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responsible for those actions it merely allows and facilitates as well as
those it requires. Thus, "when the government grants access to racist
groups to use streets and parks for racist speech, it is to that extent subsi-
dizing racist speech .... [When it] declines to allow suits for intentional
infliction of emotional distress or other forms of racial harassment, it is
permitting racists to harm minorities., 38  On that understanding, gov-
ernment bears responsibility for the effects of all speech it allows to be
broadcast. A broadcast regulatory system truly adhering to the nonprivi-
leged model might seek to use situationally sensitive means to ban private
broadcast speech disserving equality in the world at large.
A Commission that took seriously these implications of its public
interest mandate might see its own role as an activist one, directed at
removing broadcasters whose speech was less in the public interest from
the air, to be replaced by those whose programming would be more in
the public interest. It might look harder at programming (and proposed
programming) in ruling on license and transfer applications, taking a
closer look at whether the broadcast of racial or religious invective, say,
really furthered the public interest.389
The FCC has not played such a role. It has almost never denied
renewal to a television licensee in a comparative challenge.390 While it
has occasionally denied television license renewals in other contexts-
388. Balkin, supra note 175, at 377. While Professor Balkin was merely setting out the
argument and not endorsing it, other scholars have argued along just these lines. See, e.g., Charles
R. Lawrence II, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J.
431, 444-49 (arguing that the state action rule exculpates private racism by "immuniz[ing] private
discriminators from constitutional scrutiny"); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2374-80 (1989) (describing government's
tolerance and protection of hate group activities as a form of state action that legitimates and
supports racist speech); see also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 266-77.
389. But cf Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (holding that "recurrent bigoted appeals to anti-Semitic prejudice" were not grounds for
nonrenewal of broadcasting company's license where the company had offered free time for response
(quotation omitted)), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
This story may be less simple than it appears. Duncan Kennedy has indicated that even the
altruist position encompasses "the necessity and desirability of a sphere of autonomy or liberty or
freedom or privacy within which one is free to ignore both the plights of others and the consequences
of one's own acts for their welfare." Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1718. I think the approach I take
in text, though, is true to altruism as a "direction[] or orientation[] of policy argument." Balkin,
supra note 356, at 1158.
390. The Commission in the notorious WHDH case denied renewal to a Boston television
station in favor of a challenger. In that case, though, the unique procedural history of the
proceeding had led the agency to treat the incumbent as if it were merely another applicant. See
WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see also supra note 96. The Video 44
case is a more recent one in which the Commission denied renewal in a comparative proceeding. See
Video 44, 5 F.C.C.R. 6383 (1990). The agency, however, refused to do so until prodded by the court
of appeals. See Video 44,4 F.C.C.R. 1209 (1989), rev'd sub nom. Monroe Communications Corp. v.
FCC, 900 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. I am
aware of no cases in which a conventional broadcast license genuinely was won by a challenger,
rather than lost by the incumbent.
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even, on very rare occasions, on grounds implicating broadcast content-
it has not done so in any systematic way. Rather, its actions have been
sporadic exceptions to a norm of unbroken renewal.391 Similarly, even
when the fairness doctrine was in force, the Commission found actual
fairness doctrine violations only in the rarest of cases.392 While the
Commission issued a warning in the drug-oriented songs controversy,393
it took no further steps against offending licensees. Indeed, for the FCC
to have actively imposed on private speakers an official government view
of what speech was in the "public interest" would have been wholly
unacceptable to the Commissioners, steeped in privileged-position law,
and to the dominant legal culture. It would have made the contradiction
between competing legal modes too stark and inescapable. Even in an
area marked by nonprivileged concerns, ordinary First Amendment val-
ues--encapsulated in the Communication Act's formal denial to the
Commission of "the power of censorship" 394-- preclude so great a gov-
ernmental assertion of power over speakers and speech.
There are other ways in which broadcast law arguably departs from
the pure nonprivileged model. The FCC over the past thirty years has
responded to pressures to abandon the procedural mode of situationally
sensitive adjudication. 95 The history of FCC control over market entry,
for example, reflects a continual move away from situationally sensitive
standards in search of more hard-edged rules. In the initial years of FCC
decisionmaking, the agency decided whether to grant uncontested license
applications in a quintessentially situationally sensitive, subjective, and
ad hoc manner. Addressing whether there was "need" for the proposed
new service, the Commission went so far as to consider whether a station
provided relatively less valuable public service because its programming
was already available to the public on phonograph records. Judicial hos-
tility, however, eventually put a stop to the practice. The Commission
391. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
392. In one two-year period at the height of fairness enforcement, the FCC received 4280
fairness complaints; it made findings adverse to the licensee in nineteen (4/10 of 1%) and took
tangible punitive action (a fine in each case) in eight of the nineteen. Seven of those eight, in turn,
related to violations of a fairly hard-edged FCC rule requiring broadcasters to give political
candidates an opportunity to respond to editorials opposing them or endorsing a competing
candidate. The eighth related to a violation of the personal attack rule. See The Handling of Public
Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 709, 710 n.17 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r,
dissenting), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
393. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
394. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give
the Commission the power of censorship .... and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated
or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech .... ).
395. Some forms of FCC regulation remain situationally sensitive to this day. See CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973) ("[Tlhe difficulty and delicacy of administering
the Communications Act . . . call[] for flexibility and the capacity to adjust and readjust the
regulatory mechanism .... "); supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
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ultimately moved to an approach giving it much less discretion in indi-
vidual, noncomparative licensing decisions 96
The problem of selecting among competing would-be applicants saw
a similar evolution. The Commission began with a discretionary, con-
tent-sensitive process. 397 A number of events, however, including allega-
tions that Commissioners had solicited and received bribes in licensing
proceedings, contributed to the demise of that approach.398 The agency
then shifted to the more nearly rule-bound approach of the 1965 Policy
Statement, 399 notwithstanding dissenters' protests that "the significance
to be given in each decision to each... criterion must ... necessarily be
considered in context with the other facts of the individual cases." 4°
The history of the FCC comparative hearing process ever since has been
one of attempts to move still further from standards to rules.4 1 A large
part of the silliness of the current process has resulted from that attempt
to capture the "public interest" determination in hard-edged rules. The
Commission has explained that in its continuing efforts to reform the
comparative hearing process it seeks further to minimize "subjective and
imprecise" criteria, in favor of "swifter, more certain choices." 2
The Commission's approach to license renewal reinforces the same
theme. The Commission has sought to reduce uncertainty by more
nearly guaranteeing renewal for incumbent licensees. In connection with
uncontested renewal applications, it went from a purely subjective "pub-
lic interest" determination, to one informed by the applicant's compli-
ance with quantitative, but informal "processing guidelines," to a rule
under which all applications are granted virtually automatically." 3
Once again, the nonprivileged approach of ad hoe, informal, situationally
sensitive standards yielded, over time, in favor of an approach more
nearly consonant with the larger legal regime.
396. See Weinberg, supra note 40, at 651-55.
397. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
399. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965); see supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
400. 1 F.C.C.2d at 401 (Hyde, Comm'r, dissenting); see also id. at 404 (Bartley, Comm'r,
dissenting) ("There are so many varying circumstances in each case that a factor in one may be more
important than the same factor in another."). Commissioner Hyde complained:
The proposed fiat as to the weight which will be given to the various criteria-without
sound predication of accepted data and when considered only in a vacuum and in the
abstract-must necessarily result in... unfairness to some applicants and in the fashioning
of an unnecessary straitjacket for the Commission in its decisional process. How can we
decide in advance and in a vacuum that a specific broadcaster with a satisfactory record in
one community will be less likely to serve the broadcasting needs of a second community
than a specific long-time resident of that second community who doesn't have broadcast
experience? How can we make this decision without knowing more about each applicant?
Id. at 402.
401. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
402. Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 F.C.C.R.
2664, 2664 (1992); see supra text accompanying note 87.
403. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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This point is an important one; broadcast regulation has been unable
to survive as an inviolate, situationally sensitive island in a rule-bound
legal sea. Some of the reasons for the shift, though, have only attenuated
links to privileged-position ideology. At least when it comes to renewal,
for example, the Commission's actions can be traced to the facts that
broadcast licenses are worth large sums of money, and licensees invest
large sums in their stations. Both Congress and the Commission have
tended to respond favorably to the urgings of industry members that
renewal be made more nearly certain in order to encourage and protect
those investments. 40 4 The Commission's partial shift from standards to
rules thus reflects both the ideological pressures of a dominant legal cul-
ture elevating rule-bound decisionmaking as a procedural model, and the
practical need to adopt predictable procedures so as more reliably to fos-
ter and protect agency clients." 5
A final way in which FCC regulation can be said to incorporate
elements of the preferred position relates to the role of licensees in the
broadcast system. The Supreme Court in CBS v. Democratic National
Committee 406 moved significantly away from the philosophy of Red Lion
to a more individualistic view of broadcast regulation, reinforcing the
public-private distinction in broadcast law. CBS involved an attack on
broadcasters' policies of refusing to run paid political advocacy advertise-
ments. 0 7 According to plaintiffs," such policies disserved the "public
interest" by narrowing the spectrum of public debate, and thus violated
the Communications Act." 9 Moreover, the government's failure to
insist that broadcasters run such advertisements undermined the market-
404. See, e.g., Formulation of Policy & Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 4
F.C.C.R. 6363, 6365 (1989) (proposing to grant all incumbents a presumption of entitlement to
renewal expectancy, and thus to renewal, upon compliance with FCC rules requiring each licensee to
maintain certain files for public inspection); Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings
Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 425 (1970) (providing, in response to S.
2004, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. (1969), that a licensee that has provided "substantial service to the
public" is entitled to renewal without regard to competing applicants' qualifications), vacated sub
nom. Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
405. These two sets of pressures, on the other hand, may not be wholly unrelated; Kennedy's
insight is that such procedural and substantive concerns can be linked. See Kennedy, supra note
310.
406. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
407. Political advocacy advertisements seek to promote a position on a political issue or issues,
but do not relate to races for elective office. Because they do not relate to races for elective office,
broadcasters are under no obligation to carry them; they do not fall within 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7),
which requires broadcasters to carry advertisements by candidates for federal elective office on
behalf of their candidacies. See generally id.; CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding an FCC
ruling that the three major networks violated 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) by refusing to provide time for a
documentary on the record of presidential candidate Jimmy Carter).
408. Plaintiffs included an antiwar group called Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace,
which had been rebuffed in its attempt to buy radio air time to espouse its views, and the Democratic
National Committee, which anticipated similar difficulty in buying time. CBS, 412 U.S. at 97-99.
409. Id. at 98-101.
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place of ideas, and thus violated the First Amendment. 10 The Supreme
Court rejected both claims.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in CBS is most notable for its view of
the function of licensees in the broadcast system. Gone is the idea that
broadcasters are mere "fiduciaries" for the community, vessels of a larger
will; instead, a plurality of the Court emphasized that licensees were to
play, to the extent "consistent with necessary regulation, a traditional
journalistic role. '41  Broadcasters were to be treated, to the extent possi-
ble, like ordinary First Amendment speakers, "journalistic 'free
agent[s]' "; that the government was simultaneously "an 'overseer' and
ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest" called for a "delicate
balancing" act.412 Far from being mere altruistic voices of a larger com-
munity, broadcasters were individualistic, autonomous speakers.41 The
plurality, moreover, rejected the claim that the government's failure to
insist that broadcasters run advocacy advertisements amounted to "state
action" implicating the First Amendment at all. Broadcasters were pri-
vate entities, they insisted; the government had no responsibility for their
policies.414
It is thus an oversimplification to view our system of broadcast regu-
lation as an unsullied and pure embodiment of nonprivileged thought.
This point, on the other hand, should not be overplayed. FCC regulation
by "raised eyebrow" is powerful. For the Commission even on rare occa-
sions to condition its renewal of valuable licenses on content acceptability
goes a long way towards ensuring that broadcasters will internalize the
Commission's wishes in other cases. That our system of broadcast regu-
lation gives the government the authority to regulate content (even if the
government usually refrains from exercising that authority) unmistaka-
bly demonstrates the system's affinity with the nonprivileged position.
The contrary shifts I have described in broadcast law amount to the con-
struction of some privileged-position walls on an essentially nonprivi-
leged foundation.
410. Id. Plaintiffs did not state their second argument in the clearest of terms. As Justice
Brennan recapitulated the argument, though, "the public nature of the airwaves, the governmentally
created preferred status of broadcasters, the extensive Government regulation of broadcast
programming, and the specific governmental approval of the challenged policy" led him to conclude
that the government had "'so far insinuated itself into a position' of participation in this policy" as
to subject the policy to First Amendment constraints. Id. at 180-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). He then concluded that the ban violated the First Amendment's guarantee of
full and free discussion in the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 196.
411. Id. at 116. The opinion repeatedly uses language referring to broadcasters' "public
trustee" role, but the Chief Justice appears to mean something different by those words than the
vision embraced by Red Lion. In the context of CBS, a "public trustee" is simply a First
Amendment speaker who happens to be subject to the fairness doctrine.
412. Id. at 117.
413. See Blasi, supra note 37, at 613-14.
414. See CBS, 412 U.S. at 117-21; see also id. at 148, 154 (Douglas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that Red Lion was wrongly decided).
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C. A House Divided
With this understanding of speech law, it is useful to revisit the criti-
cisms of free-speech philosophy in Part II of this Article. The reality of
speech is that economic inequality distorts the marketplace of ideas; cog-
nitive structure undermines it; power relationships pervert it. In Part II,
I described it as surprising that ordinary freedom-of-speech thinking
represses those arguments.415 With the background I have set out,
though, repression begins to seem quite predictable and unexceptional; it
is a simple reflection of the privileged-position assumption that the privi-
leged arguments accurately describe the world outside of exceptional
cases.
I explained earlier that while both privileged and nonprivileged atti-
tudes are present in the law, it is the privileged position that shapes our
thinking about the law, and about the world upon which the law acts.
We tend to downplay the nonprivileged description of reality, and to
treat nonprivileged thinking as applicable only within exceptional,
sharply bounded spheres. In part, we accept the privileged vision
because we doubt that we could build a workable legal system that takes
into account the nonprivileged version of reality. We respond by ignor-
ing the nonprivileged realities altogether.
We ignore the nonprivileged arguments about speech because they
threaten the theoretical integrity of First Amendment philosophy, and
we are afraid to tear that system down. We see no way to incorporate
our concerns about the prevailing model into a workable legal struc-
ture.41 6 Rather than recognizing the contradictions (while feeling inca-
pable of doing anything about them), we ignore them. We first conclude
that the marketplace model is preferable to a regime in which the govern-
ment is wholly free to suppress speech (as if those were the only two
choices), and then make law as if the model were unflawed. 41 7
At the same time, though, we believe in the nonprivileged concerns;
we find them real and legitimate. We have built a system of broadcast
regulation embodying them. That system adopts the procedural modes
and the substantive values associated with that unprivileged side of our
law. We are staggered when asked to explain that nonprivileged system
of regulation in terms that make sense in a privileged-position world.
That, then, is the explanation that this discussion provides; every-
thing seems very neat. There remains a mystery, though: why does the
explanation work so well? Put another way, why has this area of law
415. See supra notes 294-300 and accompanying text.
416. Robert Post thus argues that, in constructing First Amendment law, we cannot take into
account the extent to which public discourse is determined by economic and social factors, because
treating citizens as less than fully autonomous in this respect is "deeply incompatible with the very
premise of democratic self-government." Post, supra note 179, at 1130.
417. See supra note 295.
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evolved in such a starkly dichotomized form? In private-law areas such
as torts and contracts, we have managed to incorporate nonprivileged
concerns into the law without needing to create two wholly separate bod-
ies of law, one privileged and one nonprivileged. There are some who
argue that all modern law is incoherent because privileged and nonprivi-
leged concerns are contradictory and cannot meaningfully coexist in the
same legal space.418 I think, though, that even a vigorous proponent of
that view would have to concede that contract and tort law are paragons
of oneness and peace when compared with the open warfare between
conventional free-speech philosophy and broadcast regulation. We have
two starkly different-indeed, contradictory-bodies of law in ordinary
free speech doctrine and broadcast regulation. Why have we not found
even a muddled and incoherent middle ground?
I can think of two answers to this question.419 The first looks to
history.420 Nonprivileged regulation of broadcasting was already in
place by the time we had fully adopted the privileged position for regula-
tion of speech generally.42 1 As we developed that First Amendment phi-
losophy, it was by no means obvious that the new broadcast
entertainment should be subject to the same sort of analysis as were older
forms of speech.422 Each area of regulation developed its own momen-
tum, and each was able to rest on its historical credentials. Some of the
momentum of the nonprivileged model may have derived from the "nat-
ural tendency to positive government of an administrative agency";
423
some, perhaps, from fear of the unique power, pervasiveness and influ-
ence of the electronic media.424 The electronic media, after all, help
418. See, eg., Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1774-78.
419. The question, as I pose it, is a descriptive one: what historical or structural factors have led
us to our current dual system? In Part IV, I discuss whether a dual system of regulations is desirable
from a policy standpoint.
420. See generally BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 17-26.
421. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
422. The Supreme Court did not hold that motion pictures, for example, were subject to First
Amendment protection until 1952. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952);
cf United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (indicating, in dictum, that
"moving pictures . .. are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First
Amendment"). Indeed, it is questionable whether movies to this day receive the same degree of
protection as do books; consider, for example, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)
(upholding prior screening of movies by censors, subject to certain safeguards).
423. SCHMIDT, supra note 10, at 119-20; see also Mayton, supra note 8, at 739-47 (describing
the FCC's development as reflecting an administrative tendency to "aggrandize power"). As Glen
Robinson put it, "Regulation is, or quickly becomes, a life-style of the regulatory bureaucrat."
Robinson, supra note 76, at 192 n.55.
424. See Lee C. Bollinger, Elitism, the Masses and the Idea of Self-Government: Ambivalence
About the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 99, 103-04 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1980) (observing that "no other technology of
communication has raised more concerns over the problem of manipulation than the electronic
media"); see also SCHMIDT, supra note 10, at 120 ("Television... is the focus of late twentieth-
century anxieties about the adequacy of an eighteenth-century First Amendment to govern the
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define who we are as a society in a way that nothing else does. Once
ensconced as an "exception" to ordinary First Amendment law,425 the
broadcast regulatory system could live on without interference.
A second way of looking at this question, though, suggests that
speech law is more glaringly schizoid than tort or contract law because
the basic nature of speech law leaves less room for accommodation
between the two visions. That speech law is painted in primary colors
seems incontestable. Individualist free-speech philosophy does not
merely treat rules as appropriate or preferable; it treats them as indispen-
sable. Government intrusions on autonomy are not a necessary evil; they
are unconstitutional. In contrast, say, to contract law, oriented to pro-
moting economic exchange, individualist free speech philosophy has the
primary and explicit goal of protecting the private citizen from public
tyranny. As a result, the public-private distinction is raised to a level of
sacred inviolability, to a degree little seen elsewhere. All of this means
that the privileged position, in speech law, has no room for compromise,
no leeway in which, even in an incoherent or muddled manner, one could
try to incorporate opposing positions. The only way that nonprivileged
positions can find legal recognition is in a full-blown world of their own.
This raises the question, though, why speech law should have these
characteristics and goals. Scholars taking a more nearly altruistic
approach might wonder why American constitutional law has treated the
problem of governmental (as opposed to private) power as speech law's
crucial organizing principle. They might wonder why we have erected
the public-private dichotomy as the distinction around which all else in
speech law revolves.
The ultimate answer may lie in the privileged position's roots in
mainstream liberal political theory.426 The classic problem to which that
political philosophy addresses itself is the dilemma of freedom and secur-
ity: how can we achieve political order without risking governmental
tyranny?427 The philosophy is thus fundamentally a response to the
problem of political despotism. Speech plays a central role; free speech is
tied to self-determination and the avoidance of governmental tyranny in
a way that freedom from state control in the making of contracts, say, is
relationship between government and the media, not only because of its technical novelty, but also
because its social force is vastly greater than that of any other communications medium in history.").
425. Other doctrinal "exceptions"-difficult to square with First Amendment philosophy on
close analysis, and in consequence not subjected to such analysis-include copyright, see Jessica
Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 204-06 (1992)
(arguing that copyright "received wisdom" conceals the damage that expansive copyright protection
does to First Amendment values), and labor picketing, see Schneider, supra note 296, at 1469
(arguing that courts have removed picketing from First Amendment protection through a series of
rationalizations designed to protect business property interests).
426. See supra note 346.
427. See UNGER, supra note 310, at 64-67 (describing order and freedom as the fundamental
problems of politics).
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not.428 The result is that when we start talking about speech, privileged-
position thinking assumes its most severe form. Within the four corners
of the individualist model, government can to some extent impose limited
restrictions on contracting without the world coming to an end; we can
tolerate a certain amount of compromise (or incoherence). We cannot,
though, as easily countenance a challenge to the individualist model's
vision of the autonomy of speakers in the private sphere and governmen-
tal restriction of that autonomy. That challenge strikes at the heart of
the liberal political state.
IV
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Our system of broadcast regulation works badly. The overlay of a
rule-bound decisional calculus on the situationally sensitive, public-inter-
est licensing determination has yielded incoherence. Indeed, the broad-
cast regulatory system can be described as "the worst of both worlds."429
The regulatory structure displays some of the least attractive characteris-
tics of standard-driven systems: the Commission's indecency law, for
example, is characterized by vagueness and arbitrariness.4 a° It displays
some of the least attractive characteristics of rule-bound systems: would-
be licensees file applications featuring "'strange and unnatural' business
arrangements" designed to fit within the Commission's rules.431
428. A would-be tyrant could, of course, seek to amass power through restrictions on private
contracts. See generally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 83
(1980) ("A free society cannot exist unless government is prohibited from confiscating private
property.... As Hamilton stated, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will."). I think, though, that the relationship of speech to the political realm is more direct.
429. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 477 (1991). The
authors do not fully endorse that language; they present it as "hypothetical commentary."
430. The Commission has emphasized that indecency cannot be evaluated except with an eye to
"the host of variables that ordinarily comprise [a work's] context." Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3
F.C.C.R. 930, 932 (1987), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This is a recipe for both vagueness and arbitrariness, since the
agency has not given clear signals explaining which elements of context are relevant to prove what.
In Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 7688 (1990), for example, the Commission imposed a
forfeiture on a radio station for playing the feminist song "Penis Envy" by the folk group Uncle
Bonsai. The singers, in clear soprano voices, begin with the words "If I had a penis, I'd wear it
outside / In cafes and car lots, with pomp and with pride," and conclude, "If I had a penis, I'd still
be a girl / But I'd make much more money and conquer the world." Id. at 7689-90.
Was the fact that the song was played on the crude and puerile Neil Rogers Show part of the
"context" that led to liability? Or is someone at the Commission particularly sensitive about songs
referring to penises? The letter opinion provides no useful answer. Cf. Suzanna Andrews, She's
Bare. He's Covered. Is There a Problem?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, § 2, at 13 (observing that full
frontal female nudity is common in movies while a film with a visible penis draws a near-automatic
NC-17 rating).
431. Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 57 (1992). Among
the disadvantages of rules is that they encourage "walking the line," that is, tailoring one's conduct
in order to take advantage of the imperfect fit, to fall within the letter but not the spirit of the law.
See Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1695-96. The rules may then become more complex as courts
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Is there a better way? The nonprivileged model, in general, seems to
work badly in the speech context. We are not wholly comfortable with
substituting public authority for private power over scarce speech
resources, because as a practical matter that means giving government
officials supervisory control over a segment of public debate. We have
stepped back from giving government officials the sort of hidden censo-
rial power that they can gain through the untrammelled use of situation-
ally-sensitive standards in awarding and renewing "licenses" to speak.
We are unwilling to abandon some form of value subjectivity as the foun-
dation stone of our free-speech thinking. Rather, for many of us, the
crucial point of free speech law is that we cannot, for purposes of sup-
pressing speech, authoritatively declare some values "right" and others
wrong. Even slavery and genocide must be treated as legitimate contend-
ers in the marketplace of ideas. Our adherence to that value subjectivity,
however, has made our commitment to the "public interest" as the
touchstone of broadcast regulation increasingly incoherent.
To the extent that we are worried about self-interested government
control of public debate-and we should be-the nonprivileged model's
emphasis on the dangers posed by great concentrations of private media
power has obvious flaws. In some circumstances, at least, the largest,
most powerful private media organs are the ones best able to resist coer-
cive state power. Drawing on the experience of the military-bureaucratic
takeover of the Japanese press before World War II, Gregory Kasza con-
cluded that "liberal resistance to state encroachment," where democracy
is threatened by a government bent on radical mobilization, is best served
by the "civil tyranny" of a few dominant, private speakers.432 Smaller
private speakers are less effective in resisting such governmental attack;
quasi-public speakers are less effective still.43 3 A regulatory approach
aimed at fostering small and medium-sized media outlets while reining in
develop exceptions in order to achieve the purposes of the drafters. They may be perceived as unfair,
riddled with loopholes for the benefit of the legally sophisticated; and they may, as a result, attract
less willing compliance. See KELMAN, supra note 311, at 44-45. In part for that reason, scholars
have argued that the power of rules to minimize uncertainty and arbitrariness is overstated. As
courts grapple with the task of applying an apparently simple and straightforward rule in a host of
differing fact-situations, they have to promulgate new sub-rules to handle problematic variations
(and, indeed, may have to choose among a variety of different potentially applicable rules). The
law's former simplicity is lost, so that people can no longer easily predict legal results. To the extent
that the courts seek to maximize predictability and minimize complexity and situationally sensitive
discretion, the new sub-rules necessarily turn on what, at least some of the time, are meaningless
factual distinctions, and thus yield arbitrary results. The fact that the decisionmaker applying these
rules has only limited discretion and cannot import a different sort of arbitrariness into the process is
of little consolation. See id. at 46-47.
The FCC's attempts to lay down rules to govern initial comparative broadcast hearings provide
a perfect illustration of all of this.
432. GREGORY J. KASZA, THE STATE AND THE MASS MEDIA IN JAPAN, 1918-1945, at 268
(1988); see generally id. at 266-73.
433. See id. at 268-70.
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huge concentrations of private media power, or establishing a strong
quasi-public media voice in opposition to private Big Media, thus, is ill-
suited to the creation of a media system that can resist state violation.
Even without regard to the dangers of government control, infor-
mal, situationally sensitive speech regulation seems problematic. Such
regulation will likely privilege those already dominant in society, and
thus suppress dissent. An informal broadcast regulation system, marked
by an abhorrence of formal rules and formal processes and a near-total
reliance on situationally sensitive standards, may assure that the greatest
influence in the broadcast licensing process is exercised by the economi-
cally, politically, and socially dominant.434 Without a system of hard-
edged rules, the regulatory body itself may be more susceptible to exter-
nal political pressures.435 Without a structure of formal rights, would-be
dissenters may have no entree into the regulatory process and may be
unable to secure licenses to speak.436
Moreover, any vision of an active governmental role in supervising
the speech marketplace founders on the significant likelihood that admin-
istrative planning will be incompetent, misguided, arbitrary, or polit-
ical.437 FCC decisions have repeatedly revealed themselves in hindsight
434. Once again, Japan provides a useful example. The effect of that country's informal
broadcast regulatory system "has been to place media power squarely within the establishment
consensus of the socially and politically acceptable, and to diffuse it through shared authority within
... power-structure groups." Weinberg, supra note 40, at 692.
435. See id. at 689-91 (describing susceptibility of Japanese regulatory scheme to political
pressures); see also Mayton, supra note 8, at 760-61 (describing susceptibility of FCC to political
pressures).
436. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 40, at 661-92 (arguing that the restrictive Japanese licensing
process "confine[s] media power almost completely within the structure of the socially acceptable
and politically influential mainstream"). My point here is simply that informal, situationally-
sensitive speech regulation is highly problematic. Is it more problematic (that is, more nearly
controlled by the economically, politically, and socially dominant) than is marketplace regulation?
In order to answer this question, one must consider whether control by the economically, politically,
and socially dominant is likely to be more pervasive in the "captured" government agency or in the
private sphere. Public choice theory suggests that such control will often be more pervasive in the
agency context; interest groups seek statutes granting regulatory authority to agencies precisely
because they think (or hope) that they will fare better under that regime than in the unregulated
marketplace. See generally Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1982).
437. Administrative allocation of broadcast rights is hampered by "the agency's lack of
knowledge, inflexibility, and exposure to political pressure," all factors of less concern in connection
with market allocation. Coase, supra note 16, at 18; see also Mayton, supra note 8, at 761-62. See
generally Jonathan Weinberg, Limiting Access to the Broadcast Marketplace, 44 BULL. INST.
JOURNALISM & COMM. STUD. 2 (1991) (University of Tokyo). This is not to deny that
administrative decisionmaking can be economically superior in certain contexts. The FCC erred, for
example, in leaving technical standards for AM stereo to the market rather than imposing them
administratively. See AM Stereophonic Broadcasting, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 516 (1988)
(perpetuating the error). The Commission has not made the same mistake in connection with high-
definition TV. See, eg., Advanced Television Systems, 68 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 167 (1990).
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as bad policy.4 38 FCC "anti-siphoning" rules, for example, were
designed to protect broadcasting from the perceived threat presented by
early cable television but ended up stifling cable's development for no
good reason.439 The FCC's comparative hearing process, intended to
allow everyone a fair chance to secure a broadcast license on a level play-
ing field,' 4 has in fact effectively excluded those without economic
means. Only the wealthy can afford to pay large legal fees for the mere
opportunity to compete for a license, in an essentially random process,
without any assurance of success." 1 FCC decisionmaking has at times
been overtly political." 2 None of this is encouraging to the proponents
of greater involvement by the organs of popular government.
At the same time, we cannot simply conform our law to the privi-
leged pole and ignore nonprivileged concerns. Those concerns are both
legitimate and real. Our freedom-of-speech philosophy rests on assump-
tions about the functioning of the marketplace of ideas that are, ulti-
mately, unsupportable. Their failure means more than that marketplace
theory is intellectually unsatisfying. A speech regulatory system based
wholly on classic free-speech philosophy underestimates the degree to
which private institutional and economic power can skew the reasoning
processes of the community. It underestimates the dangers posed by
concentrations of private media power. It ignores the benefits potentially
available from such public institutions as PBS or the BBC, and it facili-
tates and disregards socially dominant groups' influence over the public
agenda and their ascendancy in public debate.
Can we mediate the two models, taking the best aspects of each?" 3
Some scholars have argued that it is impossible to bring together the
privileged and nonprivileged approaches in that manner. The two
438. See Henry Geller, Communications Law-A Half Century Later, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 73,
73-78 (1984) (listing FCC failures).
439. The rules prohibited cable systems from carrying certain movies and sports programming
in order to ensure that attractive programming was not "siphoned" away from broadcast TV. See
Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (striking down the rules), cert. denied, 434 U.S, 829
(1977). See generally Weinberg, supra note 40, at 696-700 (describing the FCC's "anti-siphoning"
rules as undercutting the FCC's earlier vision for cable).
440. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945) (holding that the FCC must
schedule mutually exclusive broadcast applications for a single comparative hearing, so as to give
each applicant the full benefit of the "hearing... which Congress chose to give him").
441. See Robinson, supra note 76, at 242-43 (noting that the difficulties in raising the capital
necessary to engage in the uncertain venture of applying and competing for a license effectively
excludes the poor from the licensing system).
442. See Weinberg, supra note 40, at 690; supra note 71 and accompanying text. Thomas
Hazlett has characterized the political nature of our broadcast regulatory structure as "inherent." It
rests, he states, on an FCC-established "off-budget auction, in which the rents associated with
licensure are appropriated to competitive constituencies as merited by the political pressure they
effect." Hazlett, supra note 8, at 169.
443. For an eloquent-if controversial-appeal that we find that middle path, see Fiss, supra
note 151, at 1415-21. But see Powe, supra note 181, at 180-86 (attacking Fiss); Hutchinson, supra
note 294, at 19-23 (same).
1196 [Vol. 8 1:1101
BROADCASTING AND SPEECH
approaches, they say, are not made up of" 'competing concerns' [to be]
artfully balanced until a wise equilibrium is reached"; rather, they are
wholly contradictory, in fundamental, "irreducible, irremediable, irre-
solvable conflict."'  This is a difficult issue: it is hard to think clearly
about contradiction." Without regard to the accuracy of broad state-
ments about contradiction elsewhere in the law, though, the two
approaches do seem irreconcilable in the area of speech regulation.
How, for example, shall we define the scope of permissible govern-
ment intervention in the speech marketplace? Some government involve-
ment (beyond merely maintaining the property-rights system) seems
appropriate under any analysis. Almost all of us agree, for example, that
the government should enforce the antitrust laws in media markets:
anticompetitive behavior and private concentrations of media power can
injure the media marketplace. 44 6 Monopoly-controlled markets, brought
about through antitrust violations, injure that "widest possible dissemi-
nation of information from diverse and antagonistic sources [that] is
essential to ... a free society."" 7
Yet having accepted the conclusion that some government restric-
tions on speech are legitimate, we are faced with the problem of identify-
ing appropriate restrictions. The privileged position responds to that
concern by deeming freedom the norm, and carving out a sharply
defined, exceptional zone in which the government is allowed to inter-
vene because the market is deemed no longer "free." That approach is
essential to the privileged position; without sharp lines to constrain gov-
ernmental power, we lose the protection for individual autonomy that is
the keystone of rule-bounded legality. The central and contradictory
insight of the nonprivileged position, however, is that the failures of the
marketplace of ideas are not narrowly confined, but are pervasive. They
exist in greater or lesser degree throughout the system. No sharp lines
between the realm of freedom and the realm of duress can be drawn; no
444. KELMAN, supra note 311, at 3; see also Kennedy, supra note 310, at 1774-78.
445. See J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1674-75 (1990) (book review) ("A
recurring problem in theoretical argument is the confusion of conceptual opposition with logical
contradiction."); cf F. ScoTT FrrZGERALD, The Crack-up, in THE CRACK-UP 69 (Edmund Wilson
ed., 1945) ("ITihe test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind
at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.").
446. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795-96, 800 n.18
(1978) (stating that the FCC can and should apply antitrust considerations in regulating the
electronic media). The desire for competitive markets, on the other hand, is not the only goal of our
regulatory scheme. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91-95 (1953) (holding that
the public interest may require the FCC to deny a common-carrier authorization even though
granting it would increase competition); see also Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1804 (1988) (exempting joint newspaper operating arrangements from antitrust scrutiny); National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 803-14 (affirming the Commission's decision not to
order sweeping divestiture of newspaper-broadcast combinations).
447. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (rejecting First Amendment
challenge to enforcement of the Sherman Act against the Associated Press).
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easily applied, black-letter rules can identify the appropriate scope of
government intervention; no reasoned justification can be given for draw-
ing the lines in one place rather than another." I can imagine no way to
integrate these two opposing positions.
Moreover, any meaningful attempt to remedy the flaws of the indi-
vidualistic approach requires a substantive, rather than a process-ori-
ented, set of goals. How can we set about to correct the flaws of the
marketplace? How will we know a properly working marketplace when
we see one? It obviously does no good to declare that we will know a
properly working marketplace of ideas because it will lead citizens to
adopt "correct" views. That approach would not mediate the two mod-
els, but rather would wholly reject traditional First Amendment think-
ing. Yet in the absence of such a test, how are we to know whether the
success of some views and the failure of others in the marketplace are the
result of inherent merit or of market flaws?" 9 At the very least, we
would have to develop some vision of what community debate and dis-
cussion ideally ought to look like.450 Yet such a vision is inevitably sub-
stantive. It is impossible to identify "balanced" debate except with
reference to a substantive baseline.451
Indeed, it is central to the nonprivileged vision that it rejects the
public-private distinction; that it sees the state as responsible for the con-
sequences of "private" speech. Yet once we make that leap, all of our
choices regarding the circumstances under which we will allow, say,
racial hate speech, become political ones; we cannot decide them on the
basis of neutral principles. Rather, we must look to our substantive
448. It is but a short step from classical antitrust remedies to current FCC restrictions on the
nature and number of other media outlets that a broadcaster may own. It is but a short step from
there to the position that we should limit political campaign spending in order to "remedy the
systematic ways in which inequalities of wealth distort the political process." Paul Brest, Further
Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1627 (1988); see
also J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005
(1976). The Supreme Court has rejected that last stride. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1976) (striking down limits on political campaign expenditures). Yet each of these government
actions directly restricts the autonomy of the speakers who are its target, in the interest of increasing
freedom in the rest of the marketplace. Can we justify the particular line at which we stop opposing
governmental to private power?
449. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 283 (1988). The problem is reminiscent of the difficulty, in representation-
reinforcement theory, of distinguishing between groups that are unfairly treated in the political
process and those that, for good and legitimate reasons, simply lose their legislative battles. "[A]
judge must have some substantive vision of what results the process should have yielded. Otherwise
he has no way to know that the process was unfair." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products
Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1982).
450. See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1067-74 (1985) (arguing against the
constitutionality of active campaign finance law on the grounds that any justification for such laws
requires an arbitrary, unworkable image of the "ideally operating political system").
451. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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image of what constitutes the good society. This is impossible so long as
we hold on to ordinary free-speech philosophy's insistence that it makes
no substantive choices-that it defines no authoritative truth and treats
all values and ideas as equally legitimate.452 Once again, there appears to
be no common ground on which the two models can meet and negotiate.
Lee Bollinger once suggested that we have in fact mediated our
"opposing constitutional traditions regarding the press" simply by plac-
ing them side by side-by allowing one to govern print, and the other
broadcast.453 Instead of a unified scheme of regulation, we have a system
where "access"-based regulation of broadcasting is coupled with a hands-
off approach to print. This allows our system to "capture[] the benefits
of access regulation yet ... minimize[] its potential excesses. ' 414
In the end, I think, Bollinger's attempted solution is insufficient.455
By attempting to take both privileged and nonprivileged concerns into
account, our speech law has become both unstable and incoherent. As I
have shown, the contradiction between the two poles has made our
broadcast law incoherent even when viewed in isolation. We will not
accept a wholly nonprivileged broadcast scheme, but we cannot combine
privileged and nonprivileged elements in a broadcast regulatory system
in a way that makes any sense.456 Nor, in practice, do the strengths and
weaknesses of the two systems in fact complement each other. All we
have is a mess.
Bollinger's approach, though, raises a more general question: can
we build second-best solutions for speech regulation by creating nonpriv-
ileged enclaves within a larger privileged-position world? Ultimately, I
believe, such solutions are unsatisfactory in important ways. An ideal
nonprivileged approach would seek to disconnect speech from the pres-
sures of the private sphere, so that the economic resources of the speaker
or of potential individual listeners would play no role in the speech's
success. Establishing a quasi-governmental institution to disseminate
speech on the basis of its own view of the public interest might point in
that direction; so might distributing speech through some publicly-sup-
452. For an illustration of the difficulty, see Sunstein, supra note 8, at 277, 290 (simultaneously
attacking the concept of viewpoint neutrality as unacceptably contingent on "existing distributions
of resources and opportunities as the baseline for decision" and arguing that constitutionally
appropriate speech regulation must be viewpoint-neutral).
453. Bollinger, supra note 25, at 1.
454. Id. at 2.
455. See Lili Levi, Challenging the Autonomous Press, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 665, 685-90 (1993)
(book review).
456. The structure of the print marketplace is nothing to write home about either. Cf Paul
Bator, The First Amendment Applied to Broadcasting: A Few Misgivings, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 75, 75 (1987) (asking the questions "'Do I like the content of that regime?' Should that
regime be extended to another industry?" in response to "the proposal.., that the First Amendment




ported mechanism available to all. The first of these approaches looks
like the public broadcasting system; the second like some sort of com-
mon-carrier scheme. I will discuss each of them briefly.
The public broadcasting system is premised on the conviction that
an "alternative telecommunications service[]," freed from the strictures
of the economic marketplace, can provide "an expression of diversity and
excellence" not available from commercially motivated speakers.4" 7 Tel-
evision freed from the constraints of the marketplace, we imagined in
establishing the system, could "arouse our dreams, satisfy our hunger for
beauty, take us on journeys, enable us to participate in events, present
great drama and music, explore the sea and the sky and the woods and
the hills." It was to be "our Lyceum, our Chautauqua, our Minsky's,
and our Camelot."4 8
The public broadcasting concept relies to significant extent on the
nonprivileged model. Under an individualist approach, one might legiti-
mately ask whether the fact that the commercial marketplace fails to pro-
vide certain programming does not itself demonstrate that that
programming is not worth providing. Public broadcasting takes the
opposite approach, revealing a more paternalistic, value-objective, com-
munitarian bent. In its purest form, it rests on the position of Lord
Reith, first Director-General of the BBC, that it is misguided to seek to
satisfy the desires of self-contained, atomistic consumers: "few [members
of the listening public] know what they want, and very few what they
need." '459 Broadcasting can be used as an instrument of community: "to
inculcate citizenship, to pay proper attention to public affairs, . . . to
widen as far as possible the range of debate over the whole field of human
interest" and "to raise standards., 460
As a solution to our dilemma, though, public broadcasting is prob-
lematic. How should public broadcasters seek to fulfill their responsibil-
ity to the "public?" Commissioner Benjamin Hooks once characterized
public broadcasting, as practiced by New York City's WNET, as "an
electronic Harvard liberal arts course" focusing solely on "cultured,
457. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1772, 1801 (stating that only noncommercial stations can engage in
widespread production and distribution of educational and cultural programs without mass audience
appeal).
458. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUC. TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR
ACTION 13 (1967) (quoting E.B. White). The Carnegie Commission report was the "intellectual
foundation" for the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which in turn established the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting and our current system of noncommercial TV. BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at
107.
459. R.H. COASE, BRITISH BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY 47 (1950) (quoting Lord
Reith).
460. Id. at 175 (quoting Sir William Haley). To that end, public broadcasting should be run by
those of "the highest quality of character and intellect," unaffected by political or commercial
considerations. Michael Tracey, Japan: Broadcasting in a New Democracy, in THE POLITICS OF
BROADCASTING 264, 265 (Raymond Kuhn ed., 1985) (quoting Sir Ian Jacob).
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white cosmopolites"-"the caucasian intellectual's home entertainment
game."46 He lambasted it as disserving the needs of the poor and minor-
ities. Part of the reason for public television's focus on "British drama,
German music, French cuisine, and Russian Ballet, '462 of course, is that
so-called "noncommercial" broadcasting is intimately tied into the com-
mercial marketplace. It depends for its survival on corporate sponsors
who enjoy being associated with classy programming.463 But merely
loosening the link between public broadcasting and corporate sponsors
would not answer Hooks's complaint. The broader difficulty is that the
publishers of public broadcasting are not themselves the "public."
Rather, they are a professional elite responding to their own values and
institutional agenda. 46 While speech in that enclave is not limited by the
constraints of the economic marketplace, it is hardly "free" in the uto-
pian sense. It is merely subject to a different set of institutional
constraints.
An alternative, nonprivileged enclave for speech might grow out of
new technology. Science fiction writers have imagined a world in which
citizens could produce and electronically disseminate speech without
regard to their fame or resources, to be retrieved by members of the pub-
lic through some sort of index or search mechanism.465 In those visions,
anyone can engage in mass speech. All one has to do is produce a work
and upload it into the network, and the network takes care of transmis-
sion and distribution. Indeed, the beginnings of such systems are in place
now. They range from the tens of thousands of small noncommercial
computer bulletin boards to the huge but arcane Internet.466 Today's
systems fall short of the vision I have described, though, in two principal
ways. First, current systems tend to be limited to small groups of techni-
cally sophisticated users with access to relatively expensive equipment.467
461. Puerto Rican Media Action & Educ. Council, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 1178, 1195, 1199 (1975)
(Hooks, Comm'r, dissenting).
462. Id. at 1199.
463. Over the years, public broadcasting has moved ever further away from the noncommercial
ideal. See, e.g., Commission Policy Concerning the Noncommercial Nature of Educ. Broadcasting
Stations, 97 F.C.C.2d 255 (1984) (stating that donor acknowledgements may include a description of
the donor's product line or service, its location, and its slogan, so long as the slogan merely identifies
but does not promote).
464. Indeed, the courts have stressed that public broadcasters are autonomous, and must not be
constrained, in making editorial and programming decisions, by the views or objections of members
of the public. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1041, 1044 (5th Cir.
1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983).
465. See, e.g., KEVIN O'DONNELL, JR., ORA:CLE (1983).
466. See generally Mitchell Kapor, Building the Open Road: Policies for the National Public
Network 2 (Apr. 29, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
467. While some mass-market commercial networks, such as Sears Prodigy, are designed and
operated for the nontechnical user, I think it is fair to characterize the networks as a whole as
requiring a level of technical sophistication beyond the grasp of the average U.S. citizen-certainly
far beyond the grasp of the average noncomputer user. See id. at 15. While personal computer
prices drop with each passing day, so that today one can buy an entry-level machine for $1000 or
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Second, it can be paralyzingly hard to get information out of the systems.
The index and search mechanisms I airily referred to above have not
been developed. Internet thus resembles "a gigantic library with no card
catalog." 468 Trying to "read" the Usenet, a decentralized conferencing
system running over the Internet, "is like drinking from a firehose., 469
Systems that carry the speech of all users on a common-carriage
basis nonetheless might provide the foundation for a new approach.470
The key to a computer network-based strategy would be that the costs of
transmitting and distributing a communication, whether in print or in
video, would be quite low, and would not rise with the number of persons
receiving the communication. Capacity, further, would be essentially
unlimited. Through such an approach, some imagine, we could move
toward a mass communication system in which it would be easy and
cheap to become an information provider. Many could participate, both
as speakers and as listeners.47
That vision too, though, must be approached with caution. After
all, we already have a pervasive, government-subsidized, common-carrier
distribution system for speech. That system is second-class mail, which
provides a subsidy for the distribution of most newspapers and periodi-
cals.472 Here too, the government has provided a transmission and distri-
bution system for speech, subsidized by the taxpayers, on a common-
carrier basis.4 73 The second-class postal subsidy has contributed greatly
less, that price still isn't chicken feed. Computers have a long way to go before they become as
inexpensive as telephones or televisions.
468. Id. at 5.
469. Tom Maddox, Reports from the Electronic Frontier, Locus, Sept. 1992, at 11 (quoting
Steve Steinberg, editor of Intertek magazine).
470. It would not be the first time we have tried a common-carrier approach to mass
communications. AT&T made the first bid to do so back in 1922, on its WEAF radio station. In an
experiment it called "toll broadcasting," it proposed to "provide no program of its own, but provide
the channels through which anyone with whom it makes a contract can send out their own
programs." ERIK BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN TELEVISION 44
(rev. ed. 1982) (quoting AT&T announcement). The approach was ultimately a blazing success for
AT&T: advertising agencies were glad to buy up its time for programs they sponsored. Id. at 44-48.
AT&T itself later got out of the broadcasting business, selling WEAF for $1,000,000 to the newly
formed National Broadcasting Company, which in turn agreed to lease AT&T long-distance lines to
connect its stations. WEAF was ultimately renamed WNBC. Id. at 52-53.
AT&T's "toll broadcasting" plan hardly could be said to have promoted the communitarian
vision I have described. Its high tariff for broadcast time effectively precluded any noncommercial
uses.
471. See Kapor, supra note 466, at 8-9, 13.
472. Fourth-class (book rate) mail is similarly subsidized. See Robert Posch, Price Censorship is
Real and Growing, COMM. LAW., Fall 1990, at 15, 16-17.
473. The system differs in several crucial respects from the vision I have drawn of the computer
networks. First, even with the subsidy, distribution charges are still substantial, and they rise with
each additional recipient. Next, second-class mail status is available only to publications that
distribute at least half of their circulated copies to paying subscribers or to people who have
specifically requested that the periodical be sent to them. See Elizabeth Gorman, The First
Amendment and the Postal Service's Subscriber Requirement: Constitutional Problems with Denying
Equal Access to the Postal System, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 541 (1987) (citing the U.S. Postal Service's
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to the vibrancy and diversity of America's magazine market. In some
ways, the system works remarkably well. Tens of thousands of periodi-
cals are said to move through the mails, "the little magazines, the special
magazines, the cranky magazines, . . .the serious magazines."474 Yet,
even though all sorts of speech flourishes on the fringes of the magazine
market, it is still the case that there are a few market leaders, in particu-
lar the weekly newsmagazines, exerting huge media power. The speakers
exercising by far the greatest might in this marketplace are wealthy,
mass-market, taste-creating media conglomerates, led by such pillars of
the corporate community as Time Warner.475 These speakers can
expend the greatest resources on production values and on marketing.
Indeed, mass-circulation, second-class mailers that can afford segmenta-
tion or trucking techniques qualifying them for "work-sharing dis-
counts" get a larger subsidy from the postal service. Those techniques
are as a practical matter not available to fringe publishers.476 All is not
joyful anarchy, thus, in the core of the magazine market.
In the computer networks of the future, similarly, all information
providers will not be equal, no matter how user-friendly the network is.
Wealth will play a role in publicizing the availability and merits of docu-
ments or programs. It will play a role in producing speech in an attrac-
tive form.477  The networks, thus, may not provide a nonprivileged
enclave after all. They may simply provide a (kinder, gentler?) version of
the ordinary marketplace.
Where, then, do we go from here? I present in this Article no policy
Domestic Mail Manual). Also, the would-be recipient of information has no way of getting access to
information not specifically addressed to her. A speaker, therefore, cannot simply dispatch her
communication, unaddressed, to the postal system, and without further thought rely on the
distribution network to carry it to the world at large. She must first develop a subscription list, and
limit her mailing within the confines of that list. Still, the conclusions we draw about the operation
of second-class mail service may have some applicability to our thinking about computer networks.
474. POOL, supra note 15, at 150. According to one observer, "[s]ome 37,000 periodicals
regularly move through the U.S. mails." EDWIN DIAMOND, SIGN OFF: THE LAST DAYS OF
TELEVISION 229 (1982). A random sampling might include such periodicals as Jason
Underground's Notes From the Trash Compactor, with a "unique Christian anarchist slant"; Counter
Culture, devoted to "diner appreciation"; Dendron News, devoted to "people who have been through
the psychiatric system (or who are still enmeshed in it) [and] try to find more humanitarian
alternatives"; Corpus Christi Mariner News, "for Merchant Marine folks in the Corpus Christi area";
and The Black Flame, examining "the use of Satanism as a practical philosophy for surviving a cold,
uncaring world." MIKE GUNDERLOY & CARI G. JANICE, THE WORLD OF ZINES: A GUIDE TO THE
INDEPENDENT MAGAZINE REVOLUTION 31, 69, 93, 110, 122 (1992). [Editor's note: A random
sampling of the "far outer shores of the special interest magazine world," POOL, supra note 15, at
150, might also, of course, include the California Law Review.]
475. In 1981, twenty corporations accounted for 50.7% of all U.S. magazine sales. BEN H.
BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 10-14 (1983).
476. Posch, supra note 472, at back page.
477. In this medium as in (almost) all others, a mass audience will not tune in unless production
values are high enough. See Ingber, supra note 182, at 70-71 (finding something "bittersweet funny"
in the attempts of cable public-access programming to compete with the professional presentations of
commercial television). But see THE RAMONES, ROCKET TO RUSSIA (Sire Records 1977).
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solution that will solve all of the problems of the broadcasting system.
Rather, my ultimate argument in this Article is that no such policy solu-
tion can exist. There is nothing we can do in broadcast regulation that
will not leave us grappling with further contradictions and unresolved
issues. In considering how to revise broadcast law, we do badly to look
for sweeping, ideologically pure, universal solutions. The better course
may be to look for second-best solutions.
We must recognize that we want contradictory things. We want
protection against government arbitrariness, bias, and "censorial
power."478 We want protection against government control of (or influ-
ence over) the agenda of public debate. We want to be protected against
government attempts to influence what we think and believe. We want
to choose, ourselves, what we will say and what we will hear. Yet we
want as well a First Amendment theory that reflects the real world, that
recognizes the negative effects of real-life inequality and private economic
power, and doesn't explain them away through unrealistic assumptions.
In choosing what we will say and what we will hear, we want protection,
too, against the distorting effects of private power and private censorship.
We want, perhaps, programming that reflects something more than what
the corporate shills have conditioned us to swallow.
There does not appear to be any way to get all of that. The doc-
trines and procedural forms that will help us towards one set of goals
help us away from the other. As a result, it should not be surprising that
our broadcast regulation law is blazingly inconsistent with the rest of our
First Amendment philosophy. If we recast our broadcast law to elimi-
nate that contradiction, we will ameliorate one set of doctrinal and prac-
tical problems, but we will not "solve" the problems of speech law. We
will only rearrange them.
CONCLUSION
Our broadcast regulatory system centers on the "public interest"
standard of the Communications Act. The FCC, in deciding whom it
will allow to speak using broadcast media, is required to make the
choices that will best serve the "public interest." It is the FCC's job,
ultimately, to ensure that its licensed broadcasters serve the "public
interest." This standard is vague. Notwithstanding the best of inten-
tions, the FCC's application of the standard has been unpredictable and
subjective, and its decisions have incorporated hidden content biases. To
the extent that the Commission has been able to announce hard-edged,
easy-to-apply rules in pursuance of the public interest standard, those
rules have had little to do with individualized attention to the "public
478. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988).
1204 [Vol. 8 1:1101
BROADCASTING AND SPEECH
interest." This is not the agency's fault: the standard, inherently vague
and subjective, cannot be applied as if it were black-letter law.
This system conflicts, starkly and gratuitously, with conventional
free-speech philosophy. Conventional free-speech philosophy rejects the
content regulation that the Commission routinely engages in. It rejects
the broad, subjective, situationally sensitive standards the Commission
seeks to apply in ruling whether it will allow citizens to engage in speech.
It rejects the whole notion that it is the job of government to decide what
speech is and is not in the public interest. The idea of spectrum scarcity
is not enough to reconcile this system with ordinary free-speech philoso-
phy. Even if the unique characteristics of broadcasting justify adminis-
trative allocation of the broadcast spectrum, there is no way within the
four corners of conventional free speech thinking to justify allocating
that spectrum on the basis of a government agency's subjective concep-
tion of a vaguely defined public interest.
Ordinary free-speech philosophy, on the other hand, itself is flawed;
it presents an inaccurate picture of reality. It is crucially based on the
metaphor of the marketplace of ideas. That metaphor in turn relies on
questionable assumptions about individual autonomy in the private
sphere. It assumes that in a society where government enforces com-
mon-law ordering but otherwise plays no active role in regulating speech,
individuals do indeed have meaningful opportunities to speak and con-
vince others of their views. It assumes that people process speech for the
most part on a rational level, and choose to adopt one belief rather than
another as a result of this reasoning process. Neither of those assump-
tions seems well founded. Inequality in economic, social, and political
power in our society leads to marked inequalities in the ability to com-
municate. The institutional mass media do not even the scales. Nor, in
any event, do individuals tend to process new information in a "rational"
manner; our thinking is significantly constrained by our existing mindset.
It seems unlikely that we have a working marketplace of ideas outside of
a narrowly bounded range of socially acceptable ideas and values.
The inconsistency of our broadcast regulatory system with ordinary
free speech thinking, and the inconsistency of ordinary free speech think-
ing with reality, make sense if one imagines ordinary free speech thinking
and broadcast regulatory thinking as reflecting two conflicting
worldviews. The first worldview, more nearly predominant in our legal
culture, links the procedural mode of black-letter rules, individualism, a
belief in overall private autonomy, a sharp public-private distinction,
value subjectivity, and nonpaternalism. The other links the procedural
mode of situationally sensitive standards, altruism, determinism, a belief
in the pervasiveness of constraint, value objectivity (or a belief in the
communal nature of values), and paternalism. These philosophies, each
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incomplete, can be seen as pervasive in our law. Each reflects legitimate
and important impulses.
Conventional free-speech philosophy neatly reflects the former phi-
losophy. It passionately relies on black-letter rules; it reflects individual-
istic ideology, fundamentally rationalist and intentionalist. It is
grounded at its root in a thoroughgoing commitment to value subjectiv-
ity and a rejection of paternalism; it maintains a strong public-private
distinction. Broadcast law, by contrast, more nearly reflects the latter. It
is built around the situationally sensitive standard; it is concerned with
substantive inequality, domination, and constraint. It significantly
rejects individualistic thinking in favor of an approach more in the altru-
istic mold. In important respects, it is not a pure evocation of a single
worldview. It is too significantly influenced by ordinary free speech val-
ues and by the rule-bound mores of the prevailing legal culture. It none-
theless stands as a somewhat muddled island of dissident thinking in the
sea of free-speech philosophy.
The approach of our broadcast regulatory scheme works badly
when it comes to regulating speech. It is insufficient, though, simply to
ignore that approach, and to conform our law to ordinary free-speech
philosophy. Free-speech philosophy systematically underestimates the
degree to which private institutional and economic power can skew the
reasoning processes of the community. It underestimates the dangers
posed by concentrations of private power. The philosophy on which our
broadcast law is based grows out of concerns that are both legitimate and
real.
The two worldviews are not easily reconcilable. There does not
seem to be any perfect solution that would mediate the two approaches,
and take the best aspects of each. Ultimately, we can do no better than a
second-best solution. We have, as a society, legitimate and contradictory
goals in regulating speech. The doctrines that move us toward one set of
goals move us away from the other. This means that recasting our
broadcast regulation to conform to ordinary free-speech philosophy, as
some suggest, will not solve our problems. We want things that no
coherent philosophy can supply.
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